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SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR WHOM? A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY

State University of New York at Stony Brook

PH.D. 1981

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Social Science for Whom?
A Structural History of Social Psychology

A Dissertation presented
by
Carol Cina
to
The Graduate School
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

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(Social Program)
State University of New York
at
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STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

AT STONY BROOK

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

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Abstract of the Dissertation
Social Science for Whom?
A Structural History of Social Psychology
by
Carol Cina
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
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State University of New York at Stony Brook
1981

The practice and ideology of social psychology was examined in the context of its real world presence. Its deep history in the beginnings of social science itself was detailed in order to render intelligible the particulars of its systematic relationship to social classes and their purposes. The fact that military-sponsored social psychology suddenly burgeoned in U.S. academia at the end of World War II was noted and investigated; it was found that social psychology's mode of grasping human behavior was central to the conception and execution of psychological warfare during that war. A content analysis of the postwar social

psychology literature demonstrated what has been known in the halls of academe for some time: that the study of the small group is a creature of the United States military. Further investigation, into a time period beginning in the late 1950s, unearthed the cybernetic information network into which all social science productions now feed. An example from the 1970s was taken from social psychology to show how even an ordinary piece of social science research work will be turned into a weapon if possible. The problem of the consciousness of the social science worker was treated at some length.

That immense multitude is ordering itself; its order responds to an awareness of the need for order; it is no longer a dispersed force, divisible in thousands of fragments shot into space like fragments of a grenade, trying by any and all means, in a fierce struggle with their equals, to achieve a position that would give them support in the face of an uncertain future.

Che Guevara
Man and Socialism in Cuba

When the subject population has had enough of being studied, researched, analyzed, and tabulated, and actively demands instead to be fed, housed, clothed, schooled, served, alive, and sovereign, then the sponsors of research shift their assets towards the sponsorship of a different science, an alternative profession . . . the police professions.

Martin Nicolaus
"The Professional Organization of Sociology:
A View from Below"

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AND

PREFACE

My thanks, first of all, to my committee members and most of their families, who each in their own ways unflinchingly supported me through eight years of work and play as a graduate student at Stony Brook. My thanks also to Barbara Baskin of the Special Education Department at Stony Brook for making it possible for me to work on this research and writing project long enough to finish it.

Probably the greatest single intellectual influence brought to bear on this study comes out of my participation in the political movements of the 1960s and 1970s. I feel humble gratitude especially to the people of the United States, Viet Nam, Cuba, and China whose struggles have so much helped me to learn and to struggle and to think in my own life.

John Taylor at the Modern Military section of the National Archives in Wash., D.C. is the person co-responsible for unearthing the Psychology Division of

the Office of Strategic Services. I talked over with him what I was looking for, and he told me about the existence of the OSS papers. It was a pleasure to work with him; he helped me for many long weeks.

Lots and lots of friends helped in all kinds of ways, most especially with human contact. For writing a dissertation is a lonely task. It's training for isolated work.

. . . .

This dissertation began eight years ago in a social psychology methodology seminar. I noticed that many of the research studies in social psychology we were reading had been military-funded, so I asked "How do we go about finding out how this stuff was used in Viet Nam?" The leader of the seminar, who was a low-level Office of Naval Research administrative functionary in addition to being a professor of social psychology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, replied that he didn't know, and that perhaps it was impossible to know from outside the system. I replied that we weren't outside the system. We were inside it; we were the workers; we did the research.

To help preserve our sanity in a climate which stood truth on its head, several of us in the social psychology group at Stony Brook began meeting regularly to try to break down some of our academic isolation and maybe work on some ideas together. This grew into a several years-long enterprise as part of which we published the Psych-Agitator, a group-developed and -produced periodical about what's wrong with psychological social science in the real world. We at least addressed the contradiction among ourselves caused by the differential institutional legitimacy of students and teachers in the group. Needless to say, our experimentation in that sphere did not solve the problem. The Psych-Agitator study and discussion group was a supportive place for me to work out thoughts and strivings toward thoughts, and to begin to dare to write where others could read what I had to say.

Back in the second half of the 1960s, I worked with two of the people whose subsequent writings are generously sampled in this study: Martin Nicolaus and Michael Klare. Martin and I both worked with the group putting out the antiwar periodical Viet-Report on a couple of shoestrings and lots of donated labor

time. He, Mike, and Viet-Report editor Carol Brightman were doing the original work on counterinsurgency social science even as it was being used in Viet Nam. I, however, had never had truck with the social sciences except in a few college courses, and I wasn't especially interested in that aspect of the war. I tell this story to illustrate part of the problem. We are such an elite stratum of intellectual workers that we are more or less shielded from public scrutiny and other reflections of social reality. Who outside of the fields even knows to be interested?

Anyway, it was Mike Klare and another friend at the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) who helped me start on my way down the road to this dissertation. They advised me to begin by finding out about the research infrastructure--how is it funded, and how is research policy administered? They were and are experts at oppositional research; NACLA has existed since the mid-1960s and is still one of the best research groups around. Carol Brightman has been my good friend ever since those days. Once, when she read one of my drafts, she grumbled that I needed a breakthrough. But then, she had this kind of stuff figured out 15 years ago.

I gathered up about a carton full of xeroxes from various archives in carrying out my study plan. Since I quote extensively from many of these documents, I thought it would be good to make the papers accessible in case anyone should be interested in looking at them. Accordingly, I've deposited them in a filing cabinet in the social psychology program at Stony Brook.

Finally, I want to address the problem of the hidden meanings in language. When I speak or write, I try to de-program my mind and avoid use of the generic masculine when all people are what is meant. Few of the authors whose works I have quoted in this study were of the same persuasion, however, even those whose intellectual efforts were hell-bent to uncover the processes of consciousness. I decided to use the quoted material as it was without comment, since the tale I was trying to unravel was complicated enough by itself. But my train of thought was disrupted every time it happened, for I know that behind this use of language lies the web of a concept-structure in which women are thought about as subordinate.

Social Science for Whom?
A Structural History of Social Psychology

INTRODUCTION

This study is about three processes: it's about what we do every day if we are social science workers, it's about the distant and the recent history of social psychology in particular, and it's about our consciousness about our work.

Social psychology, perhaps even more than sociology, lies along the interface between the practice of physical science methodology and the study of society. It tries to apply quantification and experimentation to questions of individual and group behavior. In a synthetic sense, it's the study of humans in society. But as always in academic disciplines, it's proper definition depends on one's conceptual stance.

Like all scholarly studies, this one conducts its investigation from a conceptual framework. The main guideline I have used is my conviction that science is a social product, and therefore socially biased. So

from the start I go against a main conviction of perhaps the vast majority of social science workers who have been trained to agree that it's "objective."

In my judgement, social science is not just an activity. Social science is a body of beliefs as well. Throughout the study, therefore, I have demonstrated that social science consists of both a methodology and an ideology, with attachments of the most intimate order to the class system of the capitalist period of human history.

The study begins by introducing and explaining the apparatus of vocabulary and concepts which are the flashlights and the maps for my investigation. The framework is explicitly Marxist, because, in my experience, of all the systematic framework systems available at this time, it provides the best approximation to reality for this type of study. Secondly, it is a genetic relative of social science, both having sprung from the common parentage of the European system-change which debouched in the industrial revolution. Marxism and social science are antagonistic to each other, however. They always have been. The reason is that they have historically been on opposite sides in real-world battles between social classes. Thus, an

investigation of social science taken from a Marxist perspective is bound to be critical.

The account of social psychology's deep history comprises two chapters. The first is about England. This chapter depicts the social situation, the historical actors in those parts of the action that are relevant to social science, and the first acts of social science together with their justifications. The main question it raises and offers evidence on concerns the class allegiance into which social science practice was structurally bound at its creation. The chapter seeks to establish that the practice of social science is intrinsically class-bound and that it is bound to the rulers, as a class.

The story continues in Germany and the United States in the next chapter. Social science entered its second stage of development in industrializing Germany, where it fleshed out to a process whose institutions were more recognizable as today's. It entered the United States like a turnkey technology import, whereupon it exhibited the same structural interrelatedness with the rulers, as a class, as it had in European countries. The main institutions are specified through which social science was forged as an integral part of maintaining the work relations and

the state apparatus of U.S. capitalism. The chapter brings the historical account through World War I, at the end of which at least one strand of psychology had passed the test of war.

The next chapter picks up the trail of U.S. social psychology per se and follows it on its journey as military attache. The chapter grew out of the question: Why did social psychology suddenly burst onto the U.S. academic stage in such a big way right after World War II? Various military and other governmental archives were searched for evidence bearing on this point, and the results of investigation presented. Through content analysis, an attempt is also made to measure the effect of the huge military financial investment in the social psychology product. The chapter seeks to use social psychology as a case study in the practical aspects of social science's class servitude.

The final chapter offers another case study--this time of social psychology in counterinsurgency and destabilization work. Again, the case is argued by showing the organizational trail leading up to the effect in the world of a piece of social psychology. As in earlier chapters, evidence is presented which shows the process happening step-by-step. The chapter

extends the description of social science's integration into the population management technology of the industrial period. It offers evidence for the charge that we as social scientists now work within a computerized information-gathering enterprise whose objective is to make the world safe for corporations.

Throughout, my major concern has been to shed some light on two areas usually systematically obscured from the view of the social science worker. One of the areas is the realm of conscious organizing work which is behind the doing of social science. The research administration bureaucracy which neutrally executes policy decisions from higher up acts as a curtain of respectability for a deed of corruption. The other area is our own consciousness about our work, the ideology in our social science. We are implored to deny it, and to believe social science is value-neutral due to its positivist methodology. That's rubbish.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This study takes the perspective that social science is not just an activity. Social science is a body of beliefs as well. Throughout the study, social science will be demonstrated to consist of both a methodology and an ideology, with attachments of the most intimate order to the class system of the capitalist period of human history.

For the purposes of this study it is essential to consider the concept of social class. Social classes refer to groupings of population within a society which share a structural relation to the means of production. Thus, members of ruling classes, as a collectivity, own and/or control and make the significant decisions about productive processes of entire societies. The working classes taken as a whole do not own or control these means of production; their members earn their living by selling their ability to work. For working-class people as a whole, their ability to work (their labor power) is the only

factor of production they own or control. The other factors of production (e.g., capital, machines, and labor time) are all owned and controlled by members of the ruling class or their representative institutions.

Though the familiar Marxist criterion of relation to means of production cleaves the planet's population into social classes more and more crudely as time goes on, it is still essential for examining the role of social science work in society. There is an ample literature on the use of social class as an analytic category and on its social reality in human history. Marx (1967), Marx and Engels (1947, 1955), Bottomore (1968), and Domhoff (1967, 1970), for example, are excellent sources. This study does not pretend to substitute for the original scholarship of others on social class. It merely takes up that concept as an already sharpened analytic tool and applies it to the natural history of social psychology.

Social Psychology in Life

It would be a mistake to seek to understand the body of practice and beliefs we call social psychology as an isolated atom of human activity. It is a

sub-field within psychology, itself a component section of the broader category of human activity we call social science. In seeking to locate social science among all the technical and social inventions that constitute the capitalist order in the industrialized West, this study seeks to find and explain social psychology's small berth. Moored in among others of its kind, social psychology is tied into the main frame of capitalist society by a web of knots. To know the place of social psychology, one must know the place of social science.

The first social science in our tradition was created along with the first crush of capitalist organization of industrial production: in England in the early 19th century. The earliest "scientific" social investigations were systematically developed in response to problems of governing the newly-created but unappreciative industrial proletariat.

Two social classes had by that time irrevocably appeared in history: a large social class of those who did the industrial-era work, and a small social class of those who controlled the process of that work and owned its material means. It took around a century for the features of what would become social psychology to grow distinct. But insofar as social psychology functions

to supply both framework and alleged facts about ourselves in society, its root hairs lie precisely here-- among the problems of the industrial workplace: people agglomerated into relatively small groupings, perforce working together under a discipline imposed by the class which owned and controlled capital society-wide.

Visualize social psychology as a mushroom. A mushroom is merely a small fruiting body of a much larger plant whose main substance lies out of sight just underneath the surface of the earth. Unseen, the mycelium of a fungus weaves symbiotically among the roots of trees and other green plants, gathering up its nutrition. Here and there a fruiting body which we can see--a mushroom--grows up out of the mycelium when moisture and other conditions are favorable. Social psychology came out of social science in this way, sprinkled by finance in a favorable climate. Social science, for its part, depends on the class system of capitalism the way a fungus mycelium interpenetrates for its existence with the roots of the trees and grasses. Capitalist-dominated society is for social science the grass and the trees. Throughout its natural history capitalism has been the source and sustenance for social science, supplying the nourishment it's not designed to make itself.

Value-Freeness and Objectivity in Social Science

In social psychology, therefore, as in the rest of social science, the questions posed and the lines of evidence adduced come from the discipline's connectedness with the purposes of capitalism. The social order defines not only the human problems. It defines the definitions themselves. Social psychology is no more irrelevant to the overall social purposes of capitalism than are sociology, anthropology, medicine, or chemistry. Yet, both it and the rest of social science have been consistently represented as a "value-free" human activity. Propaganda supporting this view descends on the student and the public like a February blizzard, seriously obscuring the view and seriously falsifying reality. Increasing the details of our knowledge about how reality gets falsified and what role the activity of social science plays in that process is of major importance for the social psychologist.

One consequence of the relation of domination between the class which rules and the class which does the work has been a bias in the social sciences that systematically favors the class which in general sets the society's priorities. Karl Marx, Mao Tse-Tung, and

Antonio Gramsci are among those who have written instructively about the general level of this development. Essentially, they say that we are all urged to construe reality through a lens ground by the ruling class. Its curvature is prescribed by that class' everyday affairs with the working class. Thus:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx, 1947, p.39; emphasis added)

In a class society, everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class. (Mao, 1968, pp. 2-3)

Gramsci carries this reasoning forward to one possible conclusion, creating the concretizing concept of "social hegemony" (or ideological hegemony):

There are historically formed specialised categories for the exercise of the intellectual function. They are formed in connection with all social groups, but especially in connection with the more important, and they undergo more extensive and complex elaboration in connection with the dominant social group. . . . The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 10 and 12)

The class system isn't just "out there," in the affairs of the real world. The class system has a subjective reflection within our very thinking process. To a significant degree, we conceptualize in accordance with what we do. What we think social reality is is conditioned by what type of society we live in and by what social class we are members of. Furthermore, there is an overall directionality in the framing of our ideas, our perceptions about social reality. They don't just condense out of a vapor cloud in ideation heaven. They correspond closely with the class system's historically-formed priorities, and the forming and

disseminating of them is done systematically through an organized work process. It is the ruling class of society which definitively governs the character of this official interpreting of human experience, in part through the historically-formed category of intellectual worker. Through the varied labors of the intellectual workforce, social doctrines that enshroud the capitalist work process and serve as so much of the content of "an education" are generated in the image of "truth" and spread around and throughout our social existence to create the commonality of referents without which a society loses its glue.

One element in this framework which social science workers with different overall political visions can agree on is that social science work is about our perception of reality. Here agreement ends and the official practitioners of the science of society break into essentially two camps.

Those in the camp which Gramsci would call organic intellectuals of the industrial bourgeoisie claim that social science methodology uncovers social reality objectively. They are in the dominant tradition of our official social science. The second camp contrasts drastically with the first and has many fewer adherents.

These are the social science workers who start out with a materialist, anti-capitalist framework and claim that the matrix of a body of ideas is part of the meaning of those ideas.

"Organic intellectuals" refers to the professional mental workers whose function in society is "organising the general system of relationships"(Gramsci 1971, p.6) required by the mode of production. They work on the construction and maintenance of "the hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 228), without which civil society loses cohesion and "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Organic intellectuals of the industrial bourgeoisie

not only produce ideas and ideology, but also perform functional, administrative tasks in the management of social institutions. This latter group includes high-level civil servants, industrial managers and technicians, specialists in law and finance, and the organizers of culture both public and private. . . . For the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, the specific criterion of definition is whether the intellectual activity is weighted toward the administration of the affairs of the class as a whole, rather than narrow, personal, private interests. It is not a matter of whether these organic intellectuals consciously recognize that they are maintaining the domination of a class, but rather whether their mental activity in fact serves the crucial

function of co-ordinating the many facets of systematic social hegemony. (Patterson, 1975, pp. 275-276)

Coordinating social hegemony. I would argue that the academic workforce falls well within the meaning encompassed by Gramsci's category. Grasping the context of academic work in this framework means defining social science work historically, in terms of the functions of social scientists in the particular societies in which they exist. It both tells us what it means to say that social science exhibits a systematic bias and it explains why that bias exists.

According to this analysis, the bias of social science is built-in on purpose, not accidentally present sometimes. The reason is that a ruling group in any epoch must of necessity cultivate the totality of ideas people hold if it is to maintain its control over economic processes. It must have ideological hegemony. It must inculcate the ideas of its dominance, greasing the ways by packaging the ideas in the trappings of truth. The social science workforce serves in the construction of ideological hegemony through the building of elaborate and detailed thought structures which address themselves to almost any aspect of social interaction one can think of. It also readily

participates in the more naked enterprise of devising social control technologies.

The workers who produce and disseminate the ideas may never once think of their work process as "weighted toward the administration of the affairs of the ruling class as a whole"; historically, the problem of social science workers' consciousness about their work has been cemented shut by urgent assurance about its value-freeness. Ironically, the notion that social science work is value-free has itself been the primary agency through which its bias is preserved. "Value-free" has meant simply the promise that using positivist methodology adopted from the physical sciences will guarantee objectivity of investigation and results. The presumption, of course, is that method can somehow extract human activity from human intent.

Obviously, the value-free doctrine allows social science workers to respect both their work and themselves. It fosters the belief that they are contributing to an increase in the measure of decency available for human society--minimally, when abstracted through a notion of service to the higher purposes of science-which-is-in-the-long-run-good-for-us-humans or maximally when

directly experienced as connected to concrete meliorative efforts.

But the presupposition of the value-free argument is that the problems chosen for social science work have nothing intrinsically to do with the class nature of the society in which the social science work is done and do not bear on the extension or strengthening of class oppression and exploitation. The argument scorns the issue of class entirely, which is precisely the heart of its subservience to the class in power.

I would argue that the activity-in-society which is social science must of necessity proceed from some vision of human social arrangements, a vision which is pertinent to an explanation of the events in which social science is culturally immersed. That vision must enable social scientists to grasp the dominant material relationships as ideas, then turn around and purvey them as the discovery of nature-given conditions. Traditionally, a social scientist takes account of the historical social formations in which she or he studies human activity about as much as a geneticist takes account of the effects of gravity on the creatures she or he works with, and for the same reason--because they are assumed to be irrelevant to the investigation.

The territorial parameters of social science begin and end within the social system of its operation.

Ideas about value-freeness in social science are ideology about social science--what is sometimes called "meta-theory" because of the sense in which they stand above social science in order to explain it in a theoretical way. Extending the critical tradition inseminated by Gyorgy Lukacs (1971) on the basis of Marx and Engels' original insights, Istvan Meszaros pinpointed the falsity of the meta-theory which portrays social science as a neutral instrument of analysis:

. . .the instruments and methods of social analysis can never be radically neutral with regard to their object. The level of 'meta-theory' cannot be separated in principle from the theory itself; it is only as a moment of analysis that it can by this be separated, but it must then be reintegrated again in the overall synthesis. That is to say: meta-theory is an integral dimension of all theory, and not a privileged department governed by radically different principles. There can be no coherent social theory without its own, specific meta-theoretical dimension and vice-versa, there can be no meta-theory. . . which is not deeply rooted in a set of theoretical propositions inseparably linked to determinate social values. (Meszaros, 1972, p.46)

For all social theory is necessarily conditioned by the socio-historical situation of the particular thinkers. And it is precisely the specific set of socio-historical determinations which constitutes the ideological dimension of all social theory, irrespective of the historical vantagepoint of particular thinkers. (Meszaros, 1972, p.61)

The meta-theory of social science is that systematized collection of statements about it which purport to describe it in its social actuality. But the discipline's social actuality--its everyday existence since its inception--is in every way anchored in determinate social values. Those values which underpin our historical period of industrial capitalism also underpin social science. Social science is inescapably ideological by virtue of its having been generated by human beings living off the economic surplus while laboring with their minds in the industrial capitalist setting of the past couple of centuries in the West. Small details of ideas and entire thought systems alike bear the imprint of "the specific set of socio-historical determinations" which both define the problems and draw the limits of probing for the intellectual workforce's exploration of the social reality in which it exists. The same chain of logic binds the meta-theory dimension. It is imbedded in exactly the same social actuality and subject to the same process of generation on the basis of determinate social values, like a drop of rain which takes palpable form only around a definite speck of dust.

Meszaros offers three important reasons why generating social thought is an ideological act: (1) Its key concepts are always subject to systematic debate. (2) Any given investigation, however small and whether theoretical or empirical, is tied-in conceptually to an overarching view of social reality because it finds its justifying principles somewhere in the investigator's own overall thinking framework. (3) The objects of investigation are themselves ephemeral, specific to a given time and place in history and molded to its specific traits (Meszaros, 1972, pp. 61-62).

He concludes

that the ideologically most sensitive area of social science is the network of fundamental principles and assumptions within which the various sets of particular theoretical propositions--in a sense 'operational deductions'--are worked out. The former are necessarily linked--even if often unconsciously--to the given socio-economic formation which ultimately determine the categories, models, principles, methodological guidelines and inherent problematics--in short: the structure--of the specific fields of enquiry at any particular time in history. . . . The specific ideological character of a particular social theory is determined by the way in which the fundamental structural characteristics of the given social formation are articulated in it, from a particular social standpoint, in the form of some basic theoretical principles and assumptions (or premises) which constitute the points of departure, as well as the general framework of orientation of the particular lines of enquiry. (Meszaros, 1972, pp. 75-76)

It's especially the connections between structural characteristics of society and their network of underlying principles and assumptions which social science workers rarely, if ever, turn to with the sort of vigor of examination that they make their journals bristle with. It's a monumental turning-of-the-back, a decisive setting of the line of vision and the field of vision. The result is that the entire array of linkages binding the various products of its workers to the ownership and therefore to the history-specific requirements of the industrial bourgeoisie is entirely excluded from the social science field of vision. The work of discovering those linkages for ourselves has to include removing that attention-deflecting shield hiding them from mass view: the doctrine of value-freeness in all of its myriad faces.

It is taking even Marxist social scientists a long time and a lot of work to pierce the defenses that guard the doing of social science work. Martin Nicolaus was one of the early, blunt ones. His attacks on the judgment of his social science colleagues have not yet been surpassed for the visual quality of their metaphor or their bitten-to-the-bone texture. While a graduate student of sociology at Brandeis University, Nicolaus

delivered a seething criticism of professing academic social science. The occasion was the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, and the audience reaction was visceral. The wider setting was the U.S. war on Viet Nam. As an editor of the antiwar periodical Viet Report, Nicolaus had been applying his scholarly skills to uncovering the filthy cellars of counterinsurgency social science. He described his listeners to themselves in this way:

The trunk of political power has many branches. One of these is the professional organization of sociology, the American Sociological Association. The upper, fatter portion of this branch is grafted seamlessly, with contractual cement, to the civil, economic and military sovereignty which constitutes the trunk. From that source, the organization spreads outward and downward along the institutional scaffolding, carrying the authoritative views on matters of social reality into the universities, junior colleges, and high schools (p.45). . . . Sociology merely formulates the laws of oppressive social life (p.48). . . . Given the increasingly expensive nature of social research, those who engage in it, who make their living from it, are compelled to turn with outstretched hands towards the civil, military, and economic sovereignty, and to prove themselves 'useful.' This social fact is basic to any understanding of the politics of the organized sociological profession (p.51). . . . The one and only general sociological law that has ever been discovered. . . /is/ that the oppressors research the oppressed (p.52). (Nicolaus, 1973)

Martin Nicolaus couldn't stomach academic sociology long enough to write some of his research up in the

form of a dissertation. He dropped out of the academy and took up other, more directly activist work. Since that time a dozen years ago, there have been pitifully few vocal social scientists who could agree with Nicolaus' assessment. Most practicing social scientists would reject the overall framework out of which both Nicolaus' and my own critique come.

Considering the elaborate training in conceptual acrobatics and verbal disquisition that a social scientist takes in, this failure to see connections is like a synchronized hysterical blindness. Marxist academician Richard Lichtman is among those who have investigated this problem. Lichtman combed Marx's works for a more powerfully explanatory vision of the connection between processes of ideology and the forces of production in capitalism than is found in the early German Ideology. The early form of the idea accounts for class consciousness largely on the basis of hierarchical enforcement. By contrast, Lichtman anchored his analysis in Marx's suggestion in volume three of Capital (1967, p. 791) that the deepest level of determination of the entire structure and process of society is located in the act of extraction of surplus value from the producers:

It is always the direct relationship of the

owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers. . . which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure. (Marx, 1967, vol. 3, p. 791)

If we seek to explain something about ideology, look to the workplace for the materials of explanation. Accordingly, let us review briefly the act of extraction of surplus value from producers in the capitalist workplace.

On the Marxist Conceptual System

Marx launches Capital with an analysis of the commodity form. As product of the capitalist work process, a commodity has two characteristics which define it: Use-value and exchange-value. Use-value inheres in the commodity's physical properties and is inseparable from the physical commodity itself. You cannot sit in the idea of a chair, but only in the physical chair itself. Exchange-value, however, has nothing inextricably to do with the commodity's physical form, since two physically very different commodities can be exchanged for each other. This shows that what commodities have in common is that they are all products of human labor. Following the practice of Marx (Sweezy, 1942, p.27), I'll

use just the plain word "value" to refer to this social quality of commodities.

In capitalism, human labor is itself a commodity. Marx named the commodity form of the human ability to work "labor power." The proletariat sells its labor power to the capitalists in order to survive. The capitalists buy labor power in the form of time. They also buy machinery and raw materials, and they organize and control the process of producing and distributing commodities. According to Marx, the value of any commodity is determined solely by the socially necessary labor time that went into its production. "Socially necessary" means a society-wide average, taking into account the real conditions of production, level of technology, and skill of the labor force. The value of labor power is likewise determined by the socially necessary labor time required for its production--or more properly, reproduction, since we start with a living person. This refers to the amount of time a worker must work to earn whatever it costs to purchase the necessities of life--food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, etc.

The capitalist pays for the value of labor power in the form of wages. But in the capitalist system,a

worker exchanges more labor power than is necessary to create the value of the necessities of her or his own reproduction. The value the worker creates during this unpaid working time is called surplus-value and is appropriated by the capitalist. It is the unique property of human labor under capitalist working arrangements (relations of production) that it creates more than its own value. Another angle from which to view this is that the value of commodities produced in a capitalist enterprise is more than the value of the raw materials, machinery, and labor power the capitalist purchased and organized to produce the commodities. Whence comes this extra value? Marx answers: from surplus-value.

Marx calls the condition under which the extraction of surplus-value takes place in capitalism alienated labor. The Latin root of alien means other person. Alienated labor means labor whose results belong to a person other than the producer. Capitalists own the commodities the working class produces, so the sale of one's labor power at the capitalist workplace results in alienated labor. Perhaps Marx chose the word "alienated" to help his readers visualize a piece of the person's labor being spirited away in the value of the commodity. As commonly bandied about, this phrase has

taken on purely psychological meaning: that working people in capitalism suffer psychic pain. This is certainly true, but it wasn't the point Marx was making with the word alienation.

Now, large numbers of working people had by Marx's lifetime in the mid-nineteenth century been constituted an industrial working class in England and other European nation-states. The necessity to find a buyer for one's labor power in order to earn a livelihood was a crushing reality. It bound masses of people into a profound commonality of experience. What about "class consciousness," Marx asked? Why did the individuals involved not grasp a clear picture of what was happening to them and therefore act en masse to overturn the capitalist arrangements and remake them to their own advantage as a class? How to account for this "false consciousness," especially since many segments of that same class were in organized action to change the overall social arrangements? Marx finds the answer by looking at the living human being at work. By some process of human consciousness, people had come to accept in their own minds the propriety of their social condition. The process, as Marx called it, was a mystification of consciousness.

Bringing the Chickens Home to Roost

Now we can return to the question which necessitated this review of Marx's analytic concepts: our attempt to account for the real, concrete consciousness of social science workers as they do their work and live their lives. Picking up again on Lichtman's argument, the central theoretical conclusion in his essay on Marx's theory of ideology is exactly an attempt to account more fully for the originating processes of consciousness. In his concept of "commodity fetishism," Marx had suggested that we play tricks on our consciousness at the capitalist workplace, and commodities take on the characteristic of a fetish, "an object of irrational reverence or obsessive devotion" (Websters, 1965, p. 309). Extending this idea, Lichtman suggests that there is some amount of consciousness we take on in order to accept the power relation in the capitalist workplace, and it radiates from there throughout the rest of social existence.

What Marx does in Capital and particularly in the section on the fetishism of commodities, is to explicate the process through which the mystification of consciousness develops as an intrinsic aspect of the production of surplus value. But, if it is always the direct relationship between exploiter and exploited that determines

'the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the social structure,' and if the falsification of consciousness is an inseparable aspect of this exploitative relationship, then, I am suggesting, the concrete form of ideology embedded in the extraction of surplus labor will permeate and determine the nature of consciousness in 'the entire social structure.'Ideology is not a consequence of non-ideological factors; it is a basic aspect of social life under capitalism. The earlier view was that control over the media in the super-structure--press, schools, churches, etc.--gave the ruling class control over the formation of working-class consciousness. Now, as I grasp and extend Marx's position, the mystification of consciousness is viewed as ingredient in and constitutive of economic exploitation, through whose agency it influences the remainder of conscious life. (Lichtman, 1975, p. 56)

If Marx and Lichtman are correct, then we ought to be able to use their conception to learn something about the processes of our consciousness as social science workers. To test this out, it is necessary to act on implications we are able to draw from the theory.

One implication seems pretty clear: as a first step, we must name "the concrete form of ideology embedded in the extraction of surplus labor." Its name is: domination. As in capitalist reality at the point of production of surplus value, so in the general character of the everyday lives of people in our society. Some quite large number of human beings is dominated over a specific period of time in history by a much smaller

number of human beings.

What about the masses of people who are participating in some particular historical period and place?

They have their view of the world and of themselves as social beings at a level of ordinary practical understanding embodied in social institutions. . . . Human beings cannot become human without acquiring some view of what it is to be human--without a view of time and space, of history and society, of the distinctions and connections among men and women, superior and subordinate, labor and leisure, science, art, religion, given reality and unfulfilled ideal. (Lichtman, 1971 p. 149)

We all have consciousness. We all think as we do and about what we do. Those of us who are social science workers are no more immune to the social conditions in which these processes of consciousness are involved than uranium miners are to the air they breathe down in the mines.

The inquirer is formed in a social world. His /I/ being and consciousness are concretely determined through a definite social realm at a particular moment in its history. . . . The inquirer is not originally a reflective theoretician, but a social being whose nature and consciousness is pre-reflectively formed in a given social world. The inquirer shares this condition with the human beings who are the object of inquiry. (Lichtman, 1971, p. 150)

We are people working and living in the world. The material realities surrounding the sale of our labor are grasped by our own conscious minds. We grasp the

material relationships as ideas, with the result that domination as a principle of human organization permeates our thinking workshops. Are we not part of the "living labor" of capitalism? Are we not among the

men and women trained in the technical and social division of labor, in the rules that inculcate deference to authority and subservience to class domination? (Lichtman, 1975, p. 57)

To the extent that our relationships within society answer to that description of ourselves, to that extent are we also bound into the bottom end of the extraction of surplus value.

Social scientists are real human beings whose work must receive its social analysis in the same way as that of the work organization of an industrial worker. Intellectual labor under capitalism is still labor done under the capitalist organization of the workplace. The dimension of capitalism cuts across categories of work; the intellectual workplace is a capitalist workplace too. The products of their labor do not belong to the intellectual workers either. Control lies elsewhere than among themselves. Their ideology has a definite and definable formation; they too are subject to the acceptance of falsifications of reality. It is squarely from this perspective that the present study takes up its inspection of social psychology.

Conclusion

The discussion of epistemology, or how we know anything, is admittedly theoretical. But every alleged knowledge-getting enterprise must have its idea of how anything or any process is knowable. Social science adopted the so-called positivist methodology from physical science, in which quantifications of phenomena have mathematical manipulations performed on them in order to get knowledge. Having been told that their inquiries were therefore impartial, social scientists believed that was the case. Slim grounds on which to gull a bunch of professional intellectuals. Social inquiry is a moral venture; it's intrinsically normative about society and social beings. The more social science practitioners deny this, the more they contribute to enforcing the realities of domination.

Social inquiry is intrinsically normative because it is the theoretical labor of normative human beings' attempt to penetrate the constructed nature of normative human beings. Both the subject and object of inquiry are moral beings, and the process of inquiry, far from avoiding this dimension, is a principal mediation of the moral venture itself. It is the mystification of this fundamental point that has rendered the great mass of contemporary academic social inquiry not merely a reflection of alienation, but an additional contribution to its persistence. The positivist human inquiry, slavishly based on the misunderstood significance of natural science,

adopts toward humanity an attitude appropriate only to the natural realm, narrowly understood. (Lichtman, 1971, p. 156)

The process of inquiry mediates between classes, more often than not contributing to the persistence of the inequalities on which the profit system rests. Like the emperor with no clothes, the project of social science parades around with its imbedded values hanging out. From the crowd, few voices rise to challenge received truth.

CHAPTER 2

AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

The historical approach to explaining social psychology leads us back to the period of industrialization in England, with focus on the early 19th century. To be sure, the rivulet of social science which rose here joined others downstream; 19th-century England was by no means social science's only source. It is, however, an especially instructive source to examine, for it was in this period that a centerpiece of social science hardware first came into prominence: the social survey technique.

A mode of thinking called dialectical offers us a handle on understanding the social survey methodology historically. This approach insists that human activity should be

conceived of in terms of relations, where the conditions of existence of any process--like its potential for development--are taken to be a part of what it is. (Ollman, 1978, p. 218)

The conditions of existence of the social survey during the period of its adoption as a legitimate--indeed,

indispensible--procedure are part of what the social survey is. There was a vast social process involved in the creation of a mere social science tool. We must examine that process, for the dialectical approach leads us to conceive of that social process as template for the tool. It was a tool both made for social-use purposes, and made by one of the social classes participating in that process. Accordingly, its form and its capabilities express the purposes and the problems of its creator-class. Not accidentally, the prerogative of its systematic use has, in the intervening 150 years, been limited to that class as well.

In England, a decisive change in social system was by the beginning of the 19th century already entering the relatively mature phase of institutional consolidation. The industrial system of capitalism had burst asunder the old ways of doing things, replacing aristocracy with bourgeoisie as ruling class, religion with secular social philosophy as ruling ideology, and serfs with wage laborers as the class which did the principal work. It's not difficult to imagine the struggle that raged over the various aspects of the social power which was in process of changing hands. On its most general level, the struggle was occurring

between classes: between the old and new ruling classes on the one hand, and between the new ruling class and its new subject class on the other. It is the latter struggle which is of principle importance in our search for the relation between social arrangements and the structure and content of social science practice.

In his superb documentation of the emergence of the working class in England, E. P. Thompson (1963) counsels his reader to realize that:

Class is a relationship, and not a thing (p.11). And class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interest as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs (p.9). (Thompson, 1963)

The decisive change which working people in Britain underwent during the course of the 18th century was experienced in common as a radical changeover in the way they, as a class, earned their living--a change which was as compulsory as it was wrenching and irreversible. They articulated their class consciousness in a range of ways, individualistically and uncoordinated at the weak end of the spectrum, but collectively, through organizing over issues of working conditions, living conditions, and political constraints at its

strongest. These actions were pointedly against the social class whose domination enforced daily degradation on the working people as a class.

In the period discussed in this volume /1760-1832/ the upper classes allowed no values to the workpeople but those which the slave-owner appreciated in the slave At the time when half Europe was intoxicated and the other half terrified by the new magic of the word citizen, the English nation was in the hands of men who regarded the idea of citizenship as a challenge to their religion and their civilisation; who deliberately sought to make the inequalities of life the bases of the state, and to emphasise and perpetuate the position of the workpeople as a subject class. (Hammond, 1917, p. 325)

It's no exaggeration to say that the ruling class view was a thoroughly elitist vision of society, in which a very few legitimately concentrated power in their own hands. Continuity from the period of feudal arrangements is obvious; the few who were aristocracy had similarly concentrated civil power in their own hands as a class. But there supposedly were in that period at least some reciprocal responsibilities for the welfare of the class which performed the socially necessary labor. The social philosophy justifying the capitalist arrangements of production neatly cancelled out those obligations, offering instead the vision of a rat-race whose legitimacy was endowed by nature. Herein lies the social science connection.

New Justification for New Exploitation

In 17th century England, social/economic organization was like the fetus whose human features seem almost fully integrated by the age of five months. Although not yet an industrial capitalist society, it was surely no longer in the main a feudally-organized one.

Very nearly half the men were full-time wage earners; if the cottagers are counted as part-time wage-earners, the proportion is over two-thirds. . . .The tendency for land to be exploited as capital was already well advanced. . . .(Macpherson, 1963, p.5)

While at the same time

it was a common assumption in the seventeenth century that the labouring class is a class apart, scarcely if at all to be counted as part of civil society. (Macpherson, 1962, p.5)

The common assumption was that the labouring class was something that was to be managed by the state to make it productive of national gain. It was not that the interests of the labouring class were subordinated to the national interest. The labouring class was not considered to have an interest; the only interest was the ruling-class view of the national interest. (Macpherson, 1962, p.228)

How did this come to be the social ideology which occupied the brains of so many people in England? And what does social science have to do with the processes which gave rise to this social philosophy? Finally, what does social science have to do with maintaining

the social order in which the class of people who do the great bulk of the work can arguably be classified as 'wage slaves'?

Obviously, the industrial proletariat did not appear suddenly in a state of full development. Obviously, a rather lengthy period of change went on in England, over the course of centuries, whose result by the industrial period was the division of society into the two great classes with which we are familiar. Fixing a social philosophy such as that indicated above in the minds of the ruling bourgeoisie was no brief task. It too occurred over a period of time measured in centuries rather than in years.

Of the many social philosophers who between them worked out the principles of justification for the new socio-economic order which was in the act of replacing the old one, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is of primary interest to our investigation. His contribution occupied a fairly central place among these efforts for three reasons. The first is that, similarly to Karl Marx two centuries later, Hobbes claimed to have set out from the smallest irreducible units of humanness and deduced from these the necessary characteristics of human social organization. The second is that he did

his job thoroughly; the range of his writings was comprehensive and exhaustive, addressing all corners of the problem at hand. The third reason follows from the first two: the body of his work constitutes a major early ancestor of social science as an outlook and a practice, because subsequent social philosophers of the capitalist order could all take as an assumption that crucial element which Hobbes allegedly proved--the propriety of individualism.

To the best of his ability, Hobbes set forth what he saw around him. He did no less than codify contemporary social practice into what he claimed were, and what others took to be, basic laws of human action. By doing so, he set out many of the pedestals on which the social science structure of logic was to rest its feet.

Macpherson argues that Hobbes' method of reasoning, adopted from Galileo,

was to resolve existing society into its simplest elements and then recompose those elements into a logical whole. The resolving, therefore, was of existing society into existing individuals, and of them in turn into the primary elements of their motion. (Macpherson, 1962, p.30)

As far as Hobbes himself was concerned, however, he was considering human beings quite apart from any society. He was making discoveries about human nature

nature itself. The point is not that his methodology wasn't quite what we call social science today. The point is that his work contributed its gene pool, with great impact, to today's institution of social science.

The accumulation of work in the physical sciences had placed the image of a mechanical system firmly on center throne in the conceptual formations of the bourgeoisie's organic intellectuals. Accordingly, Hobbes envisioned his human-in-a-state-of-nature

very like an automated machine. It is not only self-moving but self-directing. It has, built into it, equipment by which it alters its motion in response to differences in the material it uses, and to the impact and even the expected impact of other matter on it. (Macpherson, 1962, p.31)

Macpherson shows that Hobbes held this as prime a priori principle:

The machine seeks to continue its own motion. It does this by moving towards things which it calculates are conducive to its continued motion and away from things not conducive. Motion towards is called appetite or desire, motion away from is called aversion. . . . Whatever is the object of any machine's appetite it registers as good, and the objects of its aversion, evil. Each therefore seeks its own good and shuns its own evil. (Macpherson, 1962, p. 32)

The importance of this form of thinking, along with its content, is that it's a direct foundation for present-day psychology. Already in the 17th century,

human beings had acquired their defining characteristic of social atom, individual unit which looks after itself. To assess the weightiness of the insistence on the centrality of this particular fact about us humans one need only compare it with Marx's insistence on the centrality of productive labor as the starting point for social philosophy. In the former case, a social philosophy for the bourgeoisie can be constructed, while in the latter, it's for the working class.

Similarly, Hobbes' a priori principle number two, while allegedly free of social contamination, is actually pregnant with the arrangements of capitalism. Hobbes' second principle puts the self-moving and self-directing human machine into contact with others of its kind and asserts that each is necessarily in opposition to the other:

The capacity of every man to get what he wants is opposed by the capacity of every other man (p.36)...Every man is in the market for power, either as supplier or demander, for everyone either has some power to offer to others or wants to acquire the power of some others (p.39).
(Macpherson, 1962)

Relative valuations of one's powers is a reciprocal affair in which all are engaged in a process of evaluating and being evaluated in return. The valuations settled upon show themselves in what one is willing

to give in exchange for using what someone else has.

We have here the essential characteristics of the competitive market. . . . Out of this immensely large number of independent value judgements, an objective value of each man is established because every man's power is regarded as a commodity, i.e., a thing normally offered for exchange, and offered competitively. . . . Every man's value is established as prices are established in the market. (Macpherson, 1962, pp. 38-39)

Supposedly setting out only from irreducible, prime units of human characteristics and deriving from these what human society must of logical necessity comprise, Hobbes instead assumed a social condition in which the very energy of each individual human being is alienable and circulatable in commodity form. This is non other than the social condition in which he himself existed. Along with all inquirers, Hobbes was

not originally a reflective theoretician, but a social being whose nature and consciousness is pre-reflectively formed in a given social world. (Lichtman, 1971, p. 150)

Hobbes did not see that he was taking capitalist social arrangements as "the state of nature." His mistake in logic was to have accepted "the state of nature" as a category for the analysis of human social action. This path leads to one place only: the justification of the as-is social system. The reason is simple: There is no such event as human beings

existing without social structure they have themselves created among themselves. We know that these structures differ according to changes in circumstances. Therefore it is a logical impossibility to examine human existence devoid of the concrete circumstances which put form on that existence.

The conception of human rights cannot be deduced from the abstract nature of man, but is determined by the stage of society in which men are living. Nor are men what they are 'by nature', but they become what they are, and change, as a result of their social activity. (Cornforth, 1953, p. 38)

A contemporary example of the same type of mistake in logic is given by the preoccupation of some psychologists with demonstrating genetic differences by race in peoples' performance on what is claimed to be tests of "intelligence." That this entire body of work has no raison d'etre other than enforcement of capitalism's social inequality has been amply demonstrated (Kamin, 1974; Karier, 1972; Bowles & Gintis 1972/1973; Progressive Labor Party, 1973, Science for the People Genetics and Social Policy Study Groups, 1976).

The thread in common between each of these historical periods is the class allegiance of the intellectual worker. The specifics of the problem differed, but in both cases the problem was anchored in the class character

of society under capitalist rule. In the case of IQ and race, the problem began with imperialism (generating justifications for the subjugation of colonized human beings) and class warfare at home in England; by the United States of the 1970s it had taken the form of tactical retaliation against widespread struggle of Black citizens and their allies against the injustice of their everyday lives. In Hobbes' case, the problem was no less than to weave a grand tapestry of social existence, a new justification to suit a new form of oppression.

It's not at all exceptional that Hobbes suffered from pockets of blind spots concerning major social assumptions. Hobbes was a mechanical materialist, a translator into the language of social description of the powerful paradigm of Newton and the tradition of work he had built upon. Mechanical materialism simply refers to the paradigmatic concept used by the bourgeoisie's organic intellectuals as a whole in their work of accounting for human social activity.

They sought to take nature to bits, to find its ultimate component parts, how they fitted together and how their interactions produced all the changes we perceive, all the phenomena of the world. And moreover, finding out how the mechanism worked, they sought to find out how to repair it, how to improve it, how to change

it and to make it produce new results corresponding to the requirements of man. (Cornforth, 1953, p. 34)

Hobbes

was full of the idea that numbers could elucidate all sorts of practical affairs, and gave the new science the name that it kept throughout the eighteenth century: 'political arithmetic.' (Oberschall, 1972, p. 23)

Hobbes and his intellectual progeny functioned in a dual capacity. In their capacity as providers of hegemonic thought about the goings-on in the real world of human social existence, they set forth a systematic foundation for justification for things-as-they-are:

This philosophy saw the world as consisting of independent atoms, each complete in itself, concerned only with itself, and all interacting. This was a mirror of capitalist society, as seen by the rising bourgeoisie. And by means of such ideas they succeeded, too, in disguising their own aims of domination and profit. Worker and capitalist were 'on a level' each was a free human atom, and they entered into a free contract, the one to work, the other to provide capital and pay wages. (Cornforth, 1953, p.13)

Their second role was to become well-defined only as the bourgeois consolidation picked up speed. As that process occurred, demands made on the intellectual stratum became more numerous and their capacities more diversified. By the time a practice recognizable as

social scientific existed, its practitioners had developed themselves into the role of activist managers for the bourgeoisie. The remainder of this chapter will highlight the story of the development of social science's social role.

A Science of Society for the Bourgeoisie

By the eve of the 19th century, we find the social doctrine called Utilitarianism at once tailing and guiding the rising star of the bourgeoisie in England. Philosophical Radicalism was another term used to identify the body of ideas and practice reflecting the strategy which was to lead to final consolidation of the capitalist arrangement of social affairs. Utilitarianism's progenitors included the work of Hobbes as foundation, but comprised that of other social philosophers as well-- John Locke, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo, to name a few of the better-known of them.

The especial quality of the writers of the Utilitarian school, and of Bentham in particular, is that they were not so much great inventors as great arrangers of ideas. They reduced to formulae the current philosophy of their country and of their century. . . . (Halevy, 1949, p.33)

In the year 1776, opposition in the American colonies reached the level of armed struggle. In England,

Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations came out, and Jeremy Bentham published the first of a river of writings on what the elements should be in the institutions of industrial capitalism's thousand-year Reich.

Bentham's axiomatic assumptions about human beings were the familiar individualist ones in which each person is defined as the social unit, each looking after her or his own interests.

Therefore it is necessary to break down all artificial barriers which traditional institutions set up between individuals, and all the social restraints based on the supposed necessity of protecting individuals against each other and against themselves. (Halevy, 1949, p.xvi)

Mutuality of responsibility, that moral and legal kernel of feudal arrangements, is cracked. Any basis of rationality for preserving even remnants of its institutions is wiped away. The intellectual slate is made clean for deducing the replacement legal forms from the 'human nature' being expounded by social thinkers with the new class allegiance. The determination of each individual's fate by market forces becomes the fair and square condition.

Thus we have the famous 'Hidden Hand' which reaches out of the pages of Smith to assuage our fears about the fate of people left to make their way in the jungle

of capitalism:

By the mechanism of exchange and the division of labor individuals, without desiring or knowing it, and while pursuing each his own interest, are working for the direct realization of the general interest. (Halevy, 1949, p.16)

The human ability to speak and reason causes the human propensity to barter, which causes the market, which causes division of labor, which increases productivity, which is one of the greatest goods for the greatest number. A theory of human society is formed on the basis of a theory of human psychology which has in turn received its formation from the realities of class-governed social practice. Only the last portion of the chain of causality is kept more or less submerged.

If the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain is the rock-bottom governing principle of human social action in our atom-to-atom relations, then various consequences follow. One consequence is that pleasures and pains can be viewed as having irreducible units which are arithmetically calculable. This is because human beings are assumed to perform an assessment of the relative weights of the two in any given situation, even if unconsciously, and to act accordingly. What they weigh is expressible in units.

David Hume and David Hartley had by the middle of the 18th century adapted the paradigm and language of Newton into what in Hartley's writings was already being called psychology. Units of psychic/emotional events could be counted and therefore treated computationally, exactly analogous to the method used with such stunning success in the physical sciences. The analogue of the ubiquitous principle of attraction and repulsion in physics and chemistry was to be transmogrified into the principle of association--the notion that ideas and perceptions attract and repel, stick together or flee each other. We know that that notion formed the basis of an entire school of deductive psychology which guided the practice of bevyes of psychology workers for several decades. People took--and take--such notions seriously and build pictures of the world on their basis, from miniatures to murals. The shame of it all is that such pictures get purveyed as truth by the officials of truth-finding.

Given the pleasure/pain assumption as the first cause of human action, Bentham and the Utilitarians "sought in the principal of association of ideas a basis on which to form a social science" (Halevy, 1949, p.11). The various paradigms of conditioning are an example

of a still-extant form of this principle of association. The social science founded on its basis emblazoned its masthead with the Utility Principle, which claimed for itself the status of no less than objective law of human nature.

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question. . . . (Halevy, 1949, p.26)

Furthermore, the Principle of Utility says that education (with respect to children) and legislation (with respect to adults) should enforce actions which will result in the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism (or, philosophical radicalism) was far from an isolated academic's movement. It's proselytes staffed the army of reformers whose agitation-al participation in the everyday affairs of governing the new bourgeois society wrenched into shape the daily particulars of how to govern. For the side of the bourgeoisie, they forged the many and shifting untied-front alliances within and between classes which birthed the elements of legal and political structure of early industrial capitalism. Their movement was the doorway through which the practice of social science was placed smack into the domain of social management in its

first performance in the theater of history.

Why Social Science?

In the year 1832, Jeremy Bentham disappeared into his grave just as the class struggle was fashioning one of the grand monuments to his life work: the Great Reform Bill of 1832 (Butler, 1914; Veitch, 1913). O. F. Christie (1928) says of that year: "During eleven fateful days of May 1832 England had been on the brink of revolution" (p.36). The foregoing account of philosophy's trail may have lulled the reader, rocking back and forth on the idealist plane. For perhaps we have momentarily forgotten that the philosophers ate whilst they wrote. And the philosopher's opportunity to put a forkful of food to her/his mouth depended--as it still does--on the existence and continued functioning of a mass network of people who grow as well as process and distribute food--which of course would have to include the blacksmith who shoes the horses that pull the vegetable carts or the railroad worker who runs the refrigerated trains, etc. The point is that there are solid connections between the particulars of the class structure in our history and the particulars, including

the structure, of social science work.

Since England is where industrial capitalism first flourished in history, England is where the industrial proletariat first came into being as a social class. By the beginning of the 19th century, people's ability to work had throughout that society been turned into a commodity whose sale could take place only where purchasers created a market for it.

The Enclosure Acts passed between 1760 and 1820 had decisively eliminated farming as a way of life for masses of people. Lands which had by tradition been used in common were suddenly legislated out of existence and consolidated in private hands to enable the raising of sheep for wool to feed England's growing textile manufacturing industry. The Enclosure Movement represented a culmination in the long process of transforming English agriculture into a capitalist agriculture, one which would fit the institutions of capitalist industry like a hand fits a glove. The Enclosure Acts created in England (1) "a class of agricultural entrepreneurs . . . and a large agrarian proletariat" (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 33); (2) a mass of unemployed laborers eligible to do industrial work; (3) an increase in agricultural productivity so as to feed the greatly expanded non-agricultural workforce; and (4) a means of capital

accumulation for industrial expansion (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 49).

Then, ignited by the expansion of export markets, industrialization took off vertically in England during the 1780s (Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 44-73); Hobsbawm, 1968, pp. 20-39). The same decade saw the triumph of capitalist political philosophy across the Channel, in the French Revolution.

To the century of the French Revolution corresponded, on the other side of the Channel, the century of the Industrial Revolution: to the juristic and spiritualistic philosophy of the Rights of Man /in France/ corresponded the Utilitarian philosophy of the identity of interests /in England/. The interests of all individuals are identical. (Halevy, 1949, p.xvi)

If each person's self-interest was, in the agglomeration of the masses, in harmony with everyone else's, then there should assuredly be no conflict between classes. But why then would a 1796 instruction to organizers of the London Corresponding Society, the first working class organization in the world, read: "You are wrestling with the Enemies of the human Race" (Thompson, 1963, p. 13)? The Society's leadership was

quickly rounded up and jailed, Palmer-Raid* fashion.

Tom Paine's Rights of Man, which Thompson (1963, p.90) calls a foundation-text of the English working class movement, was banned as subversive even though it in no way challenged capitalism's foundation-stone of property rights.

In what Thompson has called "the political counter-revolution, from 1792-1832" (1963, p. 197), aristocracy and manufacturers conspired to repress both human rights and agitation for wage increases on the part of working people. Parliament's Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 strengthened already existing legislation against trade

* Part of the World War I-era repression of working class organizing in the United States, the Palmer Raids were calculated to decimate Socialist and Communist Party leadership ranks and scare working people away from their ideas:

Only a few months after the Communist and Communist Labor parties were formed in September 1919, Attorney A. Mitchell Palmer launched his unsuccessful Presidential campaign by initiating the raids that bear his name. The Palmer Raids, the most ambitious of which took place in January 1920, resulted in the arrest of 6,000 radicals (along with many total innocents) and in the deportation of some 550 Communist aliens. Confirming the Communists' view of the political situation in the United States, the raids drove the two parties firmly underground and left them with an enduring predisposition for conspiratorial modes of operation. (Weinstein, 1967, pp. 249-250)

union organizing and forced working people into "political and social apartheid" (Thompson, 1963, p.198).

In the decades after 1795 there was a profound alienation between classes in Britain, and working people were thrust into a state of apartheid whose effects--in the niceties of social and educational discrimination--can be felt to this day. England differed from other European nations in this, that the flood-tide of counter-revolutionary feeling and discipline coincided with the flood-tide of the Industrial Revolution; as new techniques and forms of industrial organization advanced, so political and social rights receded. The 'natural' alliance between an impatient radically-minded industrial bourgeoisie and a formative proletariat was broken as soon as it was formed. (Thompson, 1963, pp. 177-178)

British scholar Tom Mairn says of the English working class that

It was born in conditions of the utmost violence, harshly estranged from all traditional and tolerable conditions of existence and thrown into the alien, inchoate world of the first industrial revolution. Formed in this alienation by the blind energies of the new capitalist order, its sufferings were made more hopeless by the severest political and ideological persecution. From the outset it inspired fear by its very existence. In the time of general fear produced by the French Revolution, such dread and hostility became chronic, affecting the old ruling class and the new industrial bourgeoisie alike, and creating a climate of total repression. What was possible but revolt, in the face of this? Humanity, pulverized and recast in this grim mould, had to rebel in order to live, to assert itself as more than a mere object of history, as more than an economic instrument. The early history of the English working class is therefore a history of revolt, covering more than half a century, from

the period of the French Revolution to the climax of Chartism in the 1840s. (Nairn, 1973, pp. 187-188)

The industrial revolution in England sundered traditional ways of living and exposed a choiceless population to the degrading life of industrial exploitation.

Its most serious consequences were social: the transition to the new economy created misery and discontent, the materials of social revolution. (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 57)

Wage workers did not share in the new wealth being created by their labor (Hammond, 1917). Instead, that wealth was owned and controlled by the bourgeoisie, a social class very small in number compared to the working class.

It's this which makes class antagonism as intrinsic to capitalism as a forcefield is to a magnet. Socialization of production and privatization of ownership, together, are sufficiently in contradiction to make the materials of social revolution.

The bourgeoisie had to come up with solutions to the unruliness of the ungrateful masses. The English Channel had proven itself an inconsequential moat for the sparks of the French Revolution, so that "almost every radical phenomenon of the 1790s can be found reproduced tenfold after 1815" (Thompson, 1963, p. 191). The year 1815 was for England the end of a war, just

as 1975 was the end of a war for the United States. At such a juncture, the structures of administering a capitalist nation-state at war must change to meet changing conditions. One of these conditions is invariably some degree of breakdown in many of the structures of social security the mass of the population at home depends on.*

The Napoleonic wars had given England prosperity, and peace seemed likely to deprive her of their-fruits. For Britain's agriculture and her industry had received a stimulus from the war which found no immediate counterpart in a world at peace. As government orders for military stores fell off, merchants found themselves loaded with goods for which there was no market. They were operating upon credits which were not likely to be renewed. . . . At the same time British agriculture approached collapse, for its output was no longer required for Wellington's armies. . . . Domestic trade moved in rhythm with agriculture. Thousands of traders found oblivion in bankruptcy. Credit was abruptly curtailed. Country bankers closed their doors by the hundred. . . . Industrial shutdowns coupled with demobilization brought into being an army of unemployed estimated at half a million, and threw into high relief social inequalities which war-time prosperity had concealed. (Jenks, 1927, pp. 25-26)

At such a juncture, the people move to defend themselves.

*

The reasons for this are varied, and the interested reader can locate further information in the journal Monthly Review or in the publications of the Union of Radical Political Economists, for example.

British historian Steven Marcus says that the period 1815-1848

or shortly thereafter is a period of unprecedented social change and social crisis in modern British history. Unrest was widespread and was thought by many to be nearing revolutionary proportions. (Marcus, 1974, p. 11)

It was a period of especially rapid economic boom and bust, as well as of drastic population expansion, as illustrated by the following table showing a 300 per cent leap in one century:

Population of England and Wales

1740	6 million persons
1800	9 million persons
1850	18 million persons
(Source = Marcus, 1974, p. 4)	

The first big strike of factory workers in world history had already occurred in Manchester in 1810. The working class in England was on the move. It was organizing itself around interests its members really did have in common--a reduction in working hours, the right to vote in Parliamentary elections, the right to be associated within the protective covering of a trade union. There is no doubt that much of this activity was, indeed, aimed at capitalism's jugular. Thompson says that in the overall context in which it was occurring,

the claim for the vote implied also further claims: a new way of reaching out by the working people for social control over their conditions of life and labour. (Thompson, 1963, p. 828)

Similarly, the trades union movement was by no means a simple bread-and-butter assault on profits. Again according to Thompson,

When Marx was still in his teens, the battle for the minds of English trade unionists, between a capitalist and a socialist political economy, had been (at least temporarily) won. (Thompson, 1963, p.829)

The winner was the model of human organization in which working people as a whole constitute the power-holding class--a socialist political economy.

In typical fashion, the ruling class response ranged from bullets of repression (as, for example, in the Peterloo Massacre of a peaceful workers' meeting in Manchester in 1819) to its version of ameliorative measures (as in the Reform Act of 1832 and subsequent legislation). It has been the mark of bourgeois democracy that the class in power responds to popular pressure for increments in the portion of decency in their lives with a pincer movement consisting of both bloodshed and rationalizing concessions. The process of rationalizing refers to changes made in the rules or practices

of governing* whose aims range from extending the terrain of ruling class power to defusing threats to the very class control of the bourgeoisie.

In England, the Reform Act of 1832 was the first shot in a program of rationalization which left in its wake that small piece of information-gathering technology which has grown up from this acorn into the centerpiece of social science work: the social survey. The Reform Act itself was a redistribution of legislative seats to reflect the population shifts brought on by the development of capitalism in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy:

In 1801 the population of Lancashire [an industrial district] was more than three times as great as the population of Cornwall [a rural district]; in 1831 it was more than four times as great, and Lancashire was assessed, for the purposes of the income and property tax, to between six and seven times as much. . .as Cornwall. Yet Cornwall as a whole, taking county and boroughs together, had more than three times as many representatives in the House of Commons as Lancashire. The contradiction was too obvious. . . .The industrial

* 'Governing' includes running the economy, administering the institutions of ideological formation, and managing the supply of whatever services are deemed necessary. It is on no account limited to problems of strictly governmental operations.

revolution had made a Reform Act inevitable.
(Veitch, 1913, p. 352).

Sectors of the working class had joined forces in a loose united front-type alliance with sectors of the ruling class to wrest legislative control from the increasingly slipping clutches of the land-based aristocracy. As so often happens, they were knifed in the back by their temporary allies on the eve of success, once their support no longer counted because enough opinion in favor of the reform had for a variety of reasons been amassed among more conservative sectors of the population. The bill's framers inserted a property-holding qualification for the right to vote in the new towns, dashing by this simple expedient working class aspirations for bourgeois-democratic access to power through the vote. The Reform Act's passage was the beginning of a codification process in which the Law of the Land was changed to reflect the direct control the industrial bourgeoisie had already achieved in the economic sphere. It made them the majority of the electorate so that their representatives could legalize what they, as a class, needed to do business.

The working class' response was to continue

pushing, as its members had to do, in the direction of small victories through reform. They formed the London Working Men's Association, which by the late 1830s became the well-known Chartist movement. Marx and Engels were associated with this movement, which has been called "the first political struggle of the modern proletariat moving along conscious class lines" (Dawson, 1930, p. 352).

Its program demanded the vote for male adults, salary for members of Parliament (so that one wouldn't need a private fortune to serve), secret ballot, annual elections and Parliaments, abolition of property qualifications for membership in the House of Commons, and an equalizing of electoral districts (Dawson, 1930, p. 352). Chartism

was not a single movement but a series of varying working-class protests whose aims were often exclusive of one another. . . . Yet it was also a national mass movement, the first of its kind anywhere (p.21). The resistance to the New Poor Law, the campaign for factory reform and a shorter working day, the cooperative and trades union associations--were all brought together and caught up in the first great historical movement of the British working class, the phenomenon known as Chartism (p.19). (Marcus, 1974)

The many-pronged working class agitation that eventually became subsumed under the label of Chartism

was undoubtedly what galvanized social reform through statistical monitoring. What Thompson (1963, p. 808) calls the Reform Bill crisis of the period from 1831 to 1832 was merely the Sarajevo shooting of the Archduke Ferdinand for the technology of social-scientific population management. As Sarajevo was only the proximate cause of World War I, the incorporation of social scientific information-gathering through the statistical presentation of survey data was simply made pressingly necessary by the level of activity and aggressiveness of the working class. It wasn't caused by it in a simplistic linear sense. It was caused by a multitude of factors, going all the way back to the redefinition of humans-in-society carried out over many decades by the new intellectuals for the bourgeoisie. Statistics-gathering had already started in earnest several years before Chartism existed under that name; both had originated among the tangle of social currents splashing in counterpoint between the class which did the work and the class which controlled the processes of that work. The causative factor overarching all given particulars was that

the physical instruments of production were
. . .giving rise in a direct and more-or-less
compulsive way to new social relationships,

institutions, and cultural modes. (Thompson, 1963, p. 191)

Two classes had come into existence for the first time in human history: an industrial working class, grappling with appalling life conditions, and its dizygotic-twin class, clenching the reigns of rule. Exploding at the end of these reigns was a great mass of humanity saying Basta!* And sniping from within the carriage were remnants of the old aristocracy trying to hold on while their ship went down.

The bourgeoisie needed reform in the legal/political structure both to get rid of the enemy in its rear and to stabilize its structural relationship with the working class. And the working class, for its part, needed socially-enforceable definitions of its legal and political standing in the new system. Bourgeois democracy was for them a necessary condition for survival in the new system but not a sufficient condition for their emancipation as human beings. For the

*
Enough! Reference is to Ernesto Che Guevara's 1960's description of peoples in Latin America, Asia, and Africa who were in armed struggle against western imperialism.

ruling class, however, it was both a necessary and a sufficient condition of existence. Social science should be seen as but one among many social inventions made in their behalf to keep their system afloat.

The First Social Surveys

Starting a few decades into the 19th century, the Parliament of Great Britain began operation of its own social-data collection service. Together with the concurrently-established Statistical Societies, the Parliamentary Commissions they set up were the earliest example of the integration of social science-type data collection into a network of intellectual-work support structures for governing institutions. The Statistical Societies and the Parliamentary Commissions were a qualitative change from earlier examples of the gathering of social data. The system of household enumeration which the Anglo-Saxons used in their culture (Oberschall, 1972) was not an enterprise of the same type as our own social science, first and foremost because it did not take place in an industrial society. Similarly, when the London draper John of Graunt published "a systematic analysis of the London parish records on

christenings and deaths (Lecuyer and Oberschall, 1968, p. 36) in 1662, he was not yet operating within an intellectual-work enterprise whose integration into the problems of governing had been accomplished.

Graunt's Natural and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills of Mortality was not unrelated to problems of governing. It was, in fact, "the first important demonstration of the usefulness of the statistical approach" (Rosen, 1974, p. 179) so vigorously advocated by his friend William Petty, popularizer of Hobbes' term 'political arithmetic' and one of the major social thinkers whose contributions were to be preserved in the work of Bentham. Petty was "a pioneer in the quantitative study of social phenomena" (Rosen, 1974, p. 178), and had "outlined a complete scheme for a political, economic, social, and health survey" (Rosen, 1974, p.180). But he operated within the framework of mercantilism, almost two centuries before the mature industrial period. The mercantilist proposition that population was a factor of production (Lazarsfeld, 1961; Rosen, 1974) "led to the first significant attempts to apply statistical methods to the public health" (Rosen, 1974, p. 178) in England, during Petty's lifetime.

However, "despite their bold and penetrating character, the ideas of Petty. . .had no immediately tangible results" (Rosen, 1974, p. 178). The capability for the gathering of social data was not yet a practical possibility due to absence of "a well-developed local administrative mechanism operating under centralized control (Rosen, 1974, p. 178). Nor was it yet widely recognized to be pressingly necessary; this view wasn't to come into its own until the beginning of the 19th century. The material conditions were not yet ripe. The monstrous conurbations of the Midlands industrial strip had not yet come into existence. The working class was not to take its place as a full-fledged social class for about another century and three-quarters (Thompson, 1963). In consequence, social data-gathering was far from a hegemonic idea yet.

It would become so soon, however. As events in society worked themselves out, ideas about how to organize social struggles and about how to manage social struggles were being developed and put into use by the contending classes. Socialism was a strong organizing body of ideas, for the working class. Social science, on the other hand, was a managing body of ideas, for the class of people who governed. It is this factor, I

would argue, which is the key distinguishing characteristic of "modern" social science. Its creation and maintenance is part of the ongoing project of rationalizing the capitalist order.

The view at the beginning is perhaps the clearest. In the opening words of their journal series, the Statistical Society of London explained statistics in this way:

The word Statistics is of German origin, and is derived from the word staat, signifying the same as our English word state, or a body of men existing in a social union. Statistics, therefore, may be said, in the words of the Prospectus of this Society, to be the ascertaining and bringing together of those 'facts which are calculated to illustrate the condition and prospects of society;' and the object of Statistical Science is to consider the results which they produce, with the view to determining those principles upon which the well-being of society depends. (Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 1, 1839, p.1)

Determining principles for whom? The Annals of the Royal Statistical Society (1934) tells us that in their original membership list

the nobility and gentry of England were fully represented. . . (p. 13). It is not to be supposed that all the nobles and gentlemen maintained a great or continuing interest in the Society. But their names are important as indicating how widespread was the feeling that it was imperative that there should be some organization which would collect and marshal facts without party bias (p. 15). (Annals of the Royal Statistical Society, 1934)

But with class bias. An in-house history of the Manchester Statistical Society says:

The founders consisted of a small group of friends, all under forty years of age, all men of philanthropic and literary taste, and all connected in some degree with local industry or banking. (Ashton, 1977, p.4)

They were those who owned, managed, and controlled the capital generated from the industrial enterprises which had firmly set their grip on the society overall. But because they claimed the non-bias of science,

the Manchester Society of a century ago could conduct inquiries which no Government could then have undertaken without exciting the distrust inspired by an inquisition, or the suspicion aroused by a tax collector. (Ashton, 1977, p. viii)

Thomas Malthus, Charles Babbage, and Adolphe Quetelet were among those involved in the Royal Statistical Society's formation, for example. Malthus gave us the underlying ideology for the contemporary Rockefellers' Zero Population Growth enterprises. Computers descended from Babbage's work. And Quetelet, along with others, gave birth to the IQ test. Certainly no one could accuse these people of being intellectual workers for the working class.

The mode of social data-gathering which utilizes statistics, and which began in the early part of the 19th

century in England, was the first within the rationality of the system dominated by the industrial bourgeoisie. It quite consciously defined itself as being in service to their state. This consciousness is no longer alive for us on a stratum-wide basis. Today our definition of ourselves includes a disclaimer on the point of class allegiance. Our work is said to be protected from bias by its 'value-freeness' and by 'academic freedom.' Class domination in society is merely backdrop to normalcy, the background radiation discounted by scientific sleuths.

One noted British scholar argues that our ancestors' consciousness was different:

From the [eighteen] thirties onwards middle class people were continuously digging channels by which working class demands could be drained away from the foundations of property. . . . And in the good years there was thought to be safety in social science and administrative reform. (Macgregor, 1957, p. 154)

Clearly, social science was for the purposes of administrative reform. Elements of the ruling class in England had turned to the gathering of social data quite consciously in self-defense:

Social research and social policy derived essentially from professional middle-class anxieties to maintain the stability of institutions by correcting the measured costs and inefficiencies of social wastage (p. 154).

The stench of urban poverty drove thoughtful, vigorous, unsentimental middle-class people --doctors, bankers, those experienced in insurance, and the like--to the study of social pathology. They organized themselves up and down the country in statistical and philosophical societies for the investigation of the accumulating consequences of urban and technological growth (p. 147). (Macgregor, 1957)

The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society supplied the governing class with "quantitative commentary on the trends of social change and the social incidence and running costs of expansive industrialism" (Beales, 1946, p. 17).

What was happening in the daily lives of the masses of the people who had been constituted by history the first industrial working class in world history? In a 100-year retrospective written in 1934, an official historian of one of the first Statistical Societies has this sense of the situation to offer, in his description of the role immigration from Ireland and the countryside played in the birth of the social science process:

No town could build quickly enough to provide proper homes for the newcomers. They crowded into the houses that the middle class vacated as they moved to the green fields and pure air of the outskirts. They packed into cellar dwellings along the banks of the Irwell and Medlock--open sewers that bore to the sea the refuse of many towns on a stream so slow that the sparrows could find footing on the filth that encrusted its surface. . . .Corporate

maladies on a scale hitherto unknown made it imperative that Manchester men should turn to social inquiry. (Ashton, 1977, p. 2)

The place was south-central Manchester in 1831, cotton-textile capital of "the great manufacturing district in the centre of the British Islands" (Engels, 1973, p. 78). Whether imported from Ireland or 'imported' from the countryside, the working class population of England was centralized in the cities. Anyone who has been in the capitalist-dominated portions of the Third World and seen what the Spanish-speaking people of North and South America call El Cordon de la Miseria will recognize the living conditions of the people who performed the industrial work in Britain during the 19th century. 'The Belt of Misery'--like the South Tehran or the South Bronx of the contemporary globe--is a hallmark of the industrial city under capitalism.

Of the many contemporary descriptions of Manchester in the second quarter of the 19th century, two are particularly interesting. They were published 13 years apart, both in book form. The first was by one Dr. Kay-Shuttersworth, an early actor in the kind of social data-gathering enterprise whose continuous tradition over the years has metamorphosed into present-day social science. The second was by Friederich Engels, himself

of owner-class origins, who before ever hearing of Karl Marx

forsook the company and the dinner-parties, the port-wine and champaign of the middle-classes, and devoted my leisure-hours almost exclusively to the intercourse with plain Working-Men. (Engels, 1973, p. 9)

James Phillips Kay-Shuttlesworth's The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes Employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester, published in 1832, explains the social-scientific philosophy of policy-formation in the opening words of chapter one:

Self-knowledge, inculcated by the maxim of the ancient philosopher, is a precept not less appropriate to societies than to individuals. The physical and moral evils by which we are personally surrounded, may be more easily avoided when we are distinctly conscious of their existence; and the virtue and health of society may be preserved, with less difficulty, when we are acquainted with the sources of its errors and diseases. (Kay-Shuttlesworth, 1969, p.17)

Representing a bourgeoisie in terror of the miasma-bred cholera, Kay-Shuttlesworth was secretary of one of Manchester's Boards of Health, newly established to keep watch on the population (Rosen, 1974).

The introduction into this country of a singularly malignant contagious malady, which, though it selects its victims from every order of society, is chiefly propagated amongst those whose health is depressed by disease, mental anxiety, or want of the comforts and conveniences of life, has directed public attention to an investigation of the state of the poor. (Kay-Shuttlesworth, 1969, p. 19)

Confined to oatmeal and potatoes as their dietary staple, the working population of Manchester

is crowded into one dense mass, in cottages separated by narrow, unpaved, and almost pestilential streets, in an atmosphere loaded with the smoke and exhalations of a large manufacturing city. The operatives are congregated in rooms and workshops during twelve hours in the day, in an enervating, heated atmosphere, which is frequently loaded with dust or filaments of cotton, or impure from constant respiration, or from other causes. (Kay-Shuttlesworth, 1969, p.24)

It would be incorrect, however, to think that Kay-Shuttlesworth's investigative efforts were narrowly preoccupied with the health care of the working population of his home city. In his "Forward" to the 1969 edition, E.L. Burney instructs us that the book

laid the facts before the public but it also goes on to provide and suggest the remedies. It points out that these horrible conditions of life of the workers lay at the root of the contemporary malaise and unrest in civil society. To restore peace and prosperity it was vitally necessary to remove the underlying causes. . . . The full title. . . tends to perpetuate the idea that Dr. Kay is merely stating the conditions under which a limited, though significant, section of the working class existed in a single town but, on reading it, one sees that it is a pamphlet of national importance and deals with national problems such as immigration, trade unions and free trade. (Kay-Shuttlesworth, 1969, no page number)

Writing in his 1892 "Preface to the English Edition" of The Condition of the Working-Class in England, Friedrich Engels calls "free trade"

the readjustment of the whole home and foreign, commercial and financial policy of England in accordance with the interests of the manufacturing capitalists--the class which now represented the nation (p. 32). . . .The Free Trade theory was based upon one assumption: that England was to be the one great manufacturing centre of an agricultural world (p. 35). (Engels, 1973)

For Engels, Manchester was

that classic soil on which English manufacture has achieved its masterwork and from which all labor movements emanate. (Engels, 1973, p. 80)

Treading in Kay-Shuttlesworth's footsteps a little over a decade later, Engels

could. . .confirm, not only Dr. Kay's description of the areas he visited, but the fact that much of the squalor and wretchedness still existed (Burney, 1969, no page number)

Manchester held in 'classic' (i.e., historically original) form

the degradation to which the application of steam-power machinery and the division of labour reduce the workingman, and the attempts of the proletariat to rise above this abasement. (Engels, 1973, p. 81)

He saw

working people's quarters, stretching like a girdle, averaging a mile and a half in breadth, around the commercial district. Outside, beyond this girdle, lives the upper and middle bourgeoisie. . . .And the finest part of the arrangement is this, that the members of this money aristocracy can take the shortest road through the middle of all the labouring districts to their places of business, without ever seeing that they are in the midst of the grimy misery that lurks to the right and the left. For the thoroughfares leading from

the Exchange in all directions out of the city are lined, on both sides, with an almost unbroken series of shops. (Engels, 1973, p. 85)

The lack of contrast between Engels' account of the first industrial city created by capitalism and a contemporary journalist's account of the main road through South Teheran is arresting:

Brick-and-marble buildings with glass store-fronts line Shirekhorshid Avenue. Behind them runs a bewildering network of serpentine paths that stop, start, drop, circle and rise between tens of thousands of mud brick houses. Half of the five million people in Teheran live here /many in/ camps where several hundred families sleep in wobbly tents and three-sided hovels put together from building scraps. (Jaynes, 1979, p.A4)

The classic belt of misery, preserved until today in form and substance. Only in the socialist parts of the planet have human beings structured the Cordon de la Miseria out of their industrializing societies. The social-data gathering started up in the 1830s amounted perhaps to a taking of puny arms against a sea of troubles. It did not--for it was not so conceived and designed--dissolve the contradictions that give rise still to the shantytowns of capitalism.

Engels was an interpreter of society for the working class. When he laid out the panorama of capitalism, he did it with an eagle's eye for its dismal details. From a bridge in north-central Manchester, Engels

looked out over a typical neighborhood where people lived and worked in 1843.

The view from this bridge, mercifully concealed from mortals of small stature by a parapet as high as a man, is characteristic for the whole district. At the bottom flows, or rather stagnates, the Irk, a narrow, coal-black, foul-smelling stream, full of debris and refuse, which it deposits on the shallower right bank. In dry weather, a long string of the most disgusting, blackish-green, slime pools are left standing on this bank, from the depths of which bubbles of miasmatic gas constantly arise and give forth a stench unendurable even on the bridge forty or fifty feet above the surface of the stream. But besides this, the stream itself is checked every few paces by high weirs, behind which slime and refuse accumulate and rot in thick masses. Above the bridge are tanneries, bonemills, and gasworks, from which all drains and refuse find their way into the Irk, which receives further the contents of all the neighboring sewers and privies. It may be easily imagined, therefore, what sort of residue the stream deposits. Below the bridge you look upon the piles of debris, the refuse, filth, and offal from the courts on the steep left bank; here each house is packed close behind its neighbour and a piece of each is visible, all black, smoky, crumbling, ancient, with broken panes and window-frames. The background is furnished by old barrack-like factory buildings. On the lower right bank stands a long row of houses and mills; the second house being a ruin without a roof, piled with debris; the third stands so low that the lowest floor is uninhabitable, and therefore without windows or doors. Here the background embraces the pauper burialground, the station of the Liverpool and Leeds railway, and, in the rear of this, the Workhouse, the 'Poor-Law Bastille' of Manchester, which, like a citadel, looks threateningly down from behind its high walls and parapets on the hilltop, upon the working-people's quarter below. (Engels, 1973, p. 89)

Evoking the image of the medieval headquarters of all succor and all punishment, the workhouse assaulted without letup the social consciousness of the working people whose daily paces were measured in its shadow. Perhaps second generation working class immigrants to the United States can remember hearing from their parents of the fear of the poorhouse in the Old World whence their parents had come, part of the river of labor imported for the industrial work in this country. In newly capitalist England, the workhouse was for the incarceration of the unemployed. Just 12 years before Engels stood on Ducie Bridge, its role as deterrent factor had been heavily reinforced by The New Poor Law of 1834. Lynchpin in a containment strategy which, like the global machinations of John Foster Dulles, was supposed to safely keep the enemy at bay, the New Poor Law was the triumphal world debut of what a structured social science enterprise could do. It was to feed-in data necessary for the 1834 amendment of the Poor Law legislation in England that His Majesty's 'Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws' set out in 1832 to gather-up

the most extensive, and at the same time the

most consistent body of evidence that was ever brought to bear on a single subject. (British Sessional Papers, 1834, vol.27, p. 3)

They queried

many thousands of witnesses, of every rank and of every profession and employment, members of the two Houses of Parliament, clergymen, country gentlemen, magistrates, farmers, manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants. (British Sessional Papers, 1834, vol. 27, p. 3)

The replies they received are reproduced, along with the questions they asked, in volumes 30-36 of the British Sessional Papers, 1834. Leafing through them shows that the vast bulk of the respondents were everyone but the poor themselves. Who were these Commissioners, and for what social class did they do their work?

They were, first of all, entirely men. They were men not unlike Dr. Kay-Shuttlesworth, of whom it was said that "The instrument of his mental activity was social science" (Ashton, 1977, p. 6). They were not unlike the son of a merchant banker, William Langton, who had suggested the idea of such an investigation to his colleague-in-banking, Kay-Shuttlesworth. Langton did so because "he came to realize the need of some agency for collecting social data" (Ashton, 1977, p. 5). Social science had developed, with the times, into a hegemonic idea. The owner-ruler class was putting it to use in the clear belief that it would do it some good. The

Royal Commissioners were the staff workers of Parliament's social data collection service, established in February of 1832.

The politics of the Royal Commissioners and those others who carried out their mission in statistics-gathering forays was authoritatively explained in the first issue of the Statistical Society of London's Journal:

The Council of the Statistical Society of London is of the opinion that the time has arrived when the Fellows of the Society, and the public, will hail with satisfaction the appearance of a Journal devoted to the collection and comparison of Facts which illustrate the condition of mankind, and tend to develop the principles by which the progress of society is determined. It is within the last few years only that the Science of Statistics has been at all actively pursued in this country; and it may not, even now, be unnecessary to explain to general readers its objects, and to define its province. (Journal of the Statistical Society of London, vol. 1, 1839, p. 1; emphasis added).

The text went on to explain the derivation of the word 'statistics' from 'Staat,' as quoted above. It continued, explaining that

The Science of Statistics. . . does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which can alone form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to social and political government. (Journal of the Statistical Society of London, vol. 1, 1839, p.1)

The Royal Statistical Society deftly captured its own social role in its emblem: a bound-up sheaf of wheat with the words (in Latin) "To be threshed out by others" (Annals of the Royal Stastical Society, 1934, p. 5).

The wheat stalks stood for the data.

But who were the "others" who would survey the numbers and tell what should be done? The "others" were persons acting on behalf of the social class which held state power. The propriety of working for that class was sometimes a consciously- and sometimes an unconsciously-held assumption on the part of those who did the work. In either case, those who gathered the data seem to have been immunized from grasping the illicit domination capitalism exercised throughout the society. Perhaps the faith of objectivity effected their inoculation:

It is not, however, true that the Statist rejects all deductions, or that Statistics consist merely of columns of figures; it is simply required that all conclusions shall be drawn from well-attested data, and shall admit of mathematical demonstration. (Journal of the Statistical Society of London, vol. 1, 1839, p. 3)

Marcus analyzed the Poor Law Reform Act as a key legislative piece of rationalizing technology for capitalism. The early 1830s in England

was, in addition to the Reform Act of 1832, a period of famous and infamous legislation. The chief infamy occurred in 1834 with the passage into law of the Poor Law Reform Act (the New Poor Law), without doubt one of the most despised and hated pieces of lawmaking in the entire history of England. The law was as modern, up-to-date and socially scientific as Jeremy Bentham himself could have wished for. . . . It provided England with a new model for administrative machinery--centralized decision-making on substantive issues of policy, professionalized civil servants,

bureaucratic rationality. (Marcus, 1974, p. 16)

Marcus called the faith of objectivity "Bentham's binaries." The faith permitted social researchers and policy-makers to understand the social problems of capitalism on an abstract level, effecting a cut in their human contact with the subject population.* It helped to make it look as if rulers were concerned about anyone other than themselves.

The most rational and efficient policy would have been simply to abolish the poor, who were 'redundant' anyway. Since taboos rendered this course impracticable, the reformers resorted to Bentham's binaries --maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain --whereupon the print-out delivered to them the principle of 'less Eligibility.' It was now necessary to enter the workhouse to be eligible for relief, and conditions there were to be made so miserable, so repellent, so harsh, so unpleasant, so punitive that the destitute poor would be likely to choose any kind of existence on the outside rather than seek relief within. If there seems today to be a touch of insanity in such proceedings it is to be ascribed not to the individual persons who were involved but in the way they had chosen to conceive of the questions at stake. The structure imposed by them upon this immense problem--and hence the structure of their 'solution' to it--was purely that of formal, economic rationality: the English poor were to have the privilege of being the first

*The "binaries" approach was Babbage's every bit as much as it was Bentham's; for it is binaries into which we must cast our questions if we want to use computers. Computer-type social science has occasionally been used to the advantage of our side, however.

group whose humanity was cost-accounted.
(Marcus, 1974, p. 17)

How did the Commissioners conceive the questions they asked about human social behavior? The investigation was undertaken because poverty was held to be caused by the existing Poor Laws, which allegedly made it too attractive to be unemployed by making it too easy for persons on the dole. Thus, they conceived their questions from the point of view of the interests of the owner-employer class. Macgregor says of this operation:

The empirical investigation before the Poor Law of 1834 was the least open minded, the most concerned to validate the dogmatic presuppositions of political economy. . . /compared to others before 1850/.
/The Poor Law of 1834/ reduced the adult, able-bodied male to the status of a depersonalized factor of production. (Macgregor, 1957, p.148)

It treated people as if they were things, to be transported from place to place like other factors of production. More than anything else a regulation of the unemployed, the Poor Law depended for its existence on the social science activity of our positivist tradition's first institutionalized appearance.

The Poor Law Commissioners described their objectives in these words:

To make a dilligent and full inquiry into the practical operation of the Laws for the Relief of the Poor in England and Wales, and into the manner in which those laws are administered, and to

report our opinion whether any and what alterations, amendments or improvements may be beneficially made in the said laws, or in the manner of administering them, and how the same may be best carried into effect. (British Sessional Papers, 1834, vol. 27, p. 1)

Beneficial to whom? By now we have established who is assumed to be the appropriate class to work for. Even though, the original professors of social data-gathering understood themselves as humanitarian social reformers whose mission it was to make The Great Society happen, the question to ask is what, in historical actuality, did their social data-collection activities contribute toward? Which class interests did their work advance?

A New Spirit Came over the Masters

It's generally over time that it becomes possible to answer the question of which class did social science work in any given period serve. Writing 58 years after the Poor Law Commissioners, and writing from the class perspective of the working people,* Friederick Engels was able to tell us his reflections on observed outcomes of the class warfare he had originally described in 1844.

* Except Irish working people. Engels was thoroughly racist toward Irish people in his 1845 book on the working class in England; nor did he retract in his 1892 preface.

In a retrospective "Preface to the English Edition," written and published in 1892, he drew his conclusions about the series of rationalizing reforms following hot upon the Reform Act of 1832. They were, he wrote,

quite. . . in favour of the giant-capitalist in his competition with his less favoured brother. Moreover, the larger the concern, and with it the number of hands, the greater the loss and inconvenience caused by every conflict between master and men; and thus a new spirit came over the masters, especially the large ones, which taught them to avoid unnecessary squabbles. (Engels, 1973, p. 27)

The time was late in the 19th century. The results of the rationalizing reforms in which the first generation of social science workers had played so pivotal a role early in the century were by then a matter of recent historical record. Working in the class service of the capitalists collectively, the early Commissioners and subsequent practitioners of the rising art had made their contributions count on the giant capitalist's side of the scale.

Increasingly dominant-within-the-dominant, the giant corporation was already in formation. As Engels indicates, human-facotr requirements within the rationality of the more centrally-capitalized sectors of the economy were somewhat different than in the myriad small-business jungles ruled by Simon Legrees. Earlier, every little

mote of advantage employer could gain over employee was another tuppence in the boss'pocket. But with trade expanded during the second half of the century to a world market, such "petty thefts upon the workpeople did no longer pay" (Engels, 1973, p. 27). As the material forces of production develop into historically new forms, so also do factors within the relations of production change and develop. Under conditions of increasing centralization of capital, conflicts between master and worker drained profit away. The new spirit which came over the masters spoke a strategic ideology of class harmony. Reform had become an ism, an institutionalized posture on the part of the rulers toward their subjects. And with it, supplying the helium to make it fly, the enterprise of social science grew fatter.

Why social science? According to an exceptionally fine British historian of social science,

Modern capitalism is in fact a mode of production in which general social knowledge has become an increasingly important component of the forces of production. . . .The transformation of the division of labour means that the production of knowledge is no longer a general and largely undeveloped attribute of ordinary social activity and of the basic social groups, nor a secondary function of intellectual groups outside production. Instead it becomes a specific, distinct function within all branches of production, and increasingly a branch of production in its own right, feeding into all other branches. It becomes correspondingly, not only a specific and acknowledged

attribute of a growing proportion of all productive workers, but also the sole activity of specialized groups of productive workers. (Shaw, 1975, pp. 6-7)

Social scientists are one of the those specialized groups of productive workers. Although it's not alone, social science is among the enterprises engaged in producing the kind of social knowledge that is a force of production in the industrial period. For

The system's constant tendency to revolutionize the means of production and to develop the labour-power which it uses requires the transformation not just of its natural but also of its human 'material'. (Shaw, 1975, p. 11)

The social sciences were an invention for working on the human 'material,' one among several constantly changing factors of production. The inescapable contradiction was that the flesh-and-blood "human factors" had to live in a society whose rules could hardly be said to have been made to serve their interests.

It is, then, precisely the problematic nature of the social goals of the organisation of production (and hence of society at large), which gives rise to the modern social sciences in all their many levels of existence. Class struggle gives rise at the same time to the need for social science within the process of production, for layers of social science-trained administrators and educators moulding the workforce outside production, and for a more sophisticated theoretical justification of the existing social order. The practical revolt of the working class is reflected, as we shall see, both in the emergence of technical social-scientific manipulation in industry, and in major changes in the structure of abstract social thought. (Shaw, 1973, p.13)

Following Marx, Lichtman (1975) counselled to seek reasons for institutional configurations in the process of extraction of surplus value itself. When we look there, we find the principle social goal of the organization of capitalist production is to increase the measure of social wealth under the control of the owner (individual or corporation). This gives rise to a host of consequences whose collective effect is to stimulate class antagonisms. Physical science manipulates the non-living factors of production. The human factor is social science terrain. But unlike a machine, the human factor had a brain which thought about what was happening to it, and emotions which reacted to its everyday life circumstances. Acting in response to conditions imposed upon them as the class who performed the work, the people of the "human factor" fought back against capitalism's everyday assaults. Thus it happened that social science has class struggle as its medium of existence.

Conclusion

We have looked in some detail into the pre-giant corporation period of capitalism, the period when the first practice we can reasonably call social science was created. We saw that social science was an enabling factor throughout the rationalizing legislation that cascaded after

the Reform Act of 1832. We have seen its original shaping as a class-biased practice, in the sense that it was for one class (the dominant one) as against the other. The kinds of class-specific problems it addressed had to do with how to govern over the massive population of working people in England.

The working class was massive, but was ruled by a tiny percentage of the population. This tiny percentage had, among other assets, a laborforce of intellectual workers for investigating and commenting upon the social world from its class perspective. The main job of their big stable of organic intellectuals was to help the system of the rule of the few over the many to stay in business.

Positivistic social science's birth cry was to assemble some of the building materials of the institutional rule of the class-biased society we have under capitalist social arrangements. Part of the record its practitioners left is the literature of the Parliamentary Blue Books. Marx used the Parliamentary Blue Books as a source of evidence for the arguments he developed in Capital. The British Sessional Papers 1834, vols.27-49, entitled "Reports from the Poor Law Commissioners," are among the volumes in the several shelf-long Parliamentary

Blue Books. They are an archive of the historically earliest social science raw data.

In the case of industrializing England, we can see in some detail how intellectual workers for opposing social classes put these data to very different uses. We have discussed some of the uses to which its owner-class put it. Marx's work, Engels' work, and the work of a great many others in the period, was for the working class. Their enterprise did not develop into our present day social science. The working class' organic intellectuals did not receive institutional support from society-wide structures; it was the bourgeoisie's organic intellectuals who did, among them the social scientists. They followed in the new spirit that came over the masters, expanding their own creative horizons as the class needs of what Peter Franks(1975) calls their 'clients' reached into new problems of social organization.

I have attempted to demonstrate why, in what form, and for whom positivistic social science took shape in western society. I have argued that social science, as an ideology and as a practical activity, was first in flower on this earth in the first capitalist country on the planet. I have brought evidence to support the

view that social science was shaped by and for the class which was more and more wielding state power during the long period of the making of capitalism in England. Evidence has been presented in the form of interpretation of original documents from the period, and in the form of the judgments of scholars who worked on other original documents. Finally, I have argued that social science was, at its inception, for the purpose of rationalizing the institutional workings of the mode of human social organization known historically as capitalism.

CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL SCIENCE GOES MULTINATIONAL

Introduction

After England, the 19th-century industrial hurricane struck more or less simultaneously on the European continent and in U.S. terrain. In Germany, the legal basis for traditional ownership claims on people as workers passed into history in 1807, when serfdom was abolished upon Prussia's defeat by Napoleon. It was still to take 60 years for the "free" labor plank in the legal wall of the bourgeois order to extend throughout the land in the United States. But by the last quarter of the century, industrialization dominated both German and U.S. societies down to the last detail of everyday life. Just as in England, working people in other places had to band together and build adversary organizations as a matter of basic self-preservation.

In the United States, the people of the huge labor force imported to staff the machinery of manufacture brought with them experiences and ideas of their places of origin. Often, they were places of long-standing traditions of organizing militantly in one's self-interest.

Some of them were even places where Karl Marx and friends had organized The International Workingmen's Association, whose statement of principles was called the Manifesto of the Communist Party and whose spectre haunted every ruling-class closet in Europe.

In the United States, struggles represented under headings like "assimilation into the melting pot" would have been more nearly described by terms like "culture-breaking" or "instilling industrial discipline." Population management was the name of the game, as far as the people of the class in power were concerned. Karl Marx and associates called it class struggle.

Social science tailed on developments in the larger framework. From its English beginnings, it branched into social management policy for Bismarck's program of national unification and industrialization which was to change Germany in 30 years from an aggregate of agricultural principalities to a full rival among capitalist imperialists.

Late 19th-century scions of the U.S. industrial bourgeoisie were sent from the United States to Germany for their training in the theory and practice of social administration. The brand of social-science-cum-social-administration they imported on their return had been

worked out in the caldrons of European industrializing. It would be tempered by the traditions and conditions of the U.S. national experience.

Cameralism

Descriptive statistics work had been afoot in varying amounts and applications in France and Belgium as well as in England and in Germany from the early 18th century onward. But it was the German cultural area which alone had a long tradition of intellectuals directly serving the state. This traditional practice was to be one of those rivulets which, collected all together, eventually transmogrified into the practice of social science. It was not necessarily the most important tributary, but it certainly was one of the important ones to know about.

The practice reached well back into the 16th century, when a collection of princely fiefdoms occupied the territory now called Germany. It was called cameralism, after the German word Kammer (room), referring to the treasury room. The bottom-line responsibility of the cameralist intellectual workers in the princely administration was to figure out how to provide the state with revenues to conduct the endemic wars of the period. But

their functions were a good deal more elaborate than that.

Historian of sociology Reinhardt Bendix said that the lack of preconditions for the development of capitalist infrastructure throughout the German region retarded the growth of private entrepreneurs. Only the state apparatus could carry out the functions necessary to do business, for the tariff barricade at the border and the change to the next state's currency were never far away. Industrialization would eventually require removal of tariffs between the German states and institution of tariffs around their perimeter to protect nascent enterprises from foreign competition. Only a centralized administration could achieve this. For another, it would require a railway network, mass education, standardized currency and financial procedures, a unified code of law--in a word, infrastructure. These too could eventually be seen to by a central state apparatus. For several reasons, then, cameralisms' central tenet emphasized "the important economic duties and leadership that the state must undertake" (Hutchison, 1966, p. 132). The state

took an active interest in the cameralistic sciences which outlined among other things procedures for the administration of economic affairs. The state required a large bureaucracy to administer its policies, and this was possible only

by a systematic training of officials. This character of the cameralistic sciences is perhaps most accurately shown by the name which many of the cameralists gave to it: 'The science of policing.' (Bendix, 1943, p. 41)

One of the pioneer developers of sociology in the United States went so far as to describe cameralism as "inchoate social sciences" (Small, 1909, p. xv). Insofar as social science amounts to more than the sum of its various pieces of hardware, it must be considered to have both an overarching perspective on society and a means for mediating between its body of ideas and the everyday affairs of governing. We saw the former at work in England, in the form of evolving social theory. We saw a version of the latter as well, in the form of the Parliamentary research commissions. But it wasn't until Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck that the institutionalization of the modern social science enterprise began to be worked out in the form with which we are familiar today. Cameralism is what served as its foundation and guideline.

Initially, cameralism referred simply to policies developed by those whose intellectual workplace was within the princely governments. Although its name remained the same, cameralist doctrine changed over time.

Cameralism was an administrative technology. . . .
It was a theory of managing natural resources
and human capacities so that they would be most

lucrative for the prince in whose interest the management was conducted. (Small, 1909, p.591)

The cameralists were a series of German writers and working bureaucrats, from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, who approached civic problems from a common viewpoint, who proposed the same central question, and who developed a coherent civic theory, corresponding with the German system of administration at the same time in course of evolution. To the cameralists the central problem of science was the problem of the state. To them the object of all social theory was to show how the welfare of the state might be secured. They saw in the welfare of the state the source of all other welfare. (Small, 1909, pp. vii-viii)

Cameralism was a technique and a theory of administering. . . .The purposes of the state were paramount. The cameralists were servants of the state. Cameralism was the system elaborated by the chief agents of the rulers, partly as mere classification of practices which rulers had already adopted; partly as ways and means of accomplishing more of the purposes which the state proposes. (Small, 1909, pp.3-4)

Given this, the obvious question is "what does this have to do with the course of social science?" The answer is to be found in what happened next, what grew in the fields developed by the practitioners of cameralism over the course of two and a half centuries. In contrast to the social thought developed in post-medieval England, thematic emphasis in cameralism was on the nation as a political unit, even though each "nation" was tiny.*

*At the time of the French Revolution, "Germany" consisted of more than 300 such independent fiefdoms (Borchardt,1973, p. 85).

The absolute ruler of each such "nation" was without question the person on whom the welfare of all subjects depended. In order to safeguard the national welfare, the ruler had to be able to finance and otherwise maintain a military force; hence the origin of cameralistics in the treasury-room. In this respect, cameralism resembled the mercantilism of England and France. It differed from it on the question of centralization of responsibility for governing.

National unification and a centralized administration had long since been achieved in England under the system of agriculture-based production. Evolving social theory there was aimed at dislodging the particular class whose power was approaching the end of its tether. Thus a theory emerged which preached that the central (outgoing) authorities had best keep their regulatory grip off the development of economic forms. They'd better let

be: laissez-faire.*

In Germany, the logic differed, as it was a different place, with a different historical experience and practice, and therefore a different theory. Both places were in system transformation from the agriculture-based, aristocracy-ruled society of recent tradition. Theories of society and how to govern moved in cadence with system motion.

*At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that this stricture was two-faced. Its full literal meaning was intended to disarm pre-capitalist ruling institutions. But its applicability to the bourgeois state was variable according to convenience:

A political structure functional to the operation and development of a capitalist economy--in Marxist terms a bourgeois state--was the fundamental political programme of nascent English political economy. . . .The principle of laissez-faire from the very beginning meant not state passivity but, basically, acceptance of the economic laws of capitalism. . . .There is a fundamental continuity in the political conception of economic theory. From the classics to Keynes the amount of state intervention considered necessary for the successful reproduction of capitalism has certainly increased considerably. That such intervention--over and above the guarantees of army and police --was necessary and useful, was part of the theoretical corpus of classicism as well as of mercantilism. (Therborn, 1976, p.85)

As a body of doctrine. . .the analysis of the Cameralists was in terms of the traditional order of things, and reflected in all its structure, the structure, economic and otherwise, of the society in which it came into being. As such a body of doctrine it stood in sharp contrast with those features of economic liberalism, which were developing in England and France and of which Adam Smith was the most effective spokesman, with their emphasis on a changing order, freedom of individual initiative in matters economic, and the minimum of regulation and administration in keeping with such freedom. (Hasek, 1925, p.44)

Compared to possessive individualism, cameralism looked rearward in time. This was because industrialization in Germany was out of phase with the process in England by more than half a century. But since Capitalism was in growth within the very body of the old order, the cameralists did address themselves to it in at least some measure. They knew about developments in England, for example:

Adam Smith and his German disciples were criticized by cameralists in Germany who pointed out the fallacy of erecting universal maxims of political economy on the limited experience of the British. (Rohr, 1963, p.6)

The cameralists of pre-capitalist Germany tread a road sharply different in its scenery than that of their English contemporaries. In elevating national society to the position of first theoretical principle, they differed from their English contemporaries by 180 degrees. They hewed to their own political traditions

and looked to their own situation for evidence of what would work. By the 19th century their clients, as a class, were on their way out and so, therefore, were the particulars of their school of thought. Their theoretical productions were eclipsed by those of their successors, but the practice they had accumulated was not wasted. The principle that the state gathered data in order to operate was already well understood and accepted.

During the second half of the eighteenth century there was little in the way of a scientific interest in social science which could be said to have foreshadowed the development of modern sociology, except for the concern of the state with the collection of data pertaining to its specific, administrative interests. (Bendix, 1943, p. 49)

From Sheaf of Wheat to Sozialpolitik

By the beginning of the 19th century, the German culture area was a pre-industrial portion of the European continent which was in the midst of transforming into an industrial society. Changing with the times, preoccupations on the intellectual-work front began to feature the new elements. "Cameralistics, the primitive science of administration and statecraft" (Ringer, 1969, p. 17), was replaced in the halls of academe by practical education "focussed upon the new discoveries and theories

in geography, politics, mathematics, and the natural sciences" (Ringer, 1969, p. 17).

Cameralism became "woven into a new version of political economy" (Bernert, 1975, p. 125), in which the problems of an industrializing rather than the problems of an agricultural society defined the issues for discourse and debate. The generic name for the modernized sphere of questions of interest was "German Historical School." Not that other "schools" didn't coexist, but that the ideas of the German Historical School ultimately dominated. Further, the German Historical School bears directly on the course of U.S. social science.

Insistence on a national perspective was one thematic consistency with the cameralists preserved in the doctrines of the German Historical School. So was the principle that the state had a duty to adjust its activities in such a way as to further the dominant class' goals and principles. So was the relatively high degree of integration of intellectual workers with the policy-making procedures of governing institutions.

The practical theoreticians of the German Historical School had both traditional thought and present necessity defining their perspective in its broadest dimension. Following the triumphant banner of the

philosophical materialism of their time, they were inductive and historical in their method, searching for reality by assembling the natural history of the social organism under study. They bundled sheafs of wheat, but they threshed them too. Their method was

to gather data concerning the development of specific institutions, enterprises, trades and guilds, the economic policies of states and the method of their administration, the class structure of societies, and the evolution and function of cities. These data were then to be examined in their historical, political and psychological setting. (Ascher, 1963, p. 285)

"The psychological" already formed part of the perspective, along with a number of other considerations. The explicit purpose in thus examining the data collected was to determine detailed social policy. In this respect their footsteps began where their English counterparts had left off. In fact, many of them travelled to Britain to study what their English counterparts did.

Many German merchants and officials visited Britain towards the end of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries to study the innovations and to transmit to Germany their newly acquired knowledge. . . . Until after the middle of the nineteenth century the imitation of foreign models remained of major importance. Not merely machinery but 'social inventions' were copied, i.e., new commercial institutions, mercantile techniques, maxims of economic policy and administrative postures. (Borchardt, 1973, p.82)

They inspected not only English industrial development and social management strategies, but also the

situation in the industrializing United States (Thompson, 1875). They poured forth abundant policy recommendations.

It was a critical time in the capitalist transformation of the German territory. So critical were the problems of managing the process of transformation into industrial capitalism that Bismarck himself paid a personal inspection visit to Manchester just a few months before Engels arrived (Marcus, 1974, p. 90). The larger questions of class relationships between the working people and the owners had to have programmatic answers if the industrial system was to be built.

These were the problems the intellectuals of the German Historical School worked on. They were developing the paradigm, in ideology and in structural form, within which social science in our lifetime is still practiced. Their theory held

that the economic life of a nation could be understood only in the context of the institutions, social patterns, and cultural attitudes in which it had developed. Since these environmental conditions and the nature of economic activity itself were subject to change over time, study of them required the techniques of the historian, rather than those of the natural scientist. Thus, according to the German school, economics was to be an inductive discipline. Its generalizations were to be based upon close and initially unsystematic observation of actual conditions of production and exchange in various countries and periods. The economist was to survey all the

aspects of man's socio-economic life, taking all kinds of motives into account, instead of isolating one special type of behavior in the manner of the classical /English/ school. In this sense, the procedure was to be more purely 'empirical' than that of the English economists. (Ringer, 1969, pp. 144-145)

By the late 1840s,

in connection with these studies and their numerous suggestions for reform, some authors even advocated a national survey of the social conditions prevailing among the working population. (Bendix, 1943, p. 178)

The various social movements of 1840-1850 had prompted them. . . to observe social phenomena in the light of a new discipline that was to furnish the knowledge necessary to counteract these disturbing social trends. (Bendix, 1943, p. 237, emphasis added)

In 1849, someone even introduced a bill into the Prussian legislature calling for the establishment of a centralized practical-academic effort to be called an institute for Sozialpolitik (social policy) (Bendix, 1943, p. 178).

In the view of the academic socialists these movements were not to be combatted by a new science but rather by a close empirical study of the economic conditions responsible for this agitation and by concrete social reforms to be undertaken by the state. (Bendix, 1943, p. 237)

Germany's organic intellectuals of the industrial period had real problems to solve concerning methods for managing the everyday affairs of governing. For the long process of industrializing intensified class strife

in Germany too. Not unlike England, primary industrialization in Germany had been prepared by a transformation of agriculture from its pre-capitalist to its capitalist form. The edict of 1807 which formally abolished serfdom in Prussia created a pauperized rural proletariat available for wage work both on and off the land, while it at the same time raised capital for the large landowners. Germany's own version of enclosures, the "freeing" of the serfs visited the miseries of mass unemployment on the population at large, giving rise, eventually and among other things, to a river of emigration to the laborforce-hungry United States (Bendix, 1943; Borchardt, 1973; Hamerow, 1958; Kuczynski, 1945 and 1967).

For those who remained in the fatherland, living and working conditions became progressively harder to bear.

As in all other countries, the standard of living of German free workers was a very low one in the beginning of the nineteenth century. (Kuczynski, 1945, p. 35)

While the poor quality of the German factory owner's goods caused him often to be beaten on the world market, he surely beat all his competitors in the barbarity of his methods of exploitationConditions in Germany deteriorated for the great mass of the people, partly for reasons effective in all countries going through the phase of early industrial capitalism, and partly because of the relative backwardness of German industry and the coincidence of the emancipation of the peasants with the development of factory

capitalism. With very few exceptions, there is not the slightest doubt among contemporary as well as later writers that the standard of living of the German workers, between the beginning and the end of the period under review, deteriorated very considerably. (Kuczynski, 1945, pp. 38-39)

During the period under review the cost of living fluctuated by over 100 per cent between its low in 1825 and its high in 1847. (Kuczynski, 1945, pp. 31-32)

Although development was uneven, industrialization was a continent-spanning process in Europe. Europe is small; developments in one nation-state are very much affected by developments in others. Warfare and immense fluctuations in the performance of national economies were chronic throughout the region during the 19th century as the system of the machine eclipsed the system of the plow as the dominant way people earned their living. Intellectuals of the earlier German Historical School were contemporaries of Karl Marx. More and more, the character of their practical problems as activist-thinkers were all over the pages of Marx's writings. "Class war" was more and more heard to describe the struggle waged in the daily lives of people in all the countries of Europe (and, let us not forget, in the United States as well).

On midcentury eve a great tremor crackled throughout the continent. Its particulars differed from one

nation-state to another, but its historical point was everywhere the same.

For the bourgeoisie. . . now suddenly discovered that it had not bred just a few industrial workingmen, but a working class, one which, though still half-asleep, was nevertheless slowly awakening and developing into a proletariat, revolutionary by its innermost nature. And this proletariat, which had won the victories for the bourgeoisie everywhere, was now putting forward demands, especially in France, which were incompatible with the continued existence of the whole bourgeois order. On 23 June 1848 the first terrible struggle between the two classes broke out in Paris. The proletariat was defeated after four days of fighting. From that time onward, the mass of the bourgeoisie throughout the whole of Europe went over to the side of reaction, and united with the bureaucrats, nobles and priests whom it had just overthrown with the help of the workers, in order to fight against the 'enemies of society!', these self-same workers. (Engels, 1968, p. 51)

A programmatic statement of a multinational workingpeople's association called the Communist Manifesto had become available to the working people of Paris just before the great insurrection of 1848. The program's "fundamental proposition which forms its nucleus" (Engels, no date, p. 23) was chillingly revolutionary. It said

that in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and

exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class--the proletariat--cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class--the bourgeoisie--without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles. (Engels, no date, pp. 23-24)

Now the streets of Paris didn't exactly connect smoothly with the streets of Berlin, Vienna, or any other of the German cities, but one of the main areas of study among practitioners of the German Historical School quickly enough came to be Die Arbeiterfrage, the question of the industrial working class in Germany. How to get rid of the obstructions to further capital expansion and concentration put up by the industrial workforce. Die Arbeiterfrage was posed in terms of arbitrating between warring social classes in order to achieve social harmony and efficient production. It was thought that the approach which is now called social science would enable arbitration to take place.

The one pervasive characteristic of German social research in the period 1848-1914 was its concern with working class people and their problems. It was essentially motivated by the need for action and reform. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 137)

Many people were disturbed by the class antagonisms that seemed to be sharpening with the rapid advance of industrialization and were anxious to find ways of overcoming them. (Ascher, 1963, p. 282)

The direction of that concern with working class people and their problems was from up downward. The client served by social research was the owner/manager class. The subject population was the class that did the work. The strategy was to pre-empt the arguments of organized people's movements by making some concessions to the changes they demanded, while--most important--keeping the control over whatever changes were to be made strictly in the hands of institutions controlled, in their turn, by the owner/manager class. Reform from above.

The demand that society be made a subject of scientific inquiry arose. . .in conscious opposition to socialism. As such it was an attempt to solve the problems which this radical approach. /Marxism/ had brought to light on the basis of a scientifically acquired knowledge concerning social problems. (Bendix, 1943, p. 141)

About mid-century,

while the concern with social questions was common, an attempt to treat them scientifically was very largely a reaction to the growing power of the socialist movements which were particularly noticeable in France and England, but which were at least anticipated in Germany. (Bendix, 1943, p. 187)

The events of the late 1840s in Germany may have been every bit as dramatic as those in Paris for the parties concerned, but at no time did the far less developed German working class threaten to achieve state

power. Even the bourgeoisie did not succeed in attaining definitive political power.

A series of hunger-driven uprisings by peasants, artisans, and other workers, together with final financial collapse for the business class, drove the Old Order into impotence in 1848. But instead of clear-cut political victory, the bourgeoisie had to settle for partial reforms in favor of the system of capital (Hamerow, 1958; Henderson, 1975).

The revolution of 1848. . . transformed the state into an outwardly constitutional form in which the bourgeoisie could establish and extend its political domination. Despite this, the bourgeoisie was still far from exercising real political power. (Engels, 1968, p. 92)

They had secured a share, albeit a modest one, in political power. (Engels, 1968, p. 31)

The process of industrialization in Germany had nevertheless reached its "take-off" level. From mid-century on it began to rise exponentially, and with it working people as a social class. The struggle for hegemony over the consciousness of the mass of the working population proceeded apace.

On the side of the working people, the most advanced ideology was developed by the leadership of the International Workingmen's Association and their affiliates. United fronts multiplied their influence. The section

of the Communist Manifesto entitled "Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties" said:

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation and with a much more developed proletariat than what existed in England in the seventeenth and in France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution. (Marx and Engels, no date, pp. 112-113)

Accuracy of prediction aside, the necessity to govern directly was apparent to at least a sector of the working class in Germany, and the working class was getting organized. For the side of the owners, the intellectual workers of the German Historical School advanced programs of pre-emptive social reform designed to avert armed class war. The organization they eventually

spawned was called the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, or Association for Social Policy. The Verein was the first modern policy research organization, the model quickly to be imported, turnkey-fashion, into the United States.

The Verein fur Sozialpolitik

In 1872,

most of leading economists and about 60 civil servants, journalists and businessmen founded the Verein fur Sozialpolitik for the purpose of sponsoring detailed researches on contemporary problems and urging the state to initiate a program of social reform. (Ascher, 1963, pp. 285-286)

They were also called Kathedersozialisten, socialists of the lecturn. They had the Paris Commune of 1871 nipping at their heels, and Germany had just become politically unified under Bismarck.

The situation in 1840-50 and in 1865-72 was similar since in both cases the impetus for the development of social science originated as a response to the socialist criticism of capitalistic society. (Bendix, 1943, p. 234n)

The Verein was

instrumental in arousing the public and thus in preparing the way for the German government to intervene in economic and social affairs after the late 1870s. Chancellor Bismarck readily acknowledged the persuasiveness of the Kathedersozialisten's arguments when he said that he himself would have joined their organization had he had the time. (Ascher, 1963, pp. 285-286)

The coalition of intellectuals, business operatives, and bureaucrats in the Verein

realized that the gap between the industrial workers and the rest of society could only be mended by the intervention of the state; at the same time they rejected the Marxist solution of the German socialists. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 21)

Social strife showed that reforms were needed, and they said they knew which ones would work. They offered solutions whose application held out the promise of strengthening the capitalist social system as against the vision of a social system built on non-capitalist priorities. They were in every sense of the word thinkers for the class which owned and/or controlled both the industrial means of production and the concomitant social-institutional forms.

For the most part professors of economics and administration, and members of the famous Verein fur Sozialpolitik, . . . /they/ were concerned primarily with the impact of industrialization upon the existing structure of society and with economic and social legislation which would help cope with the changing situation. . . . /They/ were dedicated to serving a regime which considered it a first principle that the numerically strong German workers' party should be excluded from political power both by suppression and, to the extent compatible with the interests and wishes of the other German social and economic groups, by concessions. This principle the Sozialpolitiker could, would not question. . . . They sought to contribute to social reform, not by examining the political foundations of the Imperial order and promoting working-class political action, but by revealing problems and suggesting administrative measures which, by

helping to anticipate and meet the demands of labor, would strengthen the authoritarian system. (Butz, 1955, pp. 18-19)

By 1878, the Paris Commune had been crushed seven years back. It was the year Bismarck launched his liberalized version of the policy of blood and iron. His assault had two prongs: He outlawed the Social Democratic Party, the largest working people's political organization in the country and an affiliate of the International Workingman's Association. Then he fielded the Verein's program of social reforms.

In the following years Bismarck initiated his program of social legislation with which he attempted to mitigate the effect of the decree /outlawing the Social Democratic Party/ and by which he hoped to remedy those social conditions which had previously been the cause of social and political agitation. (Bendix, 1943, p. 240)

[The year 1878/ brought Bismarck's anti-socialist laws, which in turn initiated a period of social legislation (sickness, 1883; accident, 1884; and old-age insurance, 1889). All these changes indicated that the constellation of social groups was slowly changing from a struggle between aristocracy (agriculture) and bourgeoisie (industry) to a struggle of both against the rising labor movement. (Bendix, 1943, p. 227)

Unlike large segments of the working class itself, the thinkers for the ruling class did not understand class struggle as a necessary element in capitalism. Like the English before them whose social management

inventions they borrowed freely, they believed that an ongoing technical solution could be devised to at least manage, if not eliminate, that struggle.

Bismarck intended to immunise the workers with insurance against the temptations of socialist programmes and to make them dependent on the government. (Borchardt, 1973, p. 156)

In spite of their admirable concern for social reforms and the high caliber of their research, the students of Sozialpolitik. . . were essentially technical specialists who consciously evaded the political aspects of the reality with which they were concerned. /Their/ work. . . was invaluable to the operation of the Empire; . . . the formulation and analysis of social and economic problems preparatory to legislation were jobs that had to be done. (Butz, 1955, p. 19)

From Social Policy to Corporate Liberalism

The views of the professors of Sozialpolitik are significant in four ways. First, they

are interesting and important because they correspond, at least in broad outline, to the actual policies pursued by the Imperial Government in the three decades prior to the First World War. (Ascher, 1963, p. 301)

Let us remember that by the first World War, the industrial might of Germany had grown massive enough to challenge that of the United States. Something about the policies of the period must have worked. Somehow, presumably, social policy must have contributed to quelling

the threat of the working class. The International Social Science Council's official historian of the period saw it this way too:

Bismarck's social policy and his social insurance legislation, which were based on the idea of paternalistic responsibility, did not succeed in the end in creating a genuine national community which included the industrial workers, but it was probably responsible for the less radical direction which the socialist movement took. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 9)

Second, the professors of social policy wedded the English precedent of detailed empirical studies to the German tradition of academic service to the state. In so doing they set up a paradigm still followed by the social science enterprise in industrial capitalism. Furthermore, out of their investigative activities was later to creep the practice we have come to know as social psychology.

The Verein constituted a decided advance in the development of social science. Since the aim was to map out blueprints for specific social reforms, it was necessary to make detailed empirical studies of the problems in question, an approach that had few precedents in German social science. (Bendix, 1943, p.235)

Their administrative strategy of pre-emptive social reform was built upon information about the living and working conditions of the subject population. The use of that information was a foregone conclusion. The use

belonged to the class in whose behalf the work was in the first place undertaken.

The origin of the social survey in Germany can be traced back to the material and social upheaval brought about by the industrial revolution. The purpose of most surveys was to find out what the material and moral condition of the working classes was. The motivation behind them was unmistakably the desire for reform and legislation. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 3)

Their role was to provide the social intelligence which governing the industrial state required. Like the parts of a machine, the processes of human society were to be analyzed in the interest of controlling those processes from above. It is this role which can be observed consistently down to our own time.

The lineaments of what with hindsight we might recognize as an inchoate social psychology perspective were there. Twenty years before World War I,

as in the period preceding 1895, most empirical work was still concerned with but one topic: the working classes. The two areas of major concern were the problem of work in the broadest sense, and the social psychology of the proletariat. . . ./Researchers were/ concerned with the general level of culture and education of the workers, and therefore were interested in his reading, his political ideas, his hopes and his awareness of his own situation in the world. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 76)

We saw the beginning of this interest in the "social psychology of the proletariat" all the way back at the 1848 multinational workers' revolt throughout Europe.

While Marx had conceived his knowledge of society as a revolutionary weapon in the fight for its transformation, the German Historical School sought to attain knowledge of the laws that governed this society much as the natural scientist studied physical phenomena to ascertain the laws that would or would not enable men to govern nature. They believed, however, that a knowledge of the laws of society would furnish men with the opportunity to solve the problems that had arisen, and only scientific inquiry could yield such knowledge.

This approach to the social problem around the time of the 1848 revolutions proceeded on the assumptions that are basic to sociology as we know it today. (Bendix, 1943, pp. 170-171)

A half dozen years before World War I, the Verein undertook an intensive study of the capitalist workplace. We can see the study's past in the primary industrialization struggles of Europe. Its future looks very like the 20th century Hawthorne experiments in the United States. Max Weber directed it himself. Weber worked with the Verein, becoming

immersed body and soul in problems of social research. He was the main designer of the Verein for Sozialpolitik survey of industrial workers in 1909-1911. In many ways this survey was the most carefully thought through piece of empirical research of the pre-war period. Weber spent an entire summer of observation and computation at the textile mill of a relative in preparation for it. His intention was to explore how far the conceptual apparatus and exact measurement techniques developed in the psychological sciences could be fruitfully applied to a study of industrial work on a mass scale and in a natural factory setting. It was the first explanatory survey (as opposed to the previous descriptive and fact-finding use of surveys on the material and

moral condition of the working class) since it was meant to test concrete hypotheses by means of multivariate analysis. For the first time in Verein history the workers were asked in person to provide the basic data. The intent was to combine such questionnaire data with a systematic exploitation of factory records and direct observation of the workers on the factory floor. It proved far too ambitious an undertaking for the techniques and resources at hand. Despite many refinements Weber adopted the predominantly psychophysical approach of his contemporaries to problems of industrial work. The study was unfortunately doomed to failure right at its start when most of the workers refused to fill out the Verein questionnaires. (Oberschall, 1965, pp. 7-8)

The survey was to have been

a more theoretically oriented and explanatory study of the selection and adaptation of workers in large industries. (Oberschall, 1965, p. 39)

The innovation of making the subject population and the respondents one and the same may seem to us like the invention of the wheel, but so ingrained was the class snobbery of social science workers that they for so long complacently followed their English forebears in not deigning to recognize that the working people who were their subjects had brains. Despite the fact that this particular survey fell flat on its face due to the working people's highly intelligent refusal to fill it out, the directions it indicated were quickly peopled with investigators. Those defined as psychologists busily measured "output, fatigue, muscle movements and the

effects of various factors such as temperature, lighting, diet, rest time" (Oberschall, 1965, p. 111) on productivity. That was the state of the art then. But sophistication would soon enough develop, with the "small group" abstract model and even a mathematical representation of "group dynamics" (Lewin, 1935, 1936, 1948).

The third reason the views of the German professors of Sozialpolitik are important is that the lynchpin in our social science metatheory came right from their midst. Acting as spokesperson, Max Weber enunciated the theory of value-free social science, solving the ethics debate about subservience to the state created when Bismarck outlawed the Social Democratic Party in 1878*. It was Weber who finally came along with a plausible expression of dissociation from the real-world use value of social science work. It was part of

Max Weber's epic campaign against the influence of Marx. This battle culminated in the sociologist's ultimate identification of the Prussian military bureaucracy, in its ideal-typical form,

*Richard Bendix (1943), himself a high priest of sociology in the United States, has an illuminating description of the dissarray into which the then professional organization of sociology was thrown by this event. They didn't even hold meetings for several years (pp. 240 ff).

as the highest social embodiment of rationality. Weber also introduced into sociology the comparative method, which compares the laws of two or more oppressed societies in order to deduce the laws of oppressed societies in general. Weber summarized the method, theory and practice of the modern social sciences in two speeches to Munich university audiences during a period of student unrest a few years prior to the beer-hall putsch. In these addresses, the doctrine of 'value-free social science', under which banner the German universities were integrated into the Prussian bureaucracy during the Nazi period, received its seminal and constituent expression. (Nicolaus, 1973, pp. 48-49)

Weber articulated the idea of separating the values which lead an investigator to frame research questions from the social function of that research:

The question, which problems we should posit for ourselves, for what we should interest ourselves, and what is worth knowing, is a question of values and can only be decided on the basis of subjective evaluations. But this has nothing to do, of course, with the question whether we should treat the problems in which we are interested in such a manner that we keep each and all judgments out of a scientific discussion, since they lie on a different intellectual level altogether. (Weber, 1909, in Bendix, 1943, p. 256)

Our human moral sense are to be dulled with half a loaf. We follow our interests, subjectively evaluating, and alight upon the research areas we pursue. But then our sense of connectedness with other creatures of our species is supposed to turn off. It's the claim of dissimilar etiology for theory and metatheory, nothing more than a ritual of logical alchemy requiring a leap

of faith. The first lie is that subjective evaluation is all that's involved in choosing what to work on. The second lie is that our work is liberated from value implications on the grounds that it employs the "scientific method" paradigm.

The fourth and final reason the intellectuals of 19th century Germany have merited such detailed attention is that it was their perspective and their concentration on the organizational problems and needs of the capitalist-structured industrial society which was transported to the United States in the suitcases of the returning students.

In their Verien fur Sozialpolitik the German critical economists tried to confront the social question in a straightforward and systematic manner. Leaving aside the revolutionary Marxist critique, theirs was the most explicit and elaborate of the critiques of liberal competitive economics. Further, these German critics were located in a national university system that was by the second half of the 19th century the major international centre of scholarship and science. The German universities taught American social scientists from the 1870s onwards, and provided the model for the new U.S. universities. (Therborn, 1976, p. 241)

Starting with Johns Hopkins University (established 1876), both the German form and the German content were rapidly installed in the higher education set-up of the ruling class in the United States. Noted

participant-observer John W. Burgess* gave this description:

During the U.S. Civil War Germans filled, as soldiers, the regiments of the Union and, as officers, drilled and disciplined its forces, and led them to battle and to victory. Their knowledge of military science and tactics was invaluable to the cause of the Union and contributed greatly to the ultimate triumph of the cause. . . . From the close of the Civil War began the great exodus of American students to the German universities. . . . From 1870 to the present time, the principle German universities have counted their American students by scores and hundreds; and these men, upon their return to their native land, have gradually taken possession of the professional chairs in the leading universities of learning in this country. It is no exaggeration to say that the control of the higher education in the United States is now in the hands of men who have been educated in the German universities. (Burgess, 1904, pp. 9-10)

A little later on, an ivy-league student of the process expressed it in this way:

German-trained professors helped shape graduate instruction in American universities from Massachusetts to California and, in doing so, laid the groundwork of the modern academic profession. (Herbst, 1959, p. 228)

It was the culmination of an ongoing process of building the educational system in the United States

* John W. Burgess studied in Gottingen, Leipzig, and Berlin; taught at Columbia University; and was an editor of the Public Opinion Quarterly, early trade journal to a cutting edge of the social science community.

from the bottom up. It was being fashioned after the German model (Walz, 1936). The U.S. ruling class had been importing from Germany a range of methods for socialization-through-education, starting with the Kindergarten. The realms of higher education were also transformed, the better to suit the domestic industrial condition (Thwing, 1906, 1928).

Germans and Americans were confronting the same problems from within essentially the same framework. . . .The specific contribution of the German school was in providing the critical facilities--the method that fit the American experience--to work out a new approach to the new problems of a burgeoning industrial society. The intellectual rationale was now based on facts and upon an integrated analysis of a whole society rather than upon a hide-bound speculation. (Eakins, 1966, p. 46)

Integration of the Sozialpolitik component into the U.S. corporate strategy proceeded on several fronts. In the higher education sector, the doctrine taught was that scholarship had a social responsibility to apply scientific methodology to the study of human society, producing the data on the basis of which the rulers would know how to rule: fairly undiluted Sozialpolitik tradition (Herbst, 1959, 1965; Eakins, 1966). Training apparatus for the managerial stratum of U.S. corporate capitalism, the graduate school system was constructed to maintain a stable of intellectual workers equipped in

the ways of social science. It formed one vital part of the capability to generate varieties of social and technological policy for purposes of doing business.

The second major front in the adaptation of Sozialpolitik into the particular conditions in the U.S. was the creation of a series of institutional forms within which some of the work could be done. Starting with four policy research organizations, they resemble the central social policy research institute called for in Germany since the middle of the 19th century. Like their contemporaries in Europe, corporate capitalists in the United States were having to manage the social upheaval which was so prime a characteristic of the primitive accumulation phase of capitalist development. Within the capitalist class, there were various groupings of interests, with various views on programmatic solutions. But the one that dominated and achieved hegemony over the national political structure was the one that has come to be called the "corporate liberal" sector--the largest, most centrally organized, and most securely financed corporations and banks in the nation (Weinstein, 1968). They were the ones who had in the first place imported the social-scientific population management

strategy on their returning-student voyages (Eakins, 1966).*

Corporate liberalism represented a culmination of strategic interactions between the ruling and the working class in the United States. It was

a conscious and successful effort to guide and control the economic and social policies of federal, state, and municipal governments by various business groupings in their own long-range interest as they perceived it. . . . The key word in the new corporate vision of society was responsibility, although the word meant different things to different groups of men. (Weinstein, 1968, pp. ix-x)

[Corporate liberals'] reform dynamism grew in part from a generally rational fear of American socialism. They viewed socialism as a real threat in the United States precisely because it provided an increasingly attractive alternative, both in terms of program and morality, to turn-of-the-century capitalist industrial society. (Eakins, 1966, p. 53)

The most crucial maneuver the corporate liberal strategy was designed to accomplish was to replace class struggle with partnership between labor and capital (asymmetric though it would be), through combining social reform with an increase in the productiveness of the laborforce. Raising labor's productivity would eliminate social injustices because it would raise the amount in

* This section is deeply indebted to the work of Weinstein and Eakins, both in its overview and in many of its details.

labor's slice--without having to change the slice's proportional share of the overall economic pie. But the size of the pie could only be increased with the compliance and cooperation of the general population of the country, most especially the labor force. Compliance and cooperation on a scale like that meant, among other things, social engineering--the conscious use of scientific techniques to formulate social policy. Finally, raising productivity would also require a steady stream of scientific and technological invention. To build up such a capability was one of their tasks as social reorganizers on the broad scale. By the end of World War I they had the main skeletal form in place, raising yet again the overall level of integration of intellectual work and production.

The Early Structures of Corporate-Liberal Research in the U.S.

Moving forward from the German model, the infrastructure-builders of corporate liberalism in the United States forged forms for the organization and plugging in of the required research work. Their social inventions strapped social research and technological-scientific research into tandem harness. Beginning

with the formation in 1885 of the American Economics Association, they structured numerous professional organizations, the first of the social policy research institutes, and the early part of what has become the gigantic federal nexus for integrating the intellectual labors of the academic workplace into the ongoing operations of monopoly capitalism.

The taproot of the corporate-government organization and financing of academic research in the United States begins squarely at the policy research institutes formed in the first quarter of the present century by corporate-liberal business operatives (Eakins, 1966). That was the point in the history of the United States at which business, academia, and government poured the foundations for lasting intercourse among themselves.

In the United States, the three decades leading to World War I are often called the Progressive Era. The "Era" just before it had belonged to the Robber Barons (Josephson, 1962). That had been a period of rapid industrializing following upon the Civil War consolidation of Northern capital--a period for the top dogs of the U.S. ruling class to claw their way up over the dead mound of the out-competed.

The ideology of laissez faire individualism then had facilitated the rapid accumulation of more and more capital into more and more centralized private holdings. But as the monopoly on control of entire sectors of the U.S. economy by a relative handful of corporations grew tighter, laissez faire ideology became less and less useful as the theoretical guide to the solution of problems created by its practice. The higher stage of development of industrial capacity created a corresponding necessity for a more orderly integration of the country's population into industry's priorities. It had become inefficient for industry to have labor struggle raging in the streets and the factory yards. The U.S. was in competition to-the-death with other capitalist industrial empires. U.S. industry had to be made to match up, and the question of the working class (the same old Arbeiterfrage) had to be solved.

The ideological situation in the U.S. was similar to that in Europe: an influential part of the theoretical framework of labor's struggle explicitly challenged overall power relations in capitalist society. Socialism as the way to organize industrialization had considerable support among American working people in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It also loomed in

the electoral arena, with socialists holding elective offices all over the country and the socialist labor organizer Eugene V. Debs drawing a million votes for President by 1912 (although capitalism was at no time in danger of dismantlement through the polling booth).

The problem was that inequitable distribution of the social wealth caused social struggle. The new spirit coming over the masters in the U.S. dictated that Adam Smith's hidden-hand theory of non state-intervention be supplanted by the German School's view that statistics-gathering should feed into economic and social policy planning on a national level. Concerted scholarship should, indeed, be organized and applied to problems of governing. The road to social control was to have two sides: the intellectual labors of science and technology should uncover the facts, then efficient government action should use them to make and apply curative policy. The professional organizations mediated the changeover at the level of ideology. The policy research organizations were the earliest of the laundering facilities through which academic purity could be shielded from the dirt of application. They were the first of a long line of research management structures which together support every little piece of scaffolding on which a social scientist is today likely to lay foot.

Between 1915 and 1920, corporate liberal social managers organized the Institute for Government Research, the National Industrial Conference Board, the National Bureau of Economics research, and the Twentieth Century Fund. All were technically in the private sector. Although the social scientist staffing them were the "employers' research arm to meet one sort of labor challenge" (Eakins, 1966, p. 116), they seemed to think they were making a "social science that would admit of conclusions not influenced by the social ends of classes" (Eakins, 1966, p. 115).

Germany's success in developing markets for its industrial goods in the years immediately preceding World War I, together with U.S. anticipation of a trade war with Germany after the war in which survival would go with the side that had industry and science connected-up best (Council of National Defense, 1917), had raised the ante. When the shooting between Germany and the U. S. actually began, chummy access to German science and technology was suddenly severed. This caused a quantum leap in the organization of science work of all kinds in the U.S., all under the class control of the owners. This was when the first four research institutes were formed, along with the National Research Council. Research

managers began the creation of an entire, separate (yet connected) administrative apparatus which at one stroke drastically increased the level of integration of intellectual work and production in the entire country. It was the great World War I primary centralization of research administration in this country. It was the quantum-leap into the "modern" multinational scientific-technological research machine.

From the perspective of the history of academic psychology, the structural parts whose examination will yield the most understanding are governmental. With the foundation of the National Research Council (NRC) in 1916, the U.S. federal government took up the responsibility for organizing academic workers, both for immediate military and industrial needs and for the advancement of knowledge for future needs in general (Report of the National Research Council, 1916; Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1918). Their institution-building encompassed theoretical physics on one end of the spectrum, and the social technology that dealt with the human beings who ran the machines of production and of war at the other.

The National Research Council was an enlargement of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), itself created by Congress during the U.S. Civil War to act as a

scientific advisory body to the Union government in its prosecution of the war (True, 1913). The Civil War was the first in U.S. history in which science and technology were applied to winning in an organized way. World War I was the second.

The Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Engineering Foundation financed about half the early cost of the NRC, with the War Department and the Council of National Defense supplying the rest (National Research Council, 1932). Congress had set up the Council of National Defense in 1912 in emulation of its allies and rivals, to have "a definite policy worked out in advance of war" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1912, p. 5). The Council was a top-level policy recommendation and coordination body throughout World War I. In addition to being the operational division of the NAS, the NRC was the Department of Science and Research to the Council of National Defense and the Science and Research Division of the Signal Corps of the Army (National Research Council, 1932).

At its inception the NRC had three divisions for contacts--with the federal government, with state scientific agencies, and with international scientific organizations. Thus it was at its inception constituted

as a multinational organization. It also had a division each for the subjects of physical sciences, engineering, chemistry, geology and geography, medicine, biology and agriculture, and anthropology and psychology (whose name was changed to Division of Behavioral Sciences in 1960). During the war, it set up research committees in most of the country's universities

to concentrate the research capacity of these institutions upon scientific problems of war work. . . . Most of these committees were continued after the termination of the war and are still 1932 functioning as important agencies for the encouragement of research in these institutions. (National Research Council, 1932, p. 67)

One after another, they emplaced pieces of a research infrastructure, starting with an on-site contact net in the nation's university system.

The story of how psychology made itself important during World War I has long been public. Enjoying the full cooperation of the American Psychological Association (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919), the psychology committee of the NRC supervised the wholesale use of psychologist-generated "intelligence" tests on "all new recruits of the Army" (Report of the National Research Council, 1917, p. 55). The highly-touted Army Alpha and/or progeny were

actually applied to some 1,700,000 men and since the war widely adopted for college entrance examinations and in the selection of men by industries. (Hale, 1922, p. 528)

Robert Yerkes and Edward Thorndike were chairperson and secretary, respectively, of the NRC's psychology committee (Report of the National Research Council, 1917). They were high-level stage managers of academic psychology's first giant step into population management technology. Each is of especial interest. Yerkes for his unflagging promotion of the eugenics-through-testing movement; Thorndike for his devotion to developing the racist, sexist, and class-biased automatic gatekeeping-through-testing technology which many people have learned to see through (Kamin, 1974; Karier, 1972).

When the shooting was over, President Wilson legally capacitated the NRC to carry through on the organizing of research along the lines of a centralized business (Kellog, 1919).

It was recognized from the outset. . . that true preparedness would best result from the encouragement of every form of investigation, whether for military and industrial application or for the advancement of knowledge without regard to its immediate practical bearing. The scheme of organization must be broad enough to secure the cooperation of all important agencies in accomplishing this result. (Report of the National Research Council, 1916, p. 32)

His executive order empowered it to "survey the larger possibilities of science" (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1918, p. 40) opened up during World War I through the everyday integration of its activities with the priorities and processes of the governing class. Robert Yerkes switched jobs and took over administrative responsibility for the ongoing assessment task. He coordinated the Research Information Service (RIS), whose objective since early in the war had been the complete and automatic dissemination of international scientific information to all government units (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919).

The board of directors for whom Yerkes served as chief administrative officer in the RIS consisted of the chief of the Military Intelligence Section, the director of Naval Intelligence, and a representative of the NRC (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919). The RIS had offices in Washington, D.C., London, Paris, and Rome. It was one of the three divisions for contacts added to the NRC after the war. The other two expanded the NRC's cross-institutional network. They were for educational relations and industrial relations. The military intelligence connection within the RIS was not conspicuous; an academic did the fronting.

The RIS fed its information into the NRC's "federation of the leading research agencies in the country" (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919, p. 15). The NRC's divisions were "constituted of the representatives of the leading national societies in these subjects" (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919, p. 15), plus representatives from universities, research foundations, and industrial laboratories. Representatives of the government were appointed by the President and included "heads of the scientific and technical bureaus of the Army and Navy and of the civil departments" (Third Annual Report of the National Research Council, 1919, p. 15). Ruling class members who personally sat on NRC oversight committees included such names of wealth as Mellon, DuPont, Eastman, Dodge, and Gary.

The NRC represented a flowering of that corporate liberal aspect of Progressivism which attempted to apply the methodology of science to political-economic problems. . . . This was science at the service of the corporations in a corporate society. (Eakins, 1966, pp. 123-124)

Shades of Social Psychology

Clearly, a structural format through which physical- and social-scientific research work could be both

nourished and plucked had been set working in the United States by the aftermath of World War I. Changes in conditions would cause extensive alterations to be made in organizational particulars, but the pattern was thereafter accepted as normal, value-free science. The managing imperative had wrapped its grip around intellectual no less than manual labor.

For the social sciences, varieties of problems arising from the capitalist workplace continued to be a major preoccupation. Raising productivity was still the owners' central priority. Extracting more surplus value, in its turn, necessitated ever-refined methods of controlling the human factor in production. The process of management begun when English textile workers had their self-regulation taken away by agglomeration into handwork shops is many generations distant from a scientific research apparatus working in synchronization with changes in the processes of production and distribution. We have traced the continuity of that line of descent. We have seen social science work (or what would feed its waters into the social science stream) brought into existence and developed in consort with purposes larger than itself. We have examined the self-rationale of that work from its early stages. We have seen that

a methodological requirement of the work was to perceive it as objective, not partial.

To attempt to understand any particular parcel of social science without knowing about its social context, and therefore its partialities, is like trying to understand a human individual without regard to the cultural nexus she or he exists in. To claim to explain the "emergence" of social psychology in the United States without showing how its genotype made it an instrument in the technology of population management under industrialism is, plainly, to pull a cover-up.

The few existing histories of the field have tended to do just that. J.W. Sprowls (1927), for example, described social psychology's mainline track accurately enough, but was of the classical out-of-the-head-of-Minerva school of history. He looked to the realm of thought-in-isolation for social psychology's roots and came up with them packaged in a plastic bubble of philosophy which defined social psychology's role in society:

The mission of social psychology is. . .that of determining the behavior of groups through an analysis of the mental processes involved in group interests. (p. 12)

How did "the group" come to be of interest? No account. Social psychology is presented in a way very disconnected from its history. Fay Karpf (1952, 1972)

painted a landscape in which schools of thought contend, one side or the other gains ground, then--voila--the new creature social psychology emerges sometime before World War I. Her account, like Sprowls', was ahistorical in the extreme:

With [Comte], the notion of a positive science of social control became something more than the utopian dream it had previously been. It has ever since been a prominent interest in psycho-social thought. . . . This notion was taken up in this country, practically where Comte left it, and gradually developed as a point of departure for a distinctive emphasis in American psycho-social theory and social thought generally. (Karpf, 1972, p. 24)

Social psychology began increasingly to turn from the historical problems of anthropological concern to the study of psycho-social interaction as it is observable in present-day social life. (Karpf, 1972, p. 171)

The "science of social control" is a "notion" antiseptically picked up and adopted. Why? Where did it come from, the thin air of Comte's imagination? Just what is meant by "social control"? Just what are these "social sciences" of ours?

Karpf holds the dinner-menu theory of social thought. It is as if would-be psychologists or other social philosophers sit down at table, inspect the menu, and select according to the autonomous palate of each. Edward Ross (1908), sociologist and author of the first book calling itself social psychology, selected the

French cuisine, while William McDougall (1908), author of the second, preferred the English taste. The content of social thought is portrayed as if it got there because one or another pundit so decided, on the basis of logic unsullied by real-world interests.

Gordon Allport (1954) at least hooked what he called the post-World War I upturn in social science activity-level to events occurring in society. But his definition of that connection, if believed, rules out the slightest comprehension of social psychology in its real-world development:

A special challenge fell to social psychology. The question was asked: how is it possible to preserve the values of freedom and individual rights under conditions of mounting social strain and regimentation? Can science help provide an answer? This challenging question led to a burst of creative effort that added much to our understanding of the phenomena of leadership, public opinion, rumor, propaganda, prejudice, attitude change, morale, communication, race relations, and conflicts of value. (Allport, 1954, p. 4)

We shall see in the next chapter just why these topics devolved on social psychologists to work on after World War I. Allport says on the same page that "practical meliorism" in the United States acted as fertilizer to fortify "the soil of western thought," and up sprang social psychology et al. It was springtime in the garden. Surely an image calculated to confer the

grace of sunshine and fresh vegetables on the development of Northamerican social psychology. The real picture was otherwise.

Still on the same page, Allport goes on to assert that discrepancies between people's needs and what results from the structure of this social system are due to the social sciences not yet having had enough practice using positivist methodology! His language, as always, throws a disguise over the situation:

Hornell Hart (1949) has plotted convincingly the recent upswing in the productions of social science, and argues that the recent acceleration marks the delayed entrance of social science into the era of positivism. The delay, only now ending, has resulted in a serious 'cultural lag' (Ogburn, 1922) which is due to the prior entrance of the natural sciences into the era of positivism. Technological developments are dangerously far in front of social advances. Man can change matter into energy but cannot yet socially control the energy he creates. The cultural lag manifests itself in many phases of social life. Anomie is widespread. (Allport, 1954, p. 4)

Allport says that the progenitor experiments for U.S. social psychology were born of two lines. Both were intent on the problem of influencing the individuals who made up the group. One line, via Triplett (1897) comes from studies on increases in the performance of bicycle racers in the presence of other riders. The conclusions of the Triplett study are not supported by the

data. But it was urgent to develop the conceptual language with which to "objectivize" the facts of domination in the real world, so that study was offered in the literature as science.

Citing evidence from records of bicycle racing kept by the Racing Board of the League of American Wheelmen for the year 1897, Triplett presented a graph showing differentially faster performance for paced, as against unpaced, riders. Those paced by other riders under racing conditions made even better time than those paced by a motorized vehicle. He offered some seven varieties of explanation for the phenomenon, selecting this one for testing under laboratory conditions:

Dynamogenic factors: This theory of competition holds that the bodily presence of another rider is a stimulus to the racer in arousing the competitive instinct; that another can thus be the means of releasing or freeing nervous energy for him that he cannot of himself release; and, further, that the sight of movement in that other by perhaps suggesting a higher rate of speed, is also an inspiration to greater effort. These are the factors that had their counterpart in the experimental study following; and it is along these lines that the facts determined are to find their interpretation. (Triplett, 1897, p. 516)

Triplett reported data for 40 subjects in what he took to be a laboratory replication of the paced and unpaced racing conditions. Exactly half the subjects showed the effect Triplett was after. One-fourth showed

exactly the opposite effect, and the remaining fourth showed no effect at all. No test of significance was made. The 40 subjects used for data presentation were culled from 225 subjects who performed the laboratory trials; no information was given on the performance of the remaining 185 subjects. In a leap not uncharacteristic of enthusiastic (or dishonest) social scientists, Triplett concluded that the existence of a kind of social influence process had been proven experimentally:

We infer that the bodily presence of another contestant participating simultaneously in the race serves to liberate latent energy not ordinarily available. (Triplett, 1897, p. 533)

Triplett's study was one of those rituals of scientificness through which internally consistent vocabulary to describe the human condition eventually becomes established as truth-bearing.

German work on the topic of social influence leapt the Atlantic just before World War I, giving us what Allport sees as the second line of U.S. social psychology's descent. He said that in 1915, German-American psychologist Hugo Munsterberg passed on to Floyd Allport the work of one W. Moede, a Prussian professor of the

competitive model of human group interaction.* Moede's term was "co-acting groups" (Allport, 1954, p. 47).

"He decided that a systematic attempt should be made to introduce the social variable into all, or nearly all, standard psychological experiments" (Allport, 1954, p.47). Accordingly, Moede ran experiments at Leipzig, starting in 1913, in which the presence of other subjects was a variable in the measurement of a variety of performance factors. Both he and the bicycle race investigators were getting at the same family of variables, variables which lie at the center of social psychology.

Allport took up the theme with a vengeance. In 1924 he published a book called Social Psychology, regarded by many as the foundation-text of experimental social psychology in the United States. A subsection entitled "The Influence of the Group upon Judgements of Comparison," foreshadowed the military-funded post-World War II basic research studies in social psychology by

*An investigation of Moede's nest by a German-speaking social psychology history sleuth should turn up evidence of his devotion to the interests of the class for whom he was organic intellectual. That would be an interesting addition to our store of knowledge on our own past as anointed practitioners of the arts of social science.

Solomon Asch, Leon Festinger, and others. Allport's version of the "dynamogenic effect" was that individuals had

an attitude of submission which we assume, often unconsciously, in the presence of a group. Where all are engaged upon the same sort of task this submission takes the character of conforming to the manner in which the other members are reacting. (Allport, 1927, p. 277)

It's not too difficult to imagine why submissive behavior of individuals in groups would be of interest to managerial structures ranging from industry to the military.

Allport did not take up the line simultaneously being developed by the relativists in German psychology. Kurt Lewin did not appear in the index to Allport's Social Psychology, even though he, like Moede, had published work in German concerning the behavior of human beings in groups. The gestaltist units of measurement were not to gain tenure in the ruling establishment until the administration of mass propaganda brought it on board on the eve of World War II.

Peter Franks (1975) has written what to my knowledge is still the best beginning at what is our history as social psychologists in the United States.* Franks

*The present study owes a substantial debt to both his work and his encouragement. We worked together for several years.

traced social psychology's mainline philosophy back to John Dewey, sitting at Rockefeller's University of Chicago. Starting at Chicago in 1894 and continuing at Columbia University, Dewey translated a metatheoretical debate which stemmed from Hegel's explanation of the social functioning of human mind and logic. He translated it into thought-structures tailored to the corporate liberal strategy. That strategy was a

conscious and successful effort to guide and control the economic and social policies of federal, state, and municipal governments by various business groupings in their own long-range interest as they perceived it. (Weinstein, 1968, p. ix).

For social psychology, as for much of the rest of social science, the key element in this corporate liberal strategy was

an awareness on the part of the more sophisticated business leaders that the social order could be stabilized only if it moved in the direction of general social concern and social responsibility. (Weinstein, 1968, p. 3)

In the academic sector, where social psychology inhabits, professors were hard at work generating theory and metatheory to stock the shelves of social concern. Dewey's solution to the strategic problem of corporate liberalism proposed that institutionalized scientific reason be the road to enlightened governance!

Dewey proposed that the institutionalized 'sciences of society' were the embodiment of 'intelligence,' and that, if they were allowed to guide society and its change through instrumental action, the general good would be achieved. . . .Through Hegelian idealism Dewey reified the 'Geist' (reason or intelligence) into the form of 'scientific intelligence,' as represented in the social science. This conception of the 'Geist' provided the basis on which 'Mind,' fetishized as the scientific mind, took its place as the forum of evolutionary progress, making most people the mere objects of history and the 'scientists' the subjects or agents of historical change. (Franks, 1975, p. 49)

Dewey provided social psychology with three philosophical legs to stand on: (1) His philosophical position of pragmatism, descendent from the Benthamites, asserted that it was the usefulness of an idea or plan which uniquely determined its truth value. Results were what determined whether an action in society was right. The problem with this philosophy is that those who hold the power to move resources around are the ones who decide what works or doesn't work. The measuring stick belongs to the rulers. Under these conditions, society's wisdom officials strengthen the system simply by fashioning justifications for the situations of everyday life, or even more simply, by ignoring the oppressiveness of the situations of everyday life. (2) Social science, Dewey and his inheritors argued, would find impartial solutions to injustice that even capitalism's host of critics would

have to agree were fair, since it would be science, and science is socially impartial. Like his conceptual forbears, Dewey overlooked the fact that the industrial ruling class invested in a social science establishment for practical purposes of armoring the body of the state and corporation against class war. (3) The elite knower, the bearer of "scientific intelligence" is a priest of social management in Dewey's system. In his or her very separation and inaccessibility, the elite knower justifies the alienation of science from the people which contributes so quintessentially to divesting the people of the powers of governance under the political system of bourgeois democracy (Franks, 1975).

One of the principle gateways for the Prussian model of social science in the service of the class in power, the University of Chicago was often referred to as "Standard Oil University" (Coats, 1963, p. 488). Demonstrating the virtual intellectual cloning of Allportian social psychology from Dewey's thought, Franks concluded that the University of Chicago was where the ideological foundations for the emergent practice of U.S. social psychology were worked out.

Between Dewey and Allport lay World War I, one of the critical growth stages of social psychology in the

United States. A post-World War I proclamation to the professional community from the editors of the prestigious Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology provides an idea of the state-of-the-art in social psychology in 1921. Its opening historical account is a superb exercise in mystification: Social psychology's genesis occurred sometime after 1900, when several floating blobs of data and ideas about data had a gravitational collapse upon each other. It was a science, and a highly practicable one. "The forces underlying human conduct" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 2) were its terrain. That meant: "adjustments between the personality and the social order" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 2); "interaction between the individual and the group" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 2); communication, . . .substructure of the social order, . . .the entire mechanism of social control" (JASP Editors, 1921, p.3); "how do individuals working or acting in a group influence the mental processes of one another" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 3); "more permanent social relations. . . . adjustments of the human being to his social environment" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 3); "a psychological statement of 'the national mind'"(JASP Editors, 1921, p. 4); "psychological explanations of social movement. . . ,change. . . , leadership. . . , control" (JASP Editors, 1921, p.4); "socialization. . . , the fitting of the behavior of the

individual to the social order" (JASP Editors, 1921, p.4);
"the laws of social influence and control" (JASP Editors, p.5).

It made social psychology sound like a machine shop for the cutting and polishing of fittings. "The problems of capital and labor, the formation of trade unions and industrial organizations, the claim of the I.W.W.*, and

*Industrial Workers of the World, founded in the United States in 1905. Eugene V. Debs was a member. Its program is to unite all working people as a class. The preamble to the IWW constitution, as printed in their union membership book, reads:

The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life. . . .An injury to one is an injury to all. . . .Abolition of the wage system. . . . It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. The army of production must be organized, not only for the every-day struggle with capitalists, but also to carry on production when capitalism shall have been overthrown. By organizing industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old.

By 1924, the IWW had been foreably smashed as a politically challenging force.

the various economic and political reconstructions proposed" (JASP Editors, 1921, p.4) were among the underlying problems social psychologists were being set to work on. But they were to perceive in terms of "a conflict of group interests" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 4) consisting of "a complex blending of economic and psychological factors" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 4). "The psychology of ultra-radical movements, of Bolshevism" is simply "abornal," simply "the failure to adjust to the requirements of the social group" (JASP Editors, 1921, p. 3). It was as if the blueprint for social psychologists was to make political problems look technical.

Indeed, the market for their wares lay in the myriad of institutional bureaucracies that ran social life, in both the public and the private sectors. Like the longer, fatter leg of a mandrake, one side of social psychology's bifurcated root grew up in the industrial workplace. The other leg was planted deeply in the government, especially the military. Together, these were the great historical workshops of social engineering.

Problems arising from humans in groups had been acute in the capitalist workplace for a long while. Frederick Taylor was hardly the quintessential social

psychologist, but the group solidarity he cracked with his system of scientific management became the focus of an endless variety of experimental investigations on the part of generations of social psychologists. Himself of ruling class Philadelphia family, Taylor in 1878 disguised himself as a machine-shop worker and discovered from the inside both how to do the work and how the workers kept production down to a pace they could stand. At approximately the same time, Wilhelm Wundt was opening his psychophysics laboratory in Leipzig, Prussia, where the first U.S. academic psychologists (e.g., Munsterberg) were trained. And in England, Sir Francis Galton, banker's son, eugenicist, and conceptual father of the IQ test and the fingerprint alike, was arguing for the study of individual differences.

Taylor shared the corporate-liberal assumption that victory in the class war could be won by the ruling class if the size of the economic pie could be increased:

The great revolution that takes place in the mental attitude of the parties under scientific management is that both sides take their eyes off of the division of the surplus as the all-important matter, and together turn their attention toward increasing the size of the surplus until this surplus becomes so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel over how it shall be divided. (Taylor, 1947, p. 30)

Taylor's villain was "soldiering," the consensual enforcement of a group productivity norm on the factory floor. The way he devised to overcome its power was to divide off control over mental aspects of the labor process from the worker. Time-and-motion study was to determine the most efficient sequence of motions to do a job, and workers were simply to be ordered to do it in the way and at the pace prescribed. If necessary, the speed-up orders could be sweetened at first by slightly higher piece rates for higher production.

In the second issue of their journal, the corporate-liberal American Economics Association published the plan which Taylor claimed "convince each man that it is for his permanent advantage to turn out each day the best quality and maximum quantity of work" (Taylor, 1896, p. 89), and scientific management was off and running. In his penetrating study of social science and industrial management, Loren Baritz (1960) said that Taylor's method of studying people at work opened the possibility for psychologists to do likewise:

Scientific management not only conditioned the industrial climate for the psychologists; it determined to a large degree the direction, scope and nature of psychological research. (p. 31) Managers were accepting the notion that human behavior colored the competitive positions of their companies. (p. 35)

Simultaneously, psychologists were accepting the notion that workplace-related problems were their proper realm of study. Probably the first in the United States to study the small group experimentally, Hugo Munsterberg opened his 1913 Psychology and Industrial Efficiency with the words:

Our aim is to sketch the outlines of a new science which is to intermediate between the modern laboratory psychology and the problems of economics: the psychological experiment is systematically to be placed at the service of commerce and industry. (Munsterberg, 1913, p.3)

In a bit of official hagiography, Moskowitz (1977) credits Munsterberg as a leading impresario in the construction of psychology as "a broad field with strong professional and applied aspects" (p. 824). According to his daughter Margaret Munsterberg (1922), he was born of the commercial haut bourgeoisie in Prussia, studied with Wundt at Leipzig, and in turn gurved his own psychology training school at Freiburg. In 1892 he accepted the directorship of the first psychology laboratory in the United States, at Harvard University. Robert Yerkes and Floyd Allport were among the notables of U.S. psychology trained there. Later, he professed his creed at Columbia University.

A biological determinist, Munsterberg pioneered several aspects of the experimental study of the small

group in U.S. psychology. In posing the study of attitude as a significant area, for example, Munsterberg defined the class allegiance of the work with stunning clarity:

It may be granted that many a man and many a woman stand in the factory day after day and year after year with the one feeling of distress and wretchedness at the hard work to which they are forced. But is their work really responsible for it, and is it not rather their personal attitude? Who is doing the harder work than the sportsman? (Munsterberg, 1914, p. 102)

In his original studies of juries, Munsterberg came up with the conclusion that women weren't logical and therefore should be excluded from jury participation. As a sign of his usefulness to the propagation of the class system, his "discovery" was broadcast throughout the land in a manner not unlike the spread of Arthur Jensen's 1969 "discovery" that black people were genetically inferior to white people in intelligence (Moskowitz, 1977, p. 832; Munsterberg, 1922, pp 443-446).

In what has to be one of the crowning statements of academic arrogance on record, Munsterberg preached his version of the exonerating effect of social science value-neutrality:

The psychologist is, therefore, not entangled in the economic discussion of the day; it is not his concern to decide whether the policy of the trusts or the policy of the trade-unions or any other policy for the selection of laborers is

the ideal one. He is confined to the statement: if you wish this end, then you must proceed in this way; but it is left to you to express your preference among the ends. . . .The psychologist may show how a special commodity can be advertised; but whether from a social point of view it is desirable to reinforce the sale of these goods is no problem for psychotechnics. If a sociologist insists that it would be better if not so many useless goods were bought, and that the aim ought rather to be to protect the buyer than to help the seller, the psychologist would not object. His interest would only be to find the right psychological means to lead to this other social end. He is partisan neither of the salesman nor of the consumer, neither of the capitalist nor of the laborer, he is neither Socialist nor anti-Socialist, neither high-tariff man nor free-trader. (Munsterberg, 1913, p. 19)

Some might justifiably wonder about the sanity of such a mind, but there's no erasing the fact that so much of the work that comes under the heading of social psychology has been done as if Munsterberg's purview were reasonable. Take the Hawthorne experiments, for instance. In an insightful political critique of one of the progenitor experimental series in mainline U.S. social psychology, Dana Bramel and Ronal Friend (in press, 1978) demonstrated the mythologizing function of social psychological work. They showed that the conclusions claimed for the 1920s spying expedition upon the workers of Western Electric's Hawthorne plant near Chicago were entirely unsupported by the data collected (a not so unusual phenomenon). Psychology textbooks have habitually reported that workers in the Hawthorne

studies upped their productivity because of the kindly attentions they received from the Harvard experimental team. Supposedly it was this finding which gave birth to the humanistic school of industrial relations in which attitudes of supervisors toward workers and attitudes of workers toward their jobs were targeted as the real causes of strikes and unionization struggles. It was a lovely piece of scientific hokum. Social science has shown that there's nothing wrong with the structural conditions of work under capitalism which some changing of attitudes can't fix. In this way was the pristine path of science opened up for Elton Mayo and his colleagues of the "human relations" school. They energized the detailed study of interactions within groups and between groups (workers) and leaders (management), for example (Mayo, 1945 and 1946). Mayo had been a principle in the Hawthorne experiments and was a Harvard social scientist dedicated to the continued domination of labor by capital.

In his exceptionally fine study of the degradation of work in our century, Harry Braverman (1974) summarized the links between capital's productivity problems and some of the "scientific" problems that have long occupied social psychologists.

Taylor dealt with the fundamentals of the organization of the labor process and of control over it. The later schools of Hugo Munsterberg, Elton Mayo, and others of this type dealt primarily with the adjustment of the worker to the ongoing production process as that process was designed by the industrial engineer. Work itself is organized according to Taylorian principles, while personnel departments and academics have busied themselves with the selection, training, manipulation, pacification, and adjustment of 'manpower' to suit the work processes so organized. (p. 87)

Lurking back in the shadows of academe, social psychologists serenely followed their noses in pursuit of interesting trails, blissfully unaware, one assumes, of the cartography guiding their steps.

Conclusion

In the preoccupation with attitude change, leadership, persuasion, and other group-process influences on individuals, academic social psychology didn't just happen to come up with a bunch of interesting questions. It seems fairly clear that its development was pushed and pulled at all times by goings-on in the societies where those who professed it lived and worked.

I would argue, with British social psychologist David Ingleby (1974) that

We are all industrial psychologists; and our knowledge is moulded by our role in precisely the same ways as that of the psychologist whose

contract describes him as such. What is regarded as a 'problem' is to be that which threatens the efficient working of the existing political system, rather than human unhappiness or disease per se. Adaptation of people to the social structure is our yardstick, not the adaptation of social structure to people: Providing human beings who will act out their required roles efficiently and without making trouble. Education becomes primarily a matter of training, and welfare a matter of avoiding lost working days and social unrest; we are not primarily concerned with whether people actually have a worthwhile existence--as witness what we allow to happen to them when they grow too old to be productive or threatening. The psychologist's (and doctor's) job is to serve the institutions of family, school and work in the particular form that the existing socio-economic system requires them to take--not any other, hypothetical forms: correspondingly, he will take as his independent variables those that can vary independently of that system, and will hunt around for causal factors which have nothing to do with the actual form of our civilization. In education, different strategies of learning; in clinical psychology, different attitudes to one's situation; in medicine, different drugs or operations. (p. 322)

In social psychology, different forces acting on humans in groups. We peel off our section of field, sharpen our points of methodology, and work hard. Our subservience as intellectual workers is insured by our acceptance of the value system of the capitalist order. With few exceptions, we define out the questions that go to the root.

This chapter has analyzed the soil out of which social psychology "emerged," the soil due to which the

flesh of the organism has certain elements present or absent. I have not settled for mere emergence, as if an offspring could be born without biological parents. Nor have I been satisfied to take mere ideas as parents of the content. Rather, I have looked at the form and the substance of the industrial workplace in a search for the factors which have pushed up social psychology. Its foot in the industrial workplace source has shown it to be a refinement in the division of intellectual labor whose existence rests on the separation of head-from hand-work society-wide. Its foot in the military source supports the only other great leg that social psychology has to stand on.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY SOURCE OF U.S. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Psychology lost its fig leaf as of World War I, when it provided a versatile piece of population management technology for sorting the river of conscripts into their various piles: cannon fodder, leaders, etc. As it turned out, this was an auspicious beginning for what was immediately made into the software of social control which even now keeps the gates of credentialling institutions from kindergarten to graduate school and which with equal dispassion narrows the access to skilled trades and white collar jobs. After World War I the various factors involved in psychological testing took their place as one fountainhead of interesting questions in the academic shops of intellectual work. World War I also planted the seed of a vine that would brace itself on the trunk of social psychology, a process which was not to become obvious until the end of the next World War. World War I was the first of the hearts and minds wars. On that battlefield, the United States itself was as much of a field as was enemy German territory.

In the one case, morale had to be kept up, and in the other morale had to be broken. In 25 years time, things would have "progressed" to the point where, in World War II, social psychology per se would be found in the nerve center of the war room from which psychological battles were waged at home and abroad.

In a leak to the professional community, the then organizers of the profession of psychology boasted about progress in the social psychology sector:

It seems probable that the present conflict will do for social psychology, in the broadest sense of that term, what the first World War did for intelligence testing. (Boring, Bryan, Doll, Elliott, Hilgard, Stone, & Yerkes, 1942, p. 620)

Is this any less than a statement about the process through which the contemporary academic field of social psychology was brought into its current phase? Does this not point a finger at the way its post World War II issue-areas came to be defined? --and a finger at who decided what work to provide funding for? --ultimately, a finger at some of the more potent of the social forces behind that particular study of human activity in society which is now called social psychology?

It was not, after all, a statement boastfully offered by a collection of lofty-intentioned but unorganized psychologists. They were the official National Research

Council body charged with the two-fold task of integrating the nation's psychology workers into war work and planning ahead for the social role of psychology work after the war's conclusion (Boring et al., 1942).* They were organizers of the profession, narrowly interested in the self-expansion of their balliwick. It was they who arranged for the six pre-World War II professional societies in psychology to amalgamate under the wing of one centralized American Psychological Association, streamlining the profession's administration for the battles coming up.

I followed along the direction they pointed in, entering through the door of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. OSRD was the most public part of the research management network during World War II. It was the central institution for managing wartime research in the physical sciences and to some extent the social sciences. From the record made public through psychology's professional journals, it appeared that

* It's worth mentioning that this official body held its series of meetings under the auspices of The Training School in Vineland, New Jersey. The same institution had earlier this century headquartered the eugenics movement then midwived the testing movement's plunge into the social technology of governing in this country (Bowles & Gintis, 1972-1973; Kamin, 1974; Karier, 1972; Science for the People, 1976).

Boring et al.'s 1942 finger pointed at the OSRD as the source of social psychology's new-found sustenance.

However, there were no answers to be found in the OSRD records held at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Due more to the excellent work of archivists there than to an adequate map on my part, the trail finally led into the lap of the Psychology Division of the Office of Strategic Services, headquarters of psychological warfare in World War II. It was there that I found the reason for social psychology's rosy future: the "socio-psychological" study of populations was the social scientific centerpiece of psychological warfare strategy.

At the end of World War II, all the agencies put together to administer a vast war had to be reorganized both because enabling legislation had run out with the cease-fire and because the practical situation had changed. It was back to the more usual, lower level of U.S. armed involvement around the planet. The contracting-out system of research administration which had been developed during the war was simply continued, with some administrative reorganization. For social psychologists, work became a practice definitively impregnated with the slant imparted to it by psychological warfare, enforced

by the development funding supplied to it through the velvet-gloved fist of the Office of Naval Research.

Anyone who sat in a 1970s graduate seminar in the U.S. on the basic research in social psychology would be able to discern that an unfair share of it was funded by the military, especially the Office of Naval Research. The scuttlebutt in academic psychology hallways has long been that the ONR "made" group dynamics, primary constituent of the new postwar social psychology. One high-stature social psychologist has even put out a call for the study of this phenonemon:

The Office of Naval Research supported many studies of "small groups" for some years, then shifted its support chiefly to studies carried out abroad on people's attitudes. . . .The long-range effects of such sponsorship on the kinds of problems studied would make a fascinating study in itself, which, unfortunately, remains to be done. (Sherif, 1976, p. 17)

The long-range effect of ONR small group research was to slot academic social psychology into the social science back-up work which the military believed it needed to operate effectively against the human element of the enemy. The long-range effect of the shift to atitutte studies abroad was to slot academic social psychology into the newer strategy of counterinsurgency warfare, a topic discussed at length in the next chapter.

Propaganda

Back of the firing-line, back of armies and navies, back of the great supply-depots, another struggle waged with the same intensity and with almost equal significance attaching to its victories and defeats. It was the fight for the minds of men, for the 'conquest of their convictions.' (Creel, 1920, p. 3)

In his foreward to the Hoover War Library's account of winning hearts and minds in World War I, propaganda expert Harold Lasswell indicated a straightforward link between social science workers and the strategic mind control carried on by the corporate-government nexus during the war.

There is little exaggeration in saying that the World War led to the discovery of propaganda. . .the deliberate forming of attitudes by the manipulation of words (and word substitutes). The scholar had a scientific inheritance which included the recognition of the place of propaganda in society. (Lasswell, 1938, p.v)

The World War drastically changed the relationship of the established order of society to propaganda. The principal governments saw at once that psychological war must accompany economic war and military war. They took seriously the task of psychological mobilization, and they felt the impact of the psychological campaigns of their rivals. (Lasswell, 1938, p.vii)

Lasswell had earlier compiled a unique first-hand account of propaganda during World War I, in which he described propaganda, along with military and economic force, as "one of the three chief implements of operation

against a belligerent enemy" (Lasswell, 1927, p.9).

Propaganda was

the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumours, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned with the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism. (Lasswell, 1927, p. 9)

Propaganda shared with advertising reliance on the perspective of behaviorist psychology." Words and word substitutes were the independent variables to be manipulated. Attitudes, opinions, and therefore behavior were the dependent variables to be controlled. Varieties of social communication were to be the levers of that control. To achieve these goals, the corporate liberal coalition of business, government, and supposedly, organized labor set up institutional mechanisms to feed propaganda into the populations of the home front and of the enemy alike. On both fronts academic workers were expected to feel at home plying their trade as "the specialists on abstract words about social processes"

*Stewart Ewan's Captains of Consciousness (1976) provides sweeping insight into the commingled roots of behavioral psychology and advertising.

(Lasswell, 1938, p. v). Opinions and attitudes were managed by a central agency, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), created by President Wilson in the spring of 1917. Secretaries of the military departments headed the CPI, along with its day-to-day administrator George Creel. Creel was "equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for propaganda, in fact, and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda both at home and abroad" (Lasswell, 1927, p. 18).

To get its message accepted, the CPI simply altered media representations of reality. It censored all news and features produced and disseminated by the mass media throughout the nation, and it placed rivers of news, features, films, photos, scripts, posters, and speakers programs of its own making into the national information network. Technically compliance with CPI directives was voluntary, but refusal stood little chance. Basing his analysis on original documents, historian and National-Archivist James Mock traced how, during World War I, "piece after piece of federal legislation, . . . when fitted together, made the mosaic of censorship" (1972, p. 39):

Federal law gave, in 1917, reality and legality to the belief that it is better to preserve the United States without the Constitution than the

Constitution without the United States. Specifically, the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, offered all citizens, began to slip away from the American people on April 6, 1917, when war was declared. (Mock, 1972, p. 5)

Together with Librarian of Congress Cedric Larson, Mock described the personnel of the CPI censorship apparatus:

Mr. Creel assembled as brilliant and talented a group of journalists, scholars, press agents, editors, artists, and other manipulators of the symbols of public opinion as America had ever seen united for a single purpose. It was a gargantuan advertising agency the like of which the country had never known, and the breathtaking scope of its activities was not to be equalled until the rise of totalitarian dictatorships after the war. (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 4)

The primary purpose of the CPI, according to the government's official post-war report, was "to drive home the absolute selflessness of America's aims" (The Creel Report, 1972, p. 1). The Report concluded that the CPI's purpose had been superbly realized:

The committee grew to be a world organization. Not only did it reach deep into every community in the United States, but it carried the aims and objects of America to every land. (The Creel Report, 1972, p. 2)

The World War I form of psychological warfare had as one of its vital tasks the neutralization of working class struggle and its replacement by compliance with capital's war aims. Its role went far beyond that of

velvet glove to Pinkerton's rifles*: it straightforwardly sought to implant thoughts and coax dispositions in the mass of the U.S. population. The CPI's message to working people was that "labor's interest would best be served through unquestioning support of President Wilson" (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 190). Strikes were supposed to be foresworn in the national interest--which didn't happen, as there were many strikes during World War I. No less a labor bureaucrat than American Federation of Labor president and Council of National Defense member Samuel Gompers headed the labor and industrial relations department within the CPI. The CPI's authority came from the Espionage Act of 1917, under which such working class cadre as Victor Berger, Eugene Debs, and Big Bill Haywood were jailed and the I.W. W. smashed.

There were no two ways about it: labor must be kept in line if the war was to be won. That was perhaps the biggest of all the big jobs assigned to the CPI and the formal record does not even suggest the careful attention with which the campaign was followed. . . .The CPI, of course, was but one of the government agencies keeping a sharp eye on the movement of labor

* Pinkerton's was a mercenaries agency which supplied the U.S. corporate rulers with gun thugs to beat back working peoples' 8-hour movement and other unionizing struggles (Thompson & Murfin, 1976; Boyer & Morais, 1955).

opinion and attempting to encourage it in the desired direction. The Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the War Labor Administration, the U.S. Employment Service, Military Intelligence--these and many others were vitally concerned not only with wages and hours and with regulation of manpower resources for essential industries, but with the whole great problem of labor morale. (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 189)

Even so avid a promoter of opinion-moulding technology as Harold Lasswell, a founding editor of Public Opinion Quarterly, could not resist bearing the fangs of satire at the situation into which Kurt Lewin was soon to follow his nose:

Propaganda is a concession to the rationality of the modern world. A literate world, a reading world, a schooled world prefers to thrive on argument and news. It is sophisticated to the extent of using print; and he that takes to print shall live or perish by the Press. All the apparatus of diffused erudition popularizes the symbols and forms of pseudo-rational appeal; the wolf of propaganda does not hesitate to masquerade in the sheepskin. All the voluble men of the day--writers, reporters, editors, preachers, lecturers, teachers, politicians--are drawn into the service of propaganda to amplify a master voice. All is conducted with the decorum and the trappery of intelligence, for this is a rational epoch, and demands its raw meat cooked and garnished by adroit and skilful chefs. (Lasswell, 1927, p. 221)

The labor organizers and other workers who were witch-hunted by U.S. Attorney General Mitchell Palmer right after World War I were among the hunks of humanity carved up with the dainty assistance of the academic

tinkers. Many were the victims:

When peace came, the repressive measures, instead of being abolished, were used by federal, state, and municipal officials, and were imitated by social, political and economic groups. These agencies employed censorship ideas and techniques against their domestic foes under the guise of protecting the institutions of the United States and the American way of life, without carefully defining the latter. (Mock, 1972, p.213)

Post World War I Social Psychology

Morale is the keyword behind which we will find social psychology lurking, lit too dimly for the casual eye, perhaps. The social scientists who between the two world wars worked hard at carefully investigating the many attributes of the supposed entity "morale" did not necessarily think in terms of stamping out the I.W.W. or fashioning the tactical maneuvers of mind control. Some of them must surely have had at least the socialist menace on their minds, however, for the early 19th century social science literature in the U.S. (as in England and Germany) was full of diatribes on the spectre that had come from the workers of Europe.

The social psychological conceptions that had come together around problems (for capitalists) at the capitalist workplace had originated a conceptual way of looking at things that would grow with each new application

in a new historical situation. The soldiering of the elementary work group was like a speck of material around which the thematic refrain of a new discipline condensed. Like the original raindrop that lands as a hailstone, that which we now call social psychology picked up its configuration as time went by. Through the agency of World War I, it acquired its suitability to psychological warfare.

Allport (1954) talked of "a special challenge" that "fell to social psychology" as it "emerged" in the 1920s (p. 4) as if the tasks revealed themselves to social psychologists like a mystic beast descending ex machina. Indeed, so thick is the fog bank maintained between social science workers and the class character of their work that it would not be surprising if social psychologists viewed the interesting questions they pursued as autonomously dropping into their laps. In fact, the flurry of work on "leadership, public opinion, rumor, propaganda, prejudice, attitude change, morale, communication, race relations, and conflicts of value" that Allport (1954, p.4) delineated originated in the wartime psywar needs and practices of the class controlling corporate capital society.

The changeover from what went on under the rubric

of social psychology before World War I to its concerns after the propaganda campaigns of that first global confrontation of nation-states has been described in two interrelated terminologies, dynamic segregation and communication. Bruner & Allport (1940) documented a sharp increase in the use of concepts they summarized as "dynamic segregation" in the social psychology literature between 1918 and 1938, the post-World War I and Great Depression periods.

Concepts of dynamic segregation. . . includes all discussions dealing with the differentiation of phenomena or events within a totality. Included are such conceptions as individuation (both psychological and physiological), figure-ground, field theory, activity within the context of the total personality, situational determination of social events, and various principles of Gestalt dynamics. (Bruner & Allport, 1940, p. 762)

It is to this tradition that the experience which Kurt Lewin brought to the U.S. with him from the Psychological Institute in Berlin belongs. Lewin fled from the Nazis in the early 1930s and settled into U.S. academia. According to his associate and biographer Alfred Marrow (1977), Lewin had written his earliest papers as the first decade of the 20th century gave way to the second. Among the first few were pieces on work in the agricultural and factory settings of the industrialized period. Indeed, one early paper took off directly

from Taylor's writings on the habituation of the worker to the mind control of the rationalized point of production (Lewin, 1920). Just as control at the workplace is essential to the continuation of capitalist production processes, the ability to exert significant control over the thinking of culturally diverse and geographically disparate whole populations had by World War I become necessary to inter-capitalist global war. That psychology whose conceptual terms and principles of vision could contribute to the management of global capitalism was the psychology which would rise to the top of the pile and attract intellectual workers like a magnet under a piece of paper does iron filings. Like Marx, Lewin based his reasoning on the premise of the intrinsic necessity of work. But whereas Marx had woven his concepts into a clarification of the unjust spiriting away of the worker's products under capitalism, Lewin waxed eloquent about the perfectability of the capitalist workplace.

Lewin was optimistic about scientific psychology as an aid in resolving problems of labor-management relations, and he felt that the industrial setting offered a rich field for exploring new facets of interpersonal relations. (Marrow, 1977, p. 15)

Speaking for himself, Lewin expressed his class allegiance with the utmost openness:

The realistic demands of production have to be satisfied in a way which conforms with the nature of group dynamics. (Lewin, 1944, pp. 137-138)

The challenge to him as psychological social scientist was to construct a conceptual and procedural apparatus which would be internally consistent, externally operational, within the frame of reference of the problems of governing, and encrusted with the trappings of science. The group dynamics which he so crucially defined through his life's work conformed to the nature of production, not, as he apparently thought, the other way around. Accordingly, Lewin followed his interest in the problems of the industrial workplace by creating specialized psychology-tools within the paradigm of relativity which was the dominant metaphor of his intellectual milieu. With Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Koehler, he was one of the original "big four" (Marrow, 1977, p. 69) in Gestalt psychology.

By the time World War II had begun to loom on the Northamerican horizon, Kurt Lewin, newly arrived at Cornell University in New York State, was resuming work on social forces influencing child behavior. With the creative fever for which he was renown, Lewin was ablaze with conceptual instruments which responded to the terms of real-world problems. The only drawback was the social

class for whom he labored. Not accidentally, the social forces and tension systems he elaborated in his mathematicized group psychology were consummately-formed for expressing the notions of social tension-level and mind control used in the conduct of the second global war's psychological front.

The other major summarizers of the changes effected in social psychology after World War I described a drawing together of disparate pieces of a variety of disciplines. Communications theory was in this view said to have been the glue which began to stick the new form of social psychology together (Cottrell & Gallagher, 1941). Their analysis placed a finger exactly on the knot which was to tie social psychology and propaganda together into the longer line of psychological warfare. The genius of Lewin's social psychology of group dynamics, according to these authors, "was to use a situational analysis in the symbolic context provided by the propagandist" (Cottrell & Gallagher, 1941, p.32). "Symbolic context" was vocabulary semanticists used to mean verbal, visual, and auditory media output in its broadest sense. "Situational analysis" referred to the Lewinian model of collective vectorial dynamics. His was the analytic geometry and calculus of social psychology.

The underlying assumption of this view was that if an individual could actually identify his interests with the symbol of a particular group or could so have have his interests defined by a clever propagandist, he held somewhere in his reaction system the tendency to act in the name of that symbol, the capacity to suffer or rejoice with its varying fate. The problem that faced the students who dealt with group interaction was to describe the conditions under which these identifications took place and to chart the individual behavioral reflection of shifting alignments in the world of secondary symbols. It was a problem, chiefly, in identifying position in situational fields and correlating these positions with the characteristic modes of behavior which accompany them. (Cottrell & Gallagher, 1941, p. 32)

The same authors aptly summarized this line of work as the "field-ahistorical approach in social psychology" (p.10). Everything about us humans in groups was to be examined--except the overall context in which we labored and otherwise lived.

Organizing for Social Science Research

On the academic front in the U.S., organization greatly enhanced the capability of social science to apply the scientific method to problems of day-to-day functioning of capitalist society. Social science workers in academe could be shielded from the bloodshed of reality by the variety of buffer institutions which organized their work. In the case of social psychology,

the six associations for professional psychologists formed the proximate layer of organization. Hierarchically situated with respect to these and other social scientific professional associations were entities like the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Council on Education, and of course the National Research Council. They administered a contracting-out system, intermediating between the institutional customers for the research and the research workers who freely pursued interesting questions. It was what a later official report would call "the decentralization of research activities by governmental agencies and the centralizing of research workers through the organization of research councils" (Research--a National Resource, 1938-1941, p. 16).

The overarching role of the policy research institutes in this network was to supply ideology about organizing science work. Under the direction of Wesley Mitchell, the person said to have put the use of statistics into government in the U.S., the National Bureau of Economics Research did a study of national income distribution. In the foreword to its 1933 report, President Hoover expressed the contemporary view of the role of social science in solving social problems:

It was my desire to have a complete, impartial examination of the fact. . . . This study is the latest and most comprehensive of a series, . . . to see where social stresses are occurring and where major efforts should be undertaken to deal with them constructively. (Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1933, p.v)

Hoover could have been cribbing from the early 19th century British Parliament, but he wasn't. He had appointed the Social Trends Committee in 1929, just after the Northamerican center of capital's circulation fell down into the gap of an opened-up fault line. Their charge was to study elements of instability in U.S. society. Their fundamental findings with respect to the usefulness of social science in governing were as follows:

The fundamental principles are that social problems are products of change, and that social changes are interrelated. Hence, a change in one part of the social structure will affect other parts connected with it. . . . The objective of any conscious control over the process is to secure a better adjustment between inherited nature and culture. The means of social control is social discovery and the wider adoption of new knowledge. . . . The most recent phase of American development in the social field has been the recognition of the necessity of fact finding agencies and equipment, and their actual establishment. . . . Nor can we fail to observe the interest of government itself, national, state and local alike, in the technical problems of social research and of prevision and planning. . . . There is reason to anticipate that this form of organization of social intelligence and policy will develop in the future with the increasing complexity of social life and the

realization of the significance of social interrelationship. (Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1933, pp lxx-lxxiii)

The depression marked a definitive drawing nigh between government, policy research organizations, and researchers working in universities (Eakins, 1966). If we look at this period in a dialectical way, it's possible to see a familiar pattern, operating at a given grouping of points in history. Working people were astir again, for the overall social arrangements were once more crunching on them too hard. Ever since the advent of the capitalist class arrangements, the social scientific approach has at such times been taken by the class in power to be an appropriate managerial response.

Knowledge for What?(Lynd, 1939). Social discovery for social control. Robert S. Lynd, co-author of the famed Middletown (1959) and Middletown in Transition, (1963) studies and staff intellectual for the Twentieth Century Fund, was proof that there are honest people among the ranks of social science workers. His simple question "knowledge for what?" opens a raft of conceptual boxes. For what, for whom, was the knowledge generated which received such paens of praise from the National Academy of Sciences in 1934: "Where the application of anthropology and psychology has been developed, as in

the contacts with native peoples through colonial policy of England and Holland" (National Academy of Sciences, 1934, p. 36), it has proved "of real importance" (National Academy of Sciences, 1934, p. 36).

In any plan looking over the whole field of human activities for this country it will be important to give definite emphasis to aspects of psychology, anthropology, and cultural history which can furnish interpretation of conditions and states of mind of the people individually and in groups. (National Academy of Sciences, 1934, p. 37)

For whom? What did it mean when the research administration consortium called the National Resources Committee* reported that in the period 1938-1941 "government is in close contact with all the major problems with which the social sciences deal" (Research--A National Resource, 1938-1941, p. 51)? Their report gave the federal research and development (R&D) investment figures for the years 1937 and 1938. No expenditures were listed by the War or Navy Departments under "social science and statistics" (p. 73). Yet within a couple of

* The National Resources Committee included the Secretaries of War, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; the head of the Works Progress Administration; Frederic A. Delano; Charles Merriam; Henry Dennison, and Beardsley Rumel. Its Science Committee contained people from the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council on Education.

years these disciplines would be receiving substantial investment via the military segment of the government-corporate research administration network. We are today so accustomed to that network that it perhaps seems as natural as the trees. But before the first World War, there existed no capability to militarize the social and physical sciences virtually within the blink of an eye, as happened with World War II. Just as there was a day, also before World War I, when a person travelling between nation-states didn't need a passport, and who would think to question its existence today?

For psychology, organizing for World War II began in the spring of 1939, with the establishment of the Committee on Selection and Training of Military Personnel under the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council (Garrett, 1940). A string of variously-named committees succeeded this one, all for the dual purpose of (a) refining and applying techniques for the selection and training of military personnel and (b) studying psycho-physiological and other considerations in the operation of war machinery by human beings (Hunter, 1946). Later, psychologists were registered with two agencies in order to facilitate their incorporation into the war machine (Britt, 1942). The

American Psychological Association operated the Office of Psychological Personnel under the aegis of the National Research Council, sending questionnaires to all known psychologists in the nation to assess their qualifications and experience. The Office of Psychological Personnel sent this information to the War Department for use in assigning inductees with psychology training. Second, the National Resources Planning Board and the U.S. Civil Service Commission operated the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, the agency charged with finding out who in the nation had what training. On the basis of this information, draft deferment could be issued and persons assigned to fill the needs of nominally civilian government agencies.

In general, psychologists were organized simultaneously along two tracks: (a) openly, for the full range of psychological work in a variety of wartime agencies, and (b) covertly, for the psychological warfare work of the Office of Strategic Services, parent to the contemporary Central Intelligence Agency. By 1942, the federal government was the largest single employer of psychologists in the country (Britt, 1942, p.255).

A single government agency coordinated all scientific research done more or less openly at universities,

research institutes, corporate laboratories, and the like; although everything was to be kept secret from the enemy, not everything operated under deep cover. The agency was called the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and was directed by Vannever Bush. Most if not all relatively open psychology work done during the war came under the direction of the OSRD's Applied Psychology Panel, whose Chief Charles W. Bray we shall meet up with again in the last chapter under most interesting circumstances.

Its centralized direction of psychology work began in the middle of 1942, after the precincts of the covert psychology work had been delineated. The range of its work comprised selection and testing, training, voice communication, and all manner of general and specific "man-machine" psychology. The OSRD was to create "research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare" (U.S. Senate, 1945). Bray summarized the public record by calling the Applied Psychology Panels' work

a single, coordinated approach to the human being considered as an instrumentality of war. Hence the Panel. . . studied selection, classification and training of Service personnel and human needs and capacities in relation to the design and operation of military equipment. (Office of Scientific Research and Development, Box 460, document "Final Report and Bibliography of the Applied Psychology Panel, NDRC, June 30, 1946, p. 1)

The report was also published as a book (Bray, 1948). The OSRD worked on the human being as a piece of the weapons system; another agency was charged with operating on the human being as object of a weapons system.

Psychology Division, Office of Strategic Services

At the beginning of 1937, the first journal of the management of mass thought in the U.S. began publication, with such social science luminaries as Hadley Cantril of Princeton, Harold Lasswell of the University of Chicago, and E. Pendleton Herring of Harvard and the Social Science Research Council on its editorial board. In its first few volumes, the Public Opinion Quarterly included such diverse articles as "What is Labor Thinking?" by John L. Lewis and "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," by Floyd Allport, as well as a steady stream of material on the German propaganda machine. The German Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, had taken up position as one of the chief spectres haunting Western hallways and meeting rooms. The management of mass thought on selected issues which it had so pre-eminently achieved in Germany was becoming everyday more imperative at home, from the point of view of the class in power in the U.S.

The Spanish Civil War, pilot run of the Nazi war machine,* had begun the previous year. So had the British Committee on Imperial Defense's investigation of measures necessary in case of food rationing in England, first step in what very rapidly became massive wartime government involvement in social investigation in that country. So had Britain's Mass Observation project. Started up as a populist-inspired attempt to do social science in the service of the working class of Britain, Mass Observation used a network of working class people to gather highly detailed information on the working class population. By 1940, Mass Observation had given over its talents to the British Ministry of Information, cognate organization to the U.S.'s Office of Coordinator of Information (Mass Observation Archive). Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1938) analyzed Mass Observation right away as a domestic intelligence service. As in the United States, social scientists in Europe were rapidly being organized to participate in the second global inter-capitalist war.

The nation-states of Europe and Northamerica were

*in which the world's first razing of a whole city by aerial bombardment took place, at Guernica on the north-central coast of Spain.

modernizing their military machines, and psychological warfare was to come into its own in this one. No longer simply the censorship at home and media placements abroad which had constituted the U.S.'s psychological front in World War I, Allied psychological warfare in World War II was to be operated from military command centers and require an intricate network of social science for its accomplishment. Developments since the first World War in such areas as advertising techniques and behaviorist psychology (Ewan, 1976), opinion polling, and the study of what would soon become well-known as group dynamics" had honed some fine instruments of "warfare on the intelligence that gives life to matter" (Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, 1942, p. 1).

In the summer of 1940, a group of psychologists including representatives of the six professional associations were called to Washington, D.C. by the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council "to consider the relation of psychology to the whole federal program" (Culler, 1941, p. 871). The 48th meeting of the American Psychological Association

*Psychological Abstracts started using "group dynamics" as a subject heading in 1945, with an article by Kurt Lewin.

was coming up in a few weeks. Two concrete actions were reported to have issued from this pre-APA meeting: (1) the Emergency Committee in Psychology, established in 1939 under the NRC's Division of Anthropology and Psychology, was expanded to include more subcommittees and to function as "a clearinghouse between professional psychologists and the appropriate federal agencies" (Culler, 1941, p. 871). It was to coordinate communications between the federal agencies ordering the work and the psychologists doing the work. One of its subcommittees had the duty of longer-range planning for the postwar organization of psychology as a profession. That was the group which leaked the news that social psychology was among the starlets discovered during World War II (Boring et al., 1942).

(2) A conference was arranged "to consider the Psychological Factors in Morale" (Culler, 1941, p.871). The morale conference was held in Washington, D.C. in November 1940, after that September's APA meeting. About 25 psychologists were there, again including representatives from the six national societies for professional psychologists. Participants Gordon Allport and Gertrude Schmeidler (1943) reported that the purpose of the conference was "to aid social psychologists in

making their maximum contribution in the national emergency" (p. 65, emphasis added). They did not explain that psychological warfare was the main component of the war's prosecution to which social psychology was attached. The conference empowered a group of psychologists under venerables Robert Yerkes and Gordon Allport to begin work on "psychological factors in morale" (Culler, 1941, p. 871). The group's main contribution was to produce a bibliography entitled "German Psychological Warfare." Clearly, then, "morale" was the accepted euphemism for psychological warfare, much as "incident" was offered as euphemism for the near-holocaust of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant disaster in the U.S. at the end of March 1979.

A year later, in November 1941, California psychologist Robert C. Tryon arranged with the Emergency Committee to formally organize academic social psychology to perform tasks required by his organization. Tryon was chief of the Psychology Division of the Office of Strategic Services, the organization which would become the Central Intelligence Agency after the war. When set up in the summer of 1940, the future OSS was called the Office of Coordinator of Information. The Coordinator was William Donovan, OSS Chief. Allport and

Schmeidler (1943) reported that

In late November, 1941, following a conference with R.C. Tryon on some problems encountered by the Office of the Coordinator of Information, the Emergency Committee in Psychology of the National Research Council established a Subcommittee on Defense Seminars. The function of the Subcommittee was to stimulate, coordinate, and clear research in social psychology in different colleges and universities, through the organization of seminars which would carry on investigations useful to the government. (p. 65).

Gordon Allport chaired the subcommittee of himself, R.C. Tryon, F.H. Sanford, and G.R. Schmeidler. The subcommittee elicited "promises of cooperation" (Allport & Schmeidler, 1943, p. 66) from 21 universities* before dissolving into a slightly reconstituted Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). Alvin Zander chaired the new SPSSI Committee on Morale and Leadership Research. It merged with the Defense Seminar operation, becoming SPSSI's Committee on War Service

*According to Allport & Schmeidler (1943), they were the University of California (two groups), University of California at Los Angeles, University of Chicago, College of the City of New York (two groups), University of Colorado, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, George Washington University, Harvard University, University of Iowa, University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Ohio State University, Rutgers University, Psychologists Club of San Francisco Bay Region, Sarah Lawrence College, University of Southern California, Syracuse University, Stanford University, and Yale University. Kurt Lewin worked at the University of Iowa. He was key theorist for the operative paradigm in psychological warfare-- "the small group."

and Research, with Gordon Allport chairing and Kurt Lewin, Alvin Zander, and G.R. Schmeidler among the participants. This arrangement went into effect in the fall of 1942 (Allport & Schmeidler, 1943). It was part of what showed on the outside of the organization of social psychology for achieving the military objectives of the United States.

The more interesting part of the picture has until now lay largely invisible to all except, presumably, those who needed to know at the time. Certainly vitually none of the story of what went on for social psychology in the Psychology Division of the OSS has ever been printed within the ordinary purview of the social psychologist. I combed five research libraries for traces of the inside story,* to no avail. It's therefore fair to claim that this writing represents the first time the papers of the Psychology Division of the OSS have been gone into for the purpose of unearthing information about social psychology's own history. Indeed, this investigator caused a portion of the OSS Psychology Division documents to be declassified by the Central Intelligence

* The library of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, N.Y.; the library of the British Museum in London, England; the New York Public Library in New York City; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; and the Pentagon library in Washington, D.C.

Agency and released to public scrutiny for the first time.

By the summer of 1941, a panel of psychologists was at work under G-2 (intelligence) of the Army General Staff, studying the question of psychological warfare (Hunter, 1946). In June of that year, a "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information" had been issued, upon receipt of which President Roosevelt ordered the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Strategic Information (Brown, 1976, p. 46). This document begins to explain Robert Tryon's November, 1941 move to organize what remained of social psychology in academia.

Psychologists were to make weapons:

Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. . . . It is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect either directly or through existing departments of government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character and strength of their armed forces, their principle channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies. . . . To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized trained research officials in the relative scientific fields, including technological, economic, financial and psychological scholars) is of determining influence in modern warfare. (Donovan, 1941 (vol. 1), pp. 259-260)

Donovan was a Wall Street lawyer of Roosevelt

persuasion. Together with several members of the Mellon family, the Dulles brothers, and William Angleton of the National Cash Register Company and the 1970s CIA domestic counterintelligence (Cointelpro) scandal, he organized a capacity for gathering strategically vital information. The micro-details of the human element that psychology specializes in were to form pieces of a larger picture. But not just any and all psychology, applied broadside. It was to be social psychology which pre-eminently among the sub-disciplines of the field was tailor-made to investigate the inner workings of the agglomerations of individuals that make up the social units of a culture.

According to the War Department's official history of the OSS,* the Psychology Division was

organized in September 1941 and staffed by experts drawn from the fields of psychology, sociology and social anthropology. Its purpose was to assist in long-range propaganda planning by supplying background material and current information, and otherwise to apply the specialized experience, knowledge and techniques of its expert staff to intelligence problems. (War Report of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, p. 59)

*This is not a commercially published volume. A copy is available for examination in the office of the Modern Military Archivist, The National Archives and Records Services, Wash., D.C. An edited version was published soon after the Report was declassified in 1976: Brown, A. The Secret War Report of the OSS. New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1976.

Intelligence problems were to define the psychology. In their turn, intelligence problems were defined by military situations, while the U.S.'s military mission was to secure the planet for continued corporate expansion. Psychology seems like a speck when its place is viewed through a lens of such wide angle. On the other hand, judging from the words and actions of the administrators of the U.S. psywar machine, psychology was a vital piece in the archwork of social sciences that carried the "warfare on the intelligence that gives life to matter" (Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, 1942, p. 1).

As soon as they were hired, psychology division psychologists prepared a document detailing their organization's rationale and functions:

The amazing strength of the Germans is due not only to their development of economic and military science, but to their use of scientific psychology, which is considered by the Nazis to be one of their most effective weapons. Thus Hitler over his own signature early instituted a psychological department as a permanent feature of the Nazi state.

The Nazis conceive of war as 'total,' a conflict between populations, and not only between military and economic machines. Social, religious, economic, political groups are studied and manipulated as crucial elements in attack and defense.

How do they use psychology? So far as personnel is concerned, 200 top psychologists are

on the Army payroll alone, but every German psychologist is mobilized and works on some detail of psychological warfare. A large number work on military classification problems and on the problems involved in actual fighting. More important, however, although few people who have noticed it have attached the proper significance to it, is the fact that special psychological staffs are concerned with psychological campaigns and psychological intelligence. It is significant that these latter staffs work in cooperation with the Propaganda Ministry, the Gestapo, and the Party organizations. These psychologists work on problems of 'morale' of various social groups, both within Germany and in strategic foreign countries.

Enough evidence has accumulated to indicate how the latter group of psychologists work. In Germany detailed records are kept of individuals and of groups. The social groups that compose Germany are closely studied with respect to their customs, organization and relation to other social groups. . . . An analysis of the social ways of members of. . . groups /within foreign countries/ and a study of their organization, ideology, and especially of their weaknesses is shown by dissention, disorganization and low morale, provides the necessary basis of propaganda and aggressive action. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 1-2)

They blamed it on the Nazis, but what is put forward as uniquely Germany's psywar slant on human society had long been an object of U.S. corporate admiration and emulation. As early as World War I, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was publically extolling German exporters who "would consult an ethnologist--the scientific method--/to determine how/ to sell goods to the mind behind that smile" (Redfield, 1919, p. 15) in foreign

markets. But U.S.-based multinational corporations had themselves begun studying how to play to cultural symbols in capital's quest for ever-expanding commerce. Slithering through the Open Door* into the virgin markets of China, for example, agents of the Wrigley's chewing gum company used the travelling roadshow sales techniques of pre-electronic media advertising, sending brass bands and comprador hucksters throughout the cities and the countryside. They learned details of people's beliefs in order to tailor their sales propaganda to local customs. "They proved that the arrow-head men of the spearmint ads were not devils" (Williams, 1919, p. 18), for example, in order to expand through all of Asia in the five years before World War I by "implanting in thousands of Oriental jaws a desire for a confection essentially American" (Williams, 1919, p. 18).

The implication that the U.S. thumb-twiddled with respect to the science of mind-bending until the evil force of Nazi Germany pushed the unwilling citadel of democracy into it is self-serving. The U.S. had to match the weapons systems of its challenger, it is true. But

*In 1899 and 1900, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay promulgated his Open Door Notes, founding document of the new colonialism by economic penetration (Williams, 1959).

the U.S.'s capability rapidly to assemble a war-gearred psychological warfare apparatus depended on the prior existence of a process of increasing sophistication in the permanent propaganda society heralded by the combination of mass production and World War I. Not unlike Germany, the U.S. had spent the 1920s sharpening its claws on the human objectives of the global marketplace. There is more than superficial resemblance between advertising's frontal attack on consciousness and psychological warfare itself. What the advent of shooting war between capitalist nation-states meant was a shift into a drastically more total mode of influencing the feelings and the actions of masses of people, both domestically and abroad.

Many features of the Nazi state's organizational forms for psywar were taken as models of the U.S.'s own version--for example, a special psychological staff under military command and the centralization of sociological, psychological, and other cultural information into a raw materials dump for psywar ordnance fabrication.

The OSS Psychology Division had a relatively small staff, considering the scope of its responsibilities. Records from 1942 released at my request by the Central Intelligence Agency listed 18 psychologists and secretarial workers:

Elizabeth Ainsworth (secretary to Tryon)
 Edward W. Arluck (attitudes & morale)
 Kenneth H. Baker (assistant to Tryon)
 Virginia L. Brydon (secretary in attitudes & morale)
 Donald T. Cambell (psychological strategy analysis)
 Carolyn A. Copeland (secretary)
 John E. deYoung (socio-psychological analysis)
 John F. Embree (psychology & Far East anthropology)
 J.A. Gengerelli (attitudes & morale)
 Marion J. Goetsch (secretary to Scofield)
 Edward Y. Hartshorne (psychological strategy analysis and socio-psychological analysis)
 Arthur F. Jennes (psychology)
 Buford H. Junker (social anthropology and socio-psychological analysis)
 Mary J. Kirkpatrick (secretary in socio-psychological analysis)
 Chauncey M. Louttit (psychology)
 D.V. McGranahan (psychological strategy analysis)
 Selden C. Menefee (psychology)
 Carleton F. Scofield (psychology, assistant to Tryon)
 Martin R. Singer (socio-psychological analysis)
 Katherine J. Stanley (secretary)
 Frank L. Sweetser, Jr. (attitude & morale, sociology, research analysis)
 Robert C. Tryon (director)
 Edythe C. Warden (secretary in psychological strategy analysis)
 Lloyd W. Warner (consultant, 1941)
 Joseph Weckler (consultant, 1941)

(Source = various documents, Record Group 226, Psychology Division, folders entitled "Budget Records" and "Reading File")

This is undoubtedly a partial listing, for with the exception of two documents, the CIA refused to release OSS Psychology Division records beyond 1942. A listing of psychologists "engaged in the various activities of the Office" (Marquis, 1944, p. 121) was published by the APA's Office of Psychological Personnel near the end of

the war:

Donald K. Adams, Duke University
 Edward W. Arluck, New York City
 Edward N. Bernhart, Reed College
 Urie Bronfenbrenner, University of Michigan
 John W. Gardner, Mt. Holyoke College
 James A. Hamilton, University of California
 Robert H. Knapp, Harvard University
 I. Krechevsky, New American Publications, Chicago
 Robert B. MacLeod, Swarthmore College
 J.B. Maller, U.S. Housing Authority
 Donald B. McGranahan, Harvard University
 Carleton F. Scofield, University of Buffalo
 Robert C. Tryon, University of California (chief)

(Source = Marquis, 1944, p. 121)

The first list was culled from internal organizational papers, while the second is of unknown pedigree. Neither reflects the extent and penetration of Psychology Division tentacles, for the vast bulk of the psychology work scooped up into psywar was performed either unwittingly, covertly, or simply with a low profile. Large numbers of psychologists were involved, with APA functionaries acting as organizing cadre. The job of the staff professionals was to bring together vast quantities of specific cultural, social, and psychological information and fashion from it operational approaches to manipulating social groupings like pieces on a gameboard.

It is the social science methodology which constituted the necessary technology of such information-gathering, and it was the social science perspective

which enabled such information to be organized intelligibly for integration into military planning:

The fact that the people of any country tend to associate together in social groups according to their similarities in ethnic origin, religion, social class, habitat, work, etc., provides the key to analysis. The social ways of these groups can be analyzed and described by persons with psychological, sociological, and anthropological training. No small part of the force of the Nazi effort is due to applications of these social sciences in addition to superlative utilization of the physical sciences. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 2-3)

In psychological warfare, social science workers are deployed as reconnaissance crews for military planners, working as eyes and ears to learn the characteristics of the battlefield's human terrain. Nor was the battlefield located only outside the borders of the home country:

The Situation in America--. . .Our strength would be increased enormously were we to apply the techniques of the social sciences to the study of our own people and of those in strategic foreign countries. . . .On the domestic front it cannot be said that our morale is low--it can only be said that we do not know what it is. Our populace is made up of a great many social groups and classes which differ widely in their ideologies and social ways. We know virtually nothing in a systematic way about them. . . .If we are to know the morale of the nation, we must know it for. . .important socio-cultural groups. We must also know the conditions that directly influence morale. . . . There are available trained social scientists who can discover these facts. In conducting such an investigation, it is not necessary to a governmental record on every individual.

Indeed, Americans would oppose such records as an invasion of their privacy and freedom. Our procedure of studying the significant social groups with which the individual identifies himself is quite sufficient and permits the individual to preserve his anonymity. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 3-5)

The psywar perspective was put forward as a way of spying on a population without formally infringing on whatever privacy rights might be "guaranteed" under bourgeois democracy--exactly the same sentiment that attended the birth of the social science mission in the earliest industrial-era data collection on the working class (chapter 2). It is by no means an accident that the same advantages of social science methodology over police-state methodology can be observed at both such a recent and such an early moment in its history. The information-gathering activities of social science personnel are a most versatile management tool. The social science methodology casts an aura of necessity, desirability, and class impartiality around social information-gathering concerned with mass behavior. It can be at one and the same time an activity in the service of social policy planning and of psychological warfare and of any number of governing functions in between.

The OSS's "Proposed Program of the Psychology Division" (Role of Psychology in Defense, p. 6) set forth no

new field of endeavor for social scientists to tackle. The new element was the extraordinary degree of systematic integration of social science work with highly specific strategic considerations:

Objectives--Our general aim is to appraise the 'morale' of the people of this nation and of the people of strategic foreign countries. By 'morale' we mean in general the degree of social adjustment, optimism, confidence in leadership, and willingness to cooperate, of persons belonging to a given social group. . . .

Specific Directives--Our directives are (1) the discovery of trends in morale, in its indicators, and in its conditioning factors; and (2) the prediction of trends. . . .

Techniques--Since we cannot study every individual, we must deal with samples or with the samples or with the significant social groups of which he is a member. Every country is composed of a variety of different social groups. Much material already in existence with reference to these groups should be brought together; and in addition, the most important social groupings must be currently studied. Their social organizations, ideals, taboos, motives and verbal symbols must be analyzed as crucial background information. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 6-7)

The "social group" was clearly a primary category of analysis in gathering up the "crucial background information" without which the U.S. war machine would be fatally flawed. "Social adjustment" and "conditioning factors" in morale could certainly be Pandora's boxes of manipulation techniques, developed through the study of such factors as attitude change, leadership, and forces toward conformity in a group, for example.

The material already in existence was gathered in by the OSS's Division of Special Information (DSI), which conducted what was up to that time the most massive search of the literature in social science history. A staff of academics under poet Archibald MacLeish combed the Library of Congress and other sources, organizing their findings under regional geographical headings and feeding the resulting information into the OSS and other government agencies.

The research techniques used by DSI were new only in their application to intelligence. Academic research is the result of extremely careful, thorough examination and evaluation of all possible sources; it is largely a matter of common sense, patience, judgment and familiarity with all types of sources. The most important function that DSI had to perform during the COI period was to build a sound body of background material through use of the resources of the Library of Congress and staff contacts with other libraries, universities, scholars and technical experts. The full results of this preliminary work were not apparent until later. Even during its earliest stages, however individual DSI reports proved the validity of Donovan's contention. . . 'that information already existed in the United States which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.' (War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, vol. 1, p.53)

The psychological warfare which these efforts served was waged on the home front, on allies, on enemy peoples, and on peoples who took no active part in the

shooting war. Its role encompassed a range of social science considerations, including those aspects of human experience customarily subsumed under psychology, especially social psychology:

Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is to be attained--other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions --which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

The accomplishment of these ends demands and includes: (a) general propaganda services, operating primarily against civilian groups and using mainly ideological appeals and news manipulation; (b) operations--(1) subversive services engaged in sabotage, rumor-spreading, bribery, etc.; (2) combat psychological warfare services directly attached to the armed forces, which act under the theater commander and are exemplified by the German Propaganda Companies. (c) intelligence services engaged in accumulating information by research and espionage on fundamental social, ideological and leadership vulnerabilities of enemy populations and on the current attitudes and morale of civilian and military groups, in addition to the usual military, naval, political, and economic information. (War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, "Exhibits" vol., pp. 357-358)

The OSS's mission of ideological and operational subversion had both civilian and military groups as

target populations. Civilian target groups were to receive the propaganda service, consisting of ideological appeals and news manipulation; the subversive services, consisting of sabotage, rumor-spreading, bribery, and a wide-open "etc."; and the intelligence services, consisting of information-gathering activities whose two-faced method comprised both research and espionage. Intelligence services personnel collected information on the social, ideological, and leadership vulnerabilities of enemy populations, the attitudes and morale of civilian groups, and the data provided routinely by government bureaucracies. Military target groups received the combat psychological warfare services in addition to the propaganda service, subversive services, and intelligence services. The criteria by which research and espionage were differentiated were not made clear.

Psychological Warfare

In psywar, psychological elements are systematically manipulated in such a way that military parts of the war operation are enhanced. The will and the sympathies of the enemy, of the U.S. population, and of neutrals are the defined focuses of manipulation. It's clear that the category of target peoples excludes no one;

psychological warfare is to be directed at whomever it seems desirable to manipulate. The "concrete plan of work" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 7) proposed for the OSS Psychology Division at its inception outlined three broad areas: (1) The Psychological Program for Appraising Trends in Domestic Morale, (2) Program Regarding the State of Morale in Strategic Foreign Countries, and (3) Program of Special Projects.

The Psychological Program for Appraising Trends in Domestic Morale outlined the information to be gathered on the population of the United States:

The first task is to locate the significant social groups of people that comprise our population. Social research reveals that the United States may be divided into six major cultural regions which differ sharply from each other in certain respects, such as type of agriculture, degree of urbanization, ethnic or nationality origin, racial composition, planes of living, and even social attitudes. Within these regions smaller sub-regions are discernable. Furthermore, there are some 400 cities of more than 25,000 population, which have some of the characteristics of the surrounding areas, but which differ greatly in their ways of life and social attitudes from rural areas nearby. Our first task is to bring together information on these various regions, with their cities and rural areas, which will serve as a background for interpreting changing conditions and resulting changes in morale. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 9)

Identify groups then identify the attitudes that go with each group. Existing government agencies such

as the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services (whose reports drew on 24 different federal agencies), the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Farm Security Administration, the Social Security Board, the United States Public Health Service, the National Youth Administration, the Office of Education, the Bureau of the Census, and the Research Division of the Work Projects Administration were to feed in their routinely-collected information. MacLeish's literature search would add whatever it turned up. Newspapers were to be monitored for their information on public opinion. Groups of social science workers in academia whose work could bear on the "morale" question were to be tapped to the extent possible (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 11). We have already seen that Robert Tryon, Gordon Allport, and Alvin Zander personally supervised the organization of social psychologists in academia for psywar. The plan indicated a pattern of study which differed in specifics but not in categories from psychological warfare plans for Japan or for the Normandy Invasion.*

*These plans are reproduced for the reader's information in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C is the general psywar outline, capable of being applied to any given society.

We shall integrate available psychological and sociological material of a non-statistical nature on representative groups and communities. Intensive studies of social relationships, organizations, leadership, and attitudes have been carried on in many American communities; these will be referred to as the need arises for information on particular areas or groups. Our staff of sociological psychologists will be charged with drawing upon and evaluating these materials. In addition, we shall have the volunteer services of psychologists and sociologists who have specialized in field work in different sections of the country, who will be willing to send in observations of pertinent events when called upon, and who may even conduct local studies of attitudes and morale at our request. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 11-12)

Four public opinion polling organizations were to feed their results directly into the OSS Psychology Division: The National Opinion Research Center at Denver, the American Institute of Public Opinion at Princeton, the Fortune poll, and the Division of Program Surveys of the Federal Bureau of Agricultural Economics (which is where attitude-scale inventor Rensis Likert worked). Their interviewing activity "constitute[d] a direct appraisal of the morale of the people" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 12). Information gathered by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in its everyday affairs was considered high-grade intelligence, a very important raw material for a variety of psychological warfare on the domestic population. In addition,

this agency sends 35 full-time interviewers into the field to talk to farmers in their natural habitat, employing a very adroit type of 'open' verbal interview. This agency also makes occasional excursions into selected urban areas. The information collected here cuts deeply into the personal problems of individuals. Analysis of these findings may provide helpful suggestions on questions to be formulated by the polling agencies. The work of this agency should be greatly expanded, to cover representative urban centers as well as additional farm areas. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 12-13)

In addition to having at his disposal the "routine" information gathered by Lickert's bureaucracy, Tryon would organize the "social psychology seminars" which turned into an SPSSI organizing project. The ordinary literature of the field was on board via MacLeish's on-going social science literature search in the Library of Congress, and it all was to be integrated by an OSS professional staff made up of people who were called by the name "social psychologist." The terms "sociological psychologist" and "social psychologist" were used interchangeably in the OSS. In discussing the Psychology Division's foreign responsibilities, for example, Kermit Roosevelt's* official post World War II report talked of

*CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt headed the 1953 maneuver in Iran which replaced the elected Mohammed Mossadegh with the recently removed Shah Riza Pahlevi. The reason was that Mossadegh had challenged the Western oil corporations' practice of robbing Iran of its oil.

Psychology Division staff as social psychologists:

The Psychology Division is composed of a group of social psychologists with extensive experience in psychology, social anthropology, and sociology. Its function is to supply such background and current information on the national psychological characteristics of foreign peoples as is desirable for the prosecution of psychological warfare. The Division prepares reports on the current social attitudes and morale of social groups in these countries, on the domestic and foreign propaganda to which these groups are exposed, and on the attitudes and morale of foreign armed forces. With the collaboration of other divisions it also prepares for the Special Service Branch of the War Department 'Soldiers' Guides' which equip the members of the American armed forces with information on various foreign peoples. (War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, p.310)

This is the second broad area outlined for the OSS Psychology Division in its "concrete plan of work": the Program Regarding the State of Morale in Strategic Foreign Countries.

The Program for the domestic picture was presented first in order to show the analytical procedure required for any country. The obvious first need is to discover the kinds of social groups that compose the country. If we know the state of morale of each of these, we will know it for the country as a whole. But we lack adequate sources of information compared to those we have for the domestic scene. . . .The major interest of the psychologist is in the social organization of the country, in the interaction of its social groups, and in the individuals that compose them. . . .We must. . .build up as complete a picture of the group make-up of the country as possible, showing the significant conflicting and cooperating groups and their ethos. This type of integrated social description of a given country

is necessary to the social psychologist if he is to evaluate the current incoming information from military and naval attaches, from interviews with emigres just arrived, from foreign radio broadcasts to domestic listeners, and from other sources. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, pp. 14-15)

"Ideals, taboos, motives and verbal symbols of people who are members of living social groups" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 15) were to be found out through psychological interviews with registered aliens and naturalized citizens, locatable through the use of a card sorter (giving it "the personal quality with which psychologists like to deal" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 15). Anthropologists were to elicit similar information from recent immigrants. "The current living conditions and psychological ways of the people in the selected countries" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 16) would thus become known, enabling continuous evaluation of a war zone as well as "the basis of a psychological offensive" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 17). Psychological offensive was understood to mean "the psychology of persuasion" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 17), the feeding of information "to the populace of any strategic foreign country in the emotional-cultural form which they understand" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 17). It was assumed that "persons can best be

persuaded to accept information when it is couched in their folk terms and ways" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 17). Although the incoming information on non-U.S. populations would be sparse relative to that on the U.S.'s own people, "the significance of that received may be very great when cast against the background of information we will have collected" (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 18). Although not sufficient, the on-the-shelf literature of the various fields was more than just a necessary component of intelligence-gathering; it introduced a multiplier effect which stretched current information to cover the deep questions to be answered.

The third and last of the broad areas outlined in the Psychology Division's concrete plan of work was its Program of Special Projects. To be sure, many activities carried out under this rubric have not yet come to light and may never do

so.* The concrete plan of work gave it only one paragraph out of 20 pages. It specified only propaganda and rumors, but had a catch-all secret category in addition to the ubiquitous "etc.":

In addition to the foregoing systematic plan of work, the Psychology Division will be engaged on special problems concerned with the study of current techniques of propaganda, the nature and extent of rumors, etc. We will be prepared to give advice and supply information on special problems as they arise. In doing so, we shall not attempt to have in our possession all the facts regarding any and all sources;

*Information published by John Marks and staff in their study called The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control (1979) gives an idea of OSS activities which may have been conducted but not (yet) revealed:

World War II provided more than the grand themes of the CIA's behavioral programs. It also became the formative life experience of the principle CIA officials, and, indeed, of the CIA itself as an institution. The secret derring-do of the OSS was new to the United States, and the ways of the OSS would grow into the ways of the CIA. OSS leaders would have their counterparts later in the Agency. CIA officials tended to have known the OSS men, to think like them, to copy their methods, and even, in some cases, to be the same people. When Agency officials wanted to launch their massive effort for mind control, for instance, they got out the old OSS documents and went about their goal in many of the same ways the OSS had. (Marks, 1979, p. 11)

rather, we shall attempt to know the best sources of information, and with the cooperation of the Division of Special Information and other agencies and individuals to supply quick but valid answers to questions within our field. There are, incidentally, numerous non-governmental research groups engaged in the study of special problems of morale and propaganda. Our division should become a clearing house for the results of these studies. Insofar as is possible, we shall attempt to utilize the abilities of every competent social scientist who is willing to place his services at the disposal of the government. (Role of Psychology in Defense, 1941, p. 19)

Clearly, the OSS's ability to carry out its psywar mission depended crucially upon exhaustive organizing among the nation's social science workers. How else to know the best sources of information on questions of making war on the intelligence that gives life to matter? As routinely as the Office of Scientific Research and Development integrated psychologists who specialized in perception into the massive "man-machine" problem, organizers of the OSS's Psychology Division cast their Procrustean net over social psychology and other forms of social science work. Their intelligence activities required

analysis of the populace in terms of the social groups composing it, discovering their structure, their important persistent social ideologies and symbols, their conflicts, inter-influences, leader-follower hierarchy, etc. (A plan for such social analyses was developed in the Psychology Division in December 1941.) (Tryon, July 7, 1942)

Tryon's 1942 memo referring back to the concrete plan of work laid out in the 1941 Role of Psychology in Defense distinguished between three kinds of operational activities, two focused on civilian populations and one focused on both civilian and military populations. For civilian populations there were "general propaganda operations: agencies of radio, press, graphic material, motion pictures, etc." and subversive operations: agents engaged in creating situations (rumor spreading, bribing, sabotage, etc.) that produce the desired attitudes in the populace." For both civilians and troops there were "combat propaganda operations: units utilizing at the scene of military action, radio, loud-speakers, leaflets, etc." (Tryon, July 7, 1942). Even though available materials are scarce, continuity in the work of the Psychology Division is evident. A late 1942 estimate of the Psychology Division's needs for the fiscal year ending in the middle of 1943 projected the following division of labor among its professional staff:

Socio-Psychological Analysis Section / 9 professional staff/ Extensive analyses of the people in various strategic areas in terms of the social psychology of traditional and existing social groups and of their important social ideologies. These basic social psychological data are essential to the evaluation of recurrent reports on the morale and war attitudes of the people and to the intelligent execution of American psychological

warfare in a given strategic area. . . .
Attitudes and Morale Section /10 professional staff/ Systematic and continuing analyses of the current morale and war attitudes of civilian and military groups in strategic foreign areas, based on special agents' reports, consular reports, officers' reports, intercepts, press surveys, interviews with enemy prisoners, correspondence, etc. . . .
Psychological Strategy Analysis Section /8 professional staff/ Systematic and continuing analysis of the domestic and foreign propaganda to which the peoples of various countries are and have been exposed. Studies of the subversive activities to which the peoples of enemy and Allied countries have been exposed. Studies of the combat propaganda operations focused on enemy troops and civilian populations in combat zones. On those areas on which we prepare morale and war attitudes reports we summarize the current propaganda (by radio, press, motion pictures, etc) and other psychological warfare operations to which the people are subjected by their own and other countries. (Tryon, September 4, 1942)

The "social psychological data" collected were defined by the OSS Psychology Division's "focus on the facts most crucial to our war effort"* (Junker, Warner, Embree, Arensberg, & Weckler; January 2, 1942; p. 1), according to a paper prepared for the Psychology Division. Entitled Social and Psychological Analysis of a Nation: A Working Outline, it appears to be the draft which

*"All psychological warfare is in accord with strategy approved by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff" (War Report of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, p.332).

fleshed out the "social psychological" components of psychological warfare mentioned a few months earlier in the "concrete plan of work." For the reader's interest, the outline itself is reproduced in Appendix C. It specified the framework for analyzing any country's social system in terms of its economy, its social organization, and its ideologies. The country's recent history, its leadership structures, and "the individual in his society" (Junker et al., 1942, p. 2) completed the roster of categories. "The country's social system at any point in time" (Junker et al., 1942, p. 2) could be specified with information from the first three categories, because these were the

three forms or levels of social adaptation and control which are essential to every social system. . . . All three together compose a natural persistent system in the sense that a change at any one point effects some sort of change at every other. (Junker et al., 1942, p. 2)

Thus, the social science theory of psywar was shot through with the "group" theme of study, speciality of social psychology, and postulated an integration principle which connected the various parts of society together. Social psychology's value in World War II psywar was precisely the background-arching scope of its perspective on the study of human beings in society, a perspective which featured characteristics of human behavior in groups.

It's not that only trained social psychologists could gather or process the requisite information. Rather, it was that only people whose training enabled them to operate within a perspective being called "social psychology" could organize the processing of such piles of information as were flowing into the OSS Psychology Division. The reason was that it was social psychology which, uniquely among the social sciences, claimed to give access to the primary unit of psywar: the behavior of the individual in the group--and therefore the behavior of groups of people. It is this fact which accounts for the meteoric rise of Lewinian group dynamics within the space of a few years, such that group dynamics was the face of social psychology after the war.

Recruitment of Psychologists

The manner in which large numbers of social scientists, including social psychologists, discretely organized to ply their trade in step with the rather small number of Psychology Division staff responsible for integrating all psychological warfare information is instructive. It shows how little the everyday stream of academic life need be perturbed to tap the skills of those cozily inhabiting its precincts. It shows one slice of time in

the life of the organizing net within which social scientists began to work back at the first great organizing crunch of World War I.

Tryon had in 1941 initiated a seminar system to tap the social psychology portion of the workaday world of social science. Through it and other formal and informal organization, social psychologists were brought to work on whatever was deemed necessary. A series of letters among the sparse documentation released to the investigator by the CIA in 1977 gives a concrete example of a mundane organizing task carried out by the Psychology Division among the ranks of social psychologists and others. Excerpts from a letter from Robert MacLeod, OSS Psychology Division, to Gordon Allport at Harvard University, November 9, 1942:

Dear Gordon:

Since I saw you last, I have shifted over to Bob Tryon's Division in OSS. The work is somewhat similar, but it is concerned with foreign peoples and is naturally highly secret.

We are wondering if we could interest you in an idea which might prove fruitful. It may be that you have already given it some thought. The idea is to set up a panel of German experts, e.g., refugees and others who have an intimate knowledge of Germany and a lively interest in what is going on, and who would be willing at regular intervals, let us say once a month, to make a judgment on the current state of German morale, and to state briefly the reasons for that judgment. . . .

We should be very much interested in the results if some non-governmental group, such as your Morale Seminars, were to take responsibility for it. How about it? . . . We have a good many names to suggest for the panel, and presumably you have others. Initial contacts with these people could be made by mail or by interview, and the subsequent analyses would not be very complicated. We could, if necessary, take care of the analyses ourselves, although we are sadly understaffed. We could also, by giving you a consultant appointment, defray the cost of materials, postage, and secretarial help. It would have to be understood, however, that the OSS interest in the problem should remain a secret, although you would be free to let it be known that your findings would be communicated to the government.

Could you let me know fairly soon what you think of the idea? If it appeals to you, we can discuss it further by mail, or one of us might even go up to Cambridge to talk it over with you. (MacLeod, November 1942)

The first thing to notice is the chumminess. Next thing is the relative simplicity of this deep, dark secret. The OSS was routinely implementing ideas Donald T. Cambell's psywar analysis team had worked out (Alcorn, 1942). Later, the Navy Department's ONR (Office of Naval Research) and the Air Force's RAND (Research and Development) Corporation would pursue the study of the method for many years, indicating continued military interest in processes having to do with human beings acting within groups. The OSS Psychology Division used a farming-out method, under centralized direction. That's why it was able to function with so relatively few staff.

It was the research management method preferentially used during World War II. The organizers of the academics were pledged to secrecy even though they were not contract-bound. The bond was loyalty to what was defined as the national interest. Social scientists were to have the academic freedom to participate in the study on its own terms or not, and to tell that the work was being done for government sources.

Excerpts from another letter from Robert MacLeod, OSS Psychology Division, to Wayland Vaughan at the psychology department of Boston University in Massachusetts:

Dear Mr. Vaughan:

Gordon Allport has probably discussed with you the matter which I took up with him a few weeks ago. At any rate, he indicated that you might be interested in undertaking a project, the results of which might be of considerable value to us in OSS. Allport has probably explained the general conditions under which the work would have to be done. (1) No connection with OSS could be revealed; (2) the work would unfortunately have to be on a volunteer basis, although by appointing you as a consultant, we could defray the cost of materials and secretarial help; (3) the analysis should be done by yourself and your colleagues and the results transmitted to us, although we could, if necessary, undertake the analysis ourselves.

I hope very much that you will find yourself free to develop the project. If so, perhaps you could let me know at your earliest convenience, and I shall proceed to put through a consultant's appointment for you. If possible, I should like to go up to talk the matter over with you sometime, but I think the project should

be pushed ahead anyway. The general idea is, as you know, to set up a panel of German experts from whom recurring judgments on German morale can be had. I should like to leave the design of the study completely in your hands. There are, however, a few points which might be stressed. (MacLeod, December 1942a)

In a classic example of doublethink, claims of academic freedom are scattered like stardust to cover the mental tracks of military command. A project dropped on Vaughan by the OSS was to be thought of as his own. The enclosed draft of an instruction form read, in part:

Dear _____:

The enclosure on Scale Rating of German Civilian Morale is being sent to you with the idea that you may be willing to cooperate in an effort to arrive at a consensus of expert opinion on the current condition of morale in Germany. The opinions thus collected will be used in conjunction with other available indices.

You have been selected because your past experience and your current interest should enable you to arrive at an informed opinion on this subject, and because of your loyalty to the United Nations Allied cause. (MacLeod, December 1942a)

Once again, loyalty comes first, since it defines the problem. The skills are to be placed in the service of the national interest as defined through that loyalty. Furthermore:

While it is hoped that the accompanying rating scale is self-explanatory this office will be happy to elucidate any unclear points about which you may care to inquire if you wish to cooperate. . . .

If you feel that you cannot cooperate we would appreciate your telling us your reasons. (MacLeod, December 1942a)

An example of how it was done, Vaughan's academic cover was to provide the front office for the organizing of a piece of social science work for the OSS Psychology Division. The project was even a partial assessment of the loyalty of select social science workers, whose skills might be called on again in the future. In his follow-up letter to Allport, MacLeod urged him to take a proprietary interest in Vaughan's progress on the grounds that "it would be best if the entire direction of the work were in hands other than ours" (MacLeod, December 1942b). Ever the organizer, MacLeod went on to suggest another project that might grab Allport's fancy. This one was to organize content analyzers for Hitler's speeches, with the standard disclaimer clause:

As usual, we would prefer to have all the work done outside this office as a private project. I should, however, be glad to do anything from this end that would help. It seems to me that if you were to enlist the cooperation of such people as Sachs, Goldstein, Koehler, Lewin, Charlotte Buhler, Tillich, etc., a synthesis of their interpretations might be worth studying. (MacLeod, December 1942b)

Pencilled on the top of the first page of this letter are the words Foreign Experts, one among many categories of OSS intelligence-gathering. By December

1942, Kurt Lewin had been discovered by the OSS as a loyal and talented social psychologist whose work bore heavily on the tasks of the Psychology Division. Excerpts from a letter from Carleton Scofield, Acting Assistant Chief of the Psychology Division, to Lewin at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station at the State University of Iowa, October 6, 1942:

Dear Dr. Lewin:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 2 suggesting some names for our consideration. . . .

We are, of course, familiar with your work and cognizant of its relation to our interests here in the Office of Strategic Services. I was particularly interested in your reference to what I assume is the Bavelas test in your SPSSI address recently here in Washington. We would like to hear more about this technique and hope you will send us anything concerning it which may be published in the near future. (Scofield, October 1942)

In little more than two months, Lewin had traveled the length of the intake pipe, well-launched on his military-guided trajectory. SPSSI had been doing its organizing job. Lewin was responding to a recruitment letter Scofield had sent to Donald P. Marquis of Yale University and others a few months earlier:

Dear Dr. Marquis:

I am writing to you for information about men or women psychologists who might be available for appointment to positions on the staff

of the Psychology Division in the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. . . .

I would greatly appreciate a list of names from you of persons whom you consider of high caliber. (Scofield, September 23, 1942a)

The others, to whom he sent copies, were W.L. Valentine, H. Woodrow, Richard M. Elliott, John E. Anderson, Elmer A. Culler, F.H. Allport, J.F. Dashiell, W.S. Hunter, Kurt Lewin, E.C. Tolman, Dael Wolfle, and Gordon Allport. Marquis was director of the Office of Psychological Personnel for its first year and a half, from its establishment in early 1942. Its objective was "the promotion of the most effective utilization of psychology and of psychologists in the war effort" (Marquis, 1946, p. 346). In 1943 he would take over editorship of the year-old "Psychology and the War" feature section of the Psychological Bulletin, through which the American Psychological Association fronted as organizer of psychologists for the OSS and other governmental organs. Dael Wolfle was a recurrent APA official. He would receive special mention in a 1951 letter from Matthew W. Baird, Director of Training for the CIA, to Robert Sears, president of the APA, thanking its executive secretaries profusely for help on a variety of problems. . . . The extent of your aid over the past two years has been so great that I am impelled to offer you formal and grateful acknowledgement. (Baird, 1951)

Floyd and Gordon Allport were the Dulles brothers of social psychology, and Kurt Lewin its post-World War II guru.

Scotfield wrote a second letter on September 23, 1942, to Dr. Olive Lester at the University of Buffalo. The letter gives a further glimpse of how psychology work was organized:

Dear Olive:

Last evening a group of ten of us--Goodwin Watson, Otto Klineberg, Ernest Hilgard Daniel? Katz, Rensis Likert, etc.--got together for a discussion of how we might make use of the psychologists who are still working in the universities. This was all stimulated by requests, on the part of such psychologists, which came up at the SPSSI meetings a couple of weeks ago. Apparently many people scattered throughout the country are anxious to help the agencies here in Washington but aren't sure just how to go about it. I think probably SPSSI will take some definite steps to meet the situation. . . .

There are numerous problems in connection with our work which, I believe, could probably be farmed out to you to be carried on preferably by a seminar group or a team of two or three workers, but also by individual students. Just what the specific problems would be, I can't very well say because we haven't given the matter that much thought as yet. Perhaps you yourself would have some suggestions in the light of the people and facilities you have available. . . .

Please do not feel that I am putting any pressure on you in connection with this matter. It is simply a suggestion in view of the fact that so many people are asking what they may do to help in the war effort. . . . The psychologists in various universities certainly offer a great reservoir of information and potential research which we ought not to be neglecting. (Scotfield, September 23, 1942b)

The OSS's public relations stance projected an image of passivity in which the agency only responded to demands originated by social science workers. Whereas it was true that by 1942 many if not most academic social scientists were eager to do loyal battle against the enemy, it was also true that every U.S. citizen was subject to the intensive campaigns of attitude-shaping carried on by the OSS and other agencies, and those with skills deemed useful were pursued.

For academic psychology, a truer picture is indicated by the organizing trail begun in the fall of 1939 when the National Research Council established the Emergency Committee in Psychology of the Division of Anthropology and Psychology to begin the wartime organizing task (Garrett, 1940) and the American Psychological Association established its Office of Psychological Personnel within the National Research Council as a communications clearing house between the profession and the government (Britt, 1942). Simultaneously, psychologists began their first organized service with the October 1939 establishment of the Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots under the NRC to which Leon Festinger, later of dissonance theory fame, was senior statistician (Britt, 1942). By the following summer (1940), a U.S.

team was learning from British Intelligence how to operate a psywar organization (Brown, 1976, pp. 42ff.; Marks, 1979, p. 12; War Report of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1949, pp. 300 & 322; Cline, 1976, p.21). Britain's long years as pre-eminent colonial administrator had made its operatives expert in political warfare, the techniques of systematic mind-bending which North-americans called psychological warfare. By the summer of 1941, a panel of psychologists under G-2 (Intelligence) of the Army General Staff was studying the problems of psywar (Hunter, 1946); this panel shifted to the OSS's organization once that was formally set up. The same summer, the Office of Scientific Research and Development was established and Donovan was in a position to write out a plan for organizing psychological warfare in the United States, which, when approved forthwith by President Roosevelt, would map the OSS. That fall (still 1941), Tryon began his organizing meetings for tapping virtually all of the nation's social psychology capacity (Allport & Schmeidler, 1943). By 1942, "the federal government was the largest single employer of psychologists" (Britt, 1942, p. 255). In view of the systematic nature of its solicitation, it is more than a little deceptive for the OSS to shove academic freedom

forward as its first foot. But then deception was that organization's raison d'etre, and the doctrine of academic freedom has traditionally served to conceal the use-value of social science work.

One letter released to me by the CIA affords a glimpse into the Psychology Division's internal division of labor. Dated August 22, 1942, it was addressed by Scofield to Stuart Henderson Britt, psychologist at the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel. The National Roster was the government agency responsible for knowing who in the country had what technical training (Britt, 1942). Revealing little by way of specifics and requesting the accustomed confidentiality, the letter described duties of four levels of staff the Psychology Division was looking for. The most responsible position would involve

getting together three or four members of the staff, apportioning out the various phases of a research project, and then organizing the final report. It is, of course, quite improbable that people can be found with experience directly related to our work. They should be good psychologists, sociologists, or anthropologists, alert to current socio-psychological problems. . . . Above all, it is important that they be willing to sacrifice at times academic thoroughness for practical "pointing" of their research. (Scofield, August 22, 1942)

The next-level person would do analysis of attitudes and morale in countries targeted for "socio-psychological

background studies" (Scofield, August 22, 1942). The person at the level below that

will probably be used in the socio-psychological analysis section. His work, of course, will be of a more routine nature. He will do some of the bibliographic work on projects, and his research will consist primarily in abstracting material and taking notes for the use of other men working on the project. (Scofield, August 22, 1942)

The lowest-level person sought

will be assigned to very routine duties, such as keeping up our current bibliographical card index, distributing and filing radio monitoring service digests, and some reading and note-taking. (Scofield, August 22, 1942)

Surprisingly familiar, isn't it? Really, such a routine type of social science work. Unroutine only in the breadth of centralized organization entailed and in the directness of the military servitude. The OSS Psychology Division was interested in loyal social scientists, no previous experience necessary. They would be briefed on the "socio-psychological" framework used for the organization's work; they would quickly learn its perspective.

A month earlier, in July of 1942, Tryon had written to Harvard's Gardner Murphy, greybeard of academic social psychology. Murphy had nominated Eric Fromm for some work:

Eric Fromm

Dear Gardner

Thanks for your letter on Fromme. We are very much up in the air, budgetarily speaking, but will consider him if and when an opening should occur. (Tryon, July 29, 1942)

The old boy network slipped on greased ways. Academics from all portions of the political spectrum were involved. Marxist social scientists worked against the Nazis shoulder-to-shoulder with reactionaries.* Tryon, for example, wrote to Marxist critical theorist and future philosopher of the 1960s New Left Herbert Marcuse:

Dear Mr. Marcuse:

Thank you very much for your paper on 'The New German Mentality.'

We appreciate receiving the results of your thinking about and experience with these problems. In answer to your request for coordination of your work with ours, I believe that, for the time being, the only concrete way is that of sending us the results of your researches. (Tryon, July 11, 1942)

Talcott Parsons is one of those social scientists whose loyalties would later lead him to conspire in the creation of the deliberately anticommunist doctrine of

*They were not definitely separated until Winston Churchill rang down the dividing line of loyalty in his 1948 Iron Curtain speech in the St. Louis, Missouri, hometown of his head-of-state colleague Harry Truman. The pattern of the U.S.'s geopolitical alliances had shifted, and anyone sympathetic to the Soviet Union or Marxism was anathema, whether they worked in academia, in the trade unions, in entertainment, or wherever.

pluralism in sociology (Seybold, 1978). An ideological production marketed as truth about everyday reality in U.S. society, pluralism laid a basis for confusion in the training academies of social science during a period when the atmosphere of the McCarthy Witchhunts still hung heavy. Marcuse, on the other hand, would spend his time as an academic worker trying to elucidate contradictions attempted revolutionaries faced in contemporary societies. Despite a former friendship with at least one prominent Marxist social scientist (Marrow, 1977), Kurt Lewin would come down on the same side of the fence as Parsons. Spiritual as well as theoretical guide for social psychology work in academia after the second World War, Lewin (along with academic social psychology in general) was to receive investment capital for his brand of work through the U.S. military.

The Office of Naval Research and Post World War II
Social Psychology in the United States

The wartime practice of social psychology, being oriented from top to bottom toward military objectives, would soon take up civilian life with a deeply military orientation. The psychological warfare program which recruited it from the bush leagues of academia for use

in World War II never disappeared:

Psychological warfare must assist our cause in a world which our military forces can dominate at best only slowly and partially for a long time to come. Our policies will be complicated by the struggle of the other nations, including Great Britain, to maintain a footing and establish their future interest by means of their psychological warfare activities. Psychological warfare must be recognized, therefore, as of critical importance as an auxiliary of armed combat. (War Report of the Office of Strategic Services, (OSS), 1949, p. 359)

As we know today, the United States fought a long war in Southeast Asia as a result of the neocolonial reshuffling that happened when Britain and France went into collapse as postwar colonial powers in the region. Social psychology, as reconstituted during the World War II period, remained in close touch with the socio-psychological needs of the empire as they unfolded in the postwar period and into the Viet Nam era.

The main vehicle connecting them was the postwar Office of Naval Research, centralized funding source for all basic research in the social sciences right after the war. The initial management system for promoting military-oriented social psychology consisted of an academic advisory board and a military research administration. The board was called the Advisory Panel for Research in Human Relations; it managed the content, at least in the initial years. The administration was

called the Office of Research and Inventions from its initiation in 1945 until Congress reconstituted it as the Office of Naval Research in 1946.

The role played by the Advisory Panel is illuminated by a short series of Monthly Research Reports issued by the Office of Research and Inventions and now preserved as archival material at the ONR offices in Arlington, Virginia. The earliest available of this series tells the organizing steps:

Pursuant with the plans for integrating the various personnel research programs in the Navy, the Medical Sciences Section, Planning Division, has held two informal conferences with representatives of Bupers /Bureau of Personnel/, BuMed /Bureau of Medicine/, Special Devices Division, and Planning Division, ORI, in order to discuss methods of procedure. These will be followed by a formal conference in January, the agenda for which may include proposals for an intra-Navy working committee, with the secretariat within ORI, and a scientific advisory committee drawn from civilian life. . . .A second conference was held at Columbus, Ohio, with the Board of Directors, American Psychological Association, Inc., to explore informally the procedures necessary to the nomination of a scientific advisory committee from civilian life. When and if the Navy deems it appropriate to request assistance in the selection of such a committee, the above-named association has indicated its willingness to cooperate. (Office of Research and Inventions Planning Division, December 1945, p. 189)

Three meetings are described. The first was intra-Navy and determined organizing procedure. The second

("a formal conference in January") sounds like it was intra-Navy, but the document is not clear on this point. It did result in acceptance of the proposed structure, however. The third was the implementation meeting, in which the Navy Department sat with the American Psychological Association and consulted over the staffing of the "scientific advisory committee drawn from civilian life." Why the American Psychological Association (and no other professional association, according to the available records)? Because social psychology was what the military was about to build up, as we know today. It took until the following October for the APA's work to issue in the the first ONR Advisory Panel for Research in Human Relations:

- Dr. Ruth Benedict, Department of Anthropology,
Columbia University, New York City
- Dr. Erich Fromme, 322 Central Park West, New York
City
- Dr. J.G. Jenkins, Chairman, Department of Psy-
chology, University of Maryland
- Dr. Rensis Likert, Director, Survey Research
Center, University of Michigan
- Dr. Kurt Lewin, Director, Research Center for
Group Dynamics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
- Dr. J.G. Darley, Director, Student Counselling
Bureau, University of Minnesota
- Dr. George F. Lombard, Graduate School of Busi-
ness Administration, Harvard University
- Dr. E.L. Kelly, Department of Psychology, Univ-
ersity of Michigan
- Dr. J.W. Macmillan, Head, Psychology Section, Medi-
cal Sciences Branch, Office of Naval Research
(Source: Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946,
p. 103)

These members [of various academic fields] will be invited to participate in discussions for outlining the most promising areas and methods of investigation, and to form an advisory panel to assist the Medical Sciences Branch in reviewing proposals and coordinating research activities. (Office of Naval Research, August 1946, p. 27)

If they had not all worked with the OSS, then almost all had. Such was the stature of Kurt Lewin's mode of conceptualizing that he was put into a position to impregnate the post-war field of social psychology, since for some years after the war the ONR was the only governmental source of basic research funding in the social sciences. The panel's job was to evaluate research proposals in terms of what the Navy wanted. The Navy had decided what it wanted before assembling the advisory panel of social scientists to implement its needs. They held their first meeting in October, 1946, after almost a year of military planning and conferencing. It was a blue-ribbon panel of gatekeepers of proven loyalty. This is what the Navy told the civilian advisory panel of social scientists it wanted:

In addition to those techniques already developed, new methods of identifying and isolating the factors which produce and influence the behavior of individuals and groups must be originated and tested. . . .To develop an integrated and aggressive program for research on human relations, a meeting of prominent social scientists is being planned. . . .The coordinated research program will be formulated

in terms of the salient problems on which research is needed. (Office of Naval Research, July 1946, p. 19)

The Navy Department was who decided what was salient. Pursuing trails indicated by the social psychology perspective of World War II psychological warfare, the Navy moved to mold a social science practice that did "analysis of human behavior in various social, political, and economic situations" (Office of Naval Research, August 1946, p. 26). The military--as ever--out to pursue the promise of increasing control. If it thought the social scientific study of group processes would advance its objectives, then it would supply the development funding for that study.

Problems of group organization, spread of attitudes within groups, factors influencing levels of group productivity, and others, are among those proposed for investigation. The advisory panel will meet in September or early October to discuss and integrate these and other proposals. (Office of Naval Research, September 1946, p. 35)

The panel was like the schoolteacher whose curriculum is handed to him or her for execution. It told itself that it was working on human relations as the key to human survival. In reality it was suffusing postwar academic social psychology and other social sciences with the problems of the military at the same time as it was habituating social science workers to the military research contract.

Immediately after its first meeting October 3 and 4, 1946, the panel issued a report entitled "Panel of Human Relations." Ever searching for the technological fix to social issues of war and everyday life, military officers had made in-person statements on the orientation and application of the panel. They indicated "the problems on which research is needed" (Office of Naval Research, Nov. 1, 1946, p. 103), cloaking their purposes in ideas of humanitarian nationalism:

In terms of national well being and national defense there is no area of research more important than the dynamics of human relations. Research in the physical sciences has brought about greatly changed relationships not only between nations but also between individuals. Attempts at wise understanding or control of these changes are seriously hampered by the inadequacy and incompleteness of our knowledge of the basic principles of human behavior. As a consequence we are groping in a costly fashion.

We need urgently to know the fundamental principles underlying behavior so that we can deal intelligently and efficiently with the problems we face. We need to know the answer to such questions as: why nations and smaller groups think, feel, and act as they do; how the thinking and behavior of individuals and groups can be dealt with constructively; why certain nations or groups become belligerent and even pathologically aggressive and destructive; how the objectives and goals of groups are established; what types of leadership exist and what makes them effective. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 104)

The panel in its academic freedom was "to undertake . . . to outline systematically the areas in which research was needed" (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 104). Their freedom lay in the dimension of choosing to apply their skills to the military's problems or not, for

the formulation of an integrated human relations research program will be the primary task of this group. Review of proposals already received and discussion of areas in which further research is needed will form part of the agenda. (Office of Naval Research, October 1946, pp. 56-57)

At the first meeting, the panel formulated a five-point "systematic framework for the broad integration of the research that is undertaken" (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 104): (1) Comparative Study of Different Cultures, (2) The Structure and Function of Groups, (3) Leadership, (4) Problems of Communication of Ideas, Policies, and Values, and (5) The Growth and Development of the Individual.

The first category was a direct continuation of one of the OSS Psychology Division's main preoccupations:

1. Comparative Study of Different Cultures. To provide a basis for understanding the behavior and goals of groups, research in the economic, political, cultural, psychological, and sociological structure of nationality groupings are, as they affect action situations, essential. . . . This series of research studies should also include the description of the motives, habits of

mind, and strong social values that various cultures pass on to their individual members. Either in terms of psychological warfare, or for the more desirable goal of international cooperation, we need to understand the cultural components and make-up of the nations of the world in which we live. In the realm of military government, statesmanship, and assimilation of minority groups, the outcomes of such research will be applicable. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, pp. 104-105)

Thus did the propriety of spying on whole populations become established in the postwar situation of global colonial reshuffle. Ruth Benedict was the panel's leading light regarding the comparative method of culture study. It's easy to see that the preoccupation of postwar academic social psychology with "group" themes had out-and-out psywar considerations, for one, impelling it. It's earlier origins in the management of the workplace group showed through in the second category:

2. The Structure and Function of Groups. It is apparent that our society calls upon the individual to operate efficiently as a member of a wide range of groups varying in size, purpose, structure, and interest to him. He is a member of a family group, a worker in a factory or office group, a member of a committee, of a conference, of a unit in a combat team or crew, and a participant in a pressure group.

It must be the aim of research to study the productivity, structure, and development of these various groups in relation to their assigned tasks so that we can arrive at more effective selection, training and management procedures for group relations. Specifically we need to know:

- (a) The criteria of good and bad performance of various kinds of groups.
- (b) The characteristic forms of organization and structure that produce good or bad performance
- (c) The leadership, methods of management, training, and inter-personal relations that produce good or bad performance as the group grows and develops toward its goal. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 105)

Performance of groups on the military ship, at the workplace, and in a multitude of other social institutions under the domination of multinational capitalism, whose never-ending need for suppression capability was what stimulated the spectacular growth of post World War II social psychology. The third category was for technical implementation of the control of groups:

3. Leadership. Just as all individuals at some time must operate within a group, so these groups operate under various forms of leadership. Whether the leader is selected by higher authority, elected from within the group, or emerges spontaneously under pressure of combat or immediate crisis, his contribution is often a determining factor in the group's effectiveness. Research in this area must be aimed at:

- (a) An analysis of different types of leadership: For example does the conference or administrative leader face different problems than the combat or action group leader.
- (b) A determination of criteria of good and bad leadership.
- (c) An analysis of the characteristics of the leader, to provide for more effective selection of leaders for different types of leadership responsibility.
- (d) An analysis of what conditions of group life will ensure that appropriate leadership will develop at the appropriate time. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 105)

Appropriate, good and effective for whom is of course the question never asked. Loyalty so knocks that question out that it was possible to mount a mass mind manipulation program of study within the rules and regulations of academic freedom:

4. Problems of Communication of Ideas, Policies, and Values. Between nations, between groups within a nation, and between individuals within a group, the effectiveness of communication is of paramount importance. Not only do we deal with the problems of different languages, but even where the language is common to all participants, the meaning of words, the values being sought, and the receptivity of individuals often combine to create misunderstanding, mistrust, and conflict. Further than this, it is well known that only a small part of what is communicated between nations, groups, and individuals is communicated by words. It is of especial importance to study what is communicated to others by the behavior of any one group or individual. How can top management reach the workers or how can the workers reach top management;; how can the values and goals of conflicting groups be synthesized and made understandable to all participants; what factors determine the public and private opinions out of which desirable or undesirable societal action grows?

To answer these questions we must study not only the media of newspapers, radio, organized instruction, and motion pictures, with the usual methods of public opinion research, but we must also study the relation of concrete behavior itself to what is being communicated, the growth of ideas and values and the group acceptance of common goals we must study also the determinants in the individual which predispose him to accept or reject ideas, ideals, common prejudices and knowledge. With some understanding of these factors, we may then look toward improved methods of communication and improved techniques of transmitting ideas and values which can be determinants

of group action. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 106)

It was all phrased very politely. Simply nice, sanitary technical improvements in the system's capability to deliver propaganda in all its subtle forms. Manipulation of thought and behavior was the objective, a "peacetime" version of psywar. The last category covered a multitude of sins with the language of individual psychology.

5. The Growth and Development of the Individual.

While it is generally true that the individual is molded by the culture and society in which he holds membership, he still brings to that relation considerable individual variability as a functioning member of his society. The structure and development of his personality, his tolerance to stressful conditions, his educability, his own goals and values, his levels of aspiration, all contribute to his efficient functioning. Thus, no overall pattern of research in human relations can provide workable answers unless it includes studies that are focussed on the development of individuals' capacity to participate in group life. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p.106)

Stress research, for example, has an intimate relation to torture, as we all know. But any collection of information about people as individuals functioning in the multifarious groups of everyday life might potentially be of use: it was the vacuum cleaner approach.

At its first meeting, the panel reviewed and recommended funding for six research proposals given to it by the ONR. The first two were anthropological:

(1) Med. 186, Cultural Change and Group Adjustment in the Islands of Micronesia, H.G. Barnett, University of Oregon; (2) Med. 263, Cultural Study of American Minorities of Foreign Origin, Ruth Benedict, Columbia University. The remaining four were broadly in the area of social psychology:

Med. 267 & 268.

Title: Experimental Studies on Group Productivity and Communication Within Groups.

Submitted by: Research Center for Group Dynamics, M.I.T. (Dr. K. Lewin).

Proposal: Intensive experimental attacks on two broad and coordinated areas of human productivity. The first project attempts by deliberate variation of conditions, to determine the more effective ways in which knowledge and attitudes may be spread through working groups. The second seeks to establish methods of determining reasonable levels of group-output and of discovering how these levels can be improved through training, including the training of self-sustaining leaders. . . .

Committee Comment: In peace and in war, the maintenance of morals and working efficiency leans heavily on the effectiveness with which policy--and a knowledge of the reasons for policy --can be passed down from the higher echelons. The first study above seeks to replace unsupported theory as to how this can best be done with dependable knowledge based on research. The second study attacks the problem of training groups to appraise their own output in the interest of increased operating efficiency. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 108)

Lewin's research made it amply clear which side of the slice his bread was buttered on. Basic research is never determined outside the priorities of those paying for it.

Med. 272

Title: Research on the Fundamental Problems of Organizing Human Behavior.

Submitted by: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan (Dr. Rensis Likert).

Proposal: This is basic research--in line with significant developments in industry--aimed at increased knowledge of how human groups are in fact organized and how men may be trained to make practical use of this knowledge. Where Lewin's study aims at an intensive survey of a small group (or groups) under deliberate variation of conditions, this project will be based upon extensive observation of existing groups under normal conditions of operation. By using a wide variety of techniques it will seek to evolve or gain dependable information on such topics as how groups set up their objectives, what factors influence their success or failure in moving toward these objectives, and what forces tend to weld the group together or split it apart. . . .

Committee Comment: Western Electric's 20-year program of basic research along these general lines has shown the rich returns that carefully controlled studies of group effectiveness may reasonably be expected to yield. The support of much basic research in this general area may ultimately move human management from a pure art over toward a technological procedure in which the basic laws are founded on research rather than on the unsupported opinion of some presumed 'authority.'
(Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, pp. 108-109)

Western Electric's Hawthorne series of studies had been a pilot demonstration in the social-science generated technology of small group management at the workplace. New developments in this area were to be pushed.

Med. 301

Title: Research on the Conference Process.

Submitted by: University of Michigan (Principle investigator not named).

Proposal: Detailed analyses of the proceedings of actual conferences in industry, in the armed services, and in professional groups, to ascertain those procedures which dependably contribute to the success or failure of a conference. Once the basic hypotheses have been laid down on the basis of such analyses, it is proposed to set up a series of experimental conferences in which the validity of the hypotheses may be tested by deliberate variation of the critical elements.

Committee Comment: Although conference procedures are used in determining most of the basic policies upon which our various establishments operate, it is a fact that almost nothing is known--in terms of demonstrably reliable evidence--of those factors which make for productiveness or sterility in such conferences. Only by support of long-term programs of basic research in this area can we hope to establish fundamental rules of known validity for the guidance of chairmen and for the control of conference-participants. Small gains in scientific knowledge of conference procedures would yield large gains in the practical effectiveness of such procedure. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, pp. 109-110)

Decision-making processes were to remain one of the military's favored areas of research, with the RAND corporation a leading promoter of this variety of social science after its establishment under the Air Force in 1947. (Index to Selected Publications of the RAND Corporation, 1962; Selected RAND Abstracts). The military seems to have had big plans for social psychology and other social science:

The first crude application of methods of controlled research to human affairs took place only yesterday. The first textbook in experimental social psychology appeared less than 25

years ago. . . .The infant social sciences have already brought out many results of considerable practical significance. Granted sufficient funds, trained investigators in these sciences may be expected to make genuine strides toward an adequately founded knowledge of the determination and control of human behavior. (Office of Naval Research, November 1, 1946, p. 110)

A series of ORI-ONR Annual Reports from 1946 to 1950 gives us the military's metatheory of academic freedom:

The primary aim of much of the Planning Division's scientific program is free rather than directed research. Instead of being pointed toward direct solution of some practical problem, its intention is to explore and understand more fully the laws of nature, both animate and inanimate. The reason for this emphasis should be abundantly clear in the light of history and in particular of the war: from free research new and powerful ideas spring. These ideas in turn lead to applied research and finally to development. The place to look for competent free research is among men to whom research is the major, if not only, end in view. Such men are to be found, of course, largely in universities and research institutions where this point of view is thoroughly understood. . . . (Office of Research and Inventions, June 30, 1946, p. 108)

Basic research is free research. A classic inversion of reality with a straight face. One dimension of freedom, the selection and application of methodology, is offered as freedom in some full sense. The suggestion is that ideas, too, are free rather than shaped; that an academic social psychologist studies some aspect of the group stream of questions out of native curiosity.

The reality is that of a subaltern reporting to higher-ups:

The Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports that their studies of communication of ideas, policies, and values within and between groups indicate that it will be possible to develop generalizations which will be applicable to various situations, and that their studies of group productivity have yielded results of interest regarding procedures for use in attaining maximum effectiveness of performance. (Office of Naval Research, Annual Report 1947, p. 18)

Effectiveness of performance in whose interests: The military's?

The understanding of normal man in his total environment is important from both a scientific and military point of view, for it is only with such understanding that the human resources of the nation can be made to operate at peak efficiency both in war and in peace. (Office of Naval Research, Annual Report 1948, p. 13)

Efficiency in whose interests? The owners of the economy's facilities for producing? The ONR decided the for whom, then invited the intellectual to dance to its music. It was the biggest porkbarrel of research money to date:

The huge university research program of the Navy Department is the greatest peacetime cooperative undertaking in history between the academic world and the government. (Office of Naval Research, Annual Report 1949, p. 1)

Through the usual procedures of conferencing, circulating research prospectuses, and generally seeing that its wants made themselves known in the academic

hiring halls, the ONR infused itself deeply into post World War II social psychology. Five years after its inception, a recruitment conference was held in which work done in the program between 1945 and 1950 was detailed in one place for the first time. Recruiters intended the publication of the conference proceedings in the form of a book to "have some impact in shaping research in the social sciences elsewhere by setting forth our strengths and weaknesses in these various projects" (Guetzkow, 1963, p. 3). The book included much of the classic work in social psychology which graduate students in the discipline 25 years later would be required to learn about to become knowledgeable in the field: Raymond Cattell on morale and leadership measurement; Leon Festinger on informal communication in small groups; John French on group productivity; Solomon Asch on the effects of group pressure on judgements, for example.

The conference and the continuing activities of the advisory group and the ONR staff were all part of an effort to contribute to a cumulative social science within the framework of an individual grant program. At the same time, they created a cadre of social scientists in the universities who were concerned with Navy problems even though their research had not been forced into any applied direction. The idea was to do work relevant to both the goals of science and the mission of the Navy. (Lyons, 1969, p. 137)

But "ultimately the basic research must be translated into a form of social technology with reasonable utility" (Guetzkow, 1963, p. 4). The basic research which top postwar research organizer Vannevar Bush called "scientific capital" (1945, p. 6) is generated in order to produce a shower of practical applications. Just as the lazer-guided "smart bombs" which made their appearance toward the end of the war against Viet Nam eventuated from post World War II basic research in solid state physics, the Central Intelligence Agency's "destabilization" strategy, demonstrated so viciously in Chile in 1973, rested for its essential social scientific espionage on the line of work promoted by the U.S. Office of Naval Research's program of basic research in social science.

The ONR Work as it Showed Itself in the Journals

No influence process can be said to exist in an academic discipline if it doesn't show itself in the journal literature. Since content analysis is the accepted method of quantifying dominant themes in the social science literature, I performed a content analysis on a selected portion of the journal literature in social psychology, from 1935 to 1957. The period began in 1935

to give a pre-World War II baseline; it ended in 1957 because that's when the social science espionage of psychological warfare began to undergo its transformation into the counterinsurgency social science of the Viet Nam era.

Four faculty members in social psychology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook were asked to name the social psychology journals which in their judgment have been prestigious and influential in their field since World War II. Fifteen graduate students in social psychology at the same institution were asked to do likewise. Both groups knew that the purpose of the inquiry was to select journal sets for a content analysis of certain research themes in the field of social psychology; a few of them knew which themes. Four journal sets were chosen on the basis of this method: Psychological Review (established 1894), Psychological Bulletin (established 1904), Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (established 1906; "and Social" added in 1921), and Human Relations (established 1947).

Categories were selected on the basis of statements made in the ONR documents presented of the type of social science research it wanted to promote. I selected three categories: Groups, Attitude, and Leadership.

The Groups category was meant to include studies in which the dependent or independent variables were factors which arise or exist solely as phenomena of interaction between persons in a group situation, whether at the industrial workplace, in the military camp, in the academic psychology experiment room, or elsewhere. Between 2 and about 25 people was defined as a "small group" for the purpose of this content analysis. Typical research topics in this category included social influence processes of various kinds (e.g., group pressure, group norms, conformity, persuasion), conference processes for decision-making and planning, effect of group dynamics processes on rumor transmission and other communication processes, and leadership processes within the context of a group. Research papers on group psychotherapy were not counted in this category, because clinical rather than social psychologists have been the principle researchers in this area.

The Leadership category was meant to include any study in which the origins, characteristics, or effects of leadership were investigated, whether as dependent, independent, or correlational variable. Group processes were often variables in the same study, and assignment to both categories should have been made.

The attitude category was meant to include the study of attitudes, beliefs, opinions, morale, values, rumor, propaganda effects on individuals or groups, political or other preferences, stereotypes, prejudice, and similar cognitive formations in the individual or in aggregations of individuals. The emphasis in this category was the measurement of their level, strength, or simply presence, including measurement of their changes over time. When the dynamics of group or leadership processes were variables as well, the article should have been counted under multiple categories. However, when the question under investigation concerned changes in ideas, dispositions, preferences, or perceptual judgments which were presumed to be produced by group dynamics influences, the article should not have been counted in the "attitude" category. Such studies should have been counted only in the "groups" category. Discursive discussions of ideology or other cases of belief-holding in the abstract were not included in this category unless problems of measurement of attitude, etc. were addressed explicitly.

For each volume of a journal, the total number of articles listed in the table of contents was counted and recorded. Book reviews and similar back-of-the-book material were neither counted nor otherwise included in

this content analysis. Then each title in the table of contents was read. If an article seemed on the basis of its title alone to fit under one or more of the content analysis categories, its page number was written on that volume's data sheet under the appropriate heading(s). Articles for which this judgment could not be made on the basis of title alone were also noted. Each article so noted was then looked up and scanned until it could be determined whether it was correctly assigned to a category. Any necessary correction was made, and then its author(s), their institutions, and their fund-sources, if stated, were noted. An attempt was made to avoid seeing whether or not a funding source was given or what it was until after category assignment was made. This was accomplished by physically covering up the bottom of the first page, which is generally where funding source is given.


As a reliability check, two undergraduate students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook repeated the procedure. One had some familiarity with my overall political viewpoint and the other did not. One was female and one male. Working separately, each replicated my analysis procedure on three years from each of the four journal sets. The 24 year-units which

were re-analyzed constituted 30% of the 80 year-units analyzed all together. To achieve an even time spread, and to control for practice and order effects in the reliability raters to the extent possible, volumes were assigned to each rater in reverse-block order. The time period re-analyzed evenly represented the entire spread of years analyzed. Reliability rater A analyzed volumes in the earlier-to-later order, while reliability rater B did the reverse. For each reliability rater, one third of the volumes were from the first third of the time period covered, one third from the second third, and one third from the third third. Their categorization was compared with my own. First, the number of articles in each category on which we agreed and disagreed was noted. Then a ratio was calculated between the overall number on which we agreed and the sum of the number on which we agreed plus the number on which we disagreed. Reliability rater A and I agreed 63% of the time. Reliability rater B and I agreed 64% of the time.

The results of the content analysis show the influence of the Office of Naval Research on postwar social psychology with stunning clarity. Figure 1 is a plot of the total numbers of articles from all journals surveyed in each of the three content analysis categories as they varied year by year from 1935 to 1957.

FIGURE 1

Number of articles in three content analysis categories in four journal sets



The relative number of studies on group processes began its precipitous rise in the years 1945-1950, the years of the primary postwar organization of social psychology work.* One might want to argue that it was the damburst held up by World War II, now pouring out in the journals. But social psychologists were not sitting around in academia doing abstract studies of the small group during the war. Those that were still in academia had their work cut out for them, and it was quite practical (Allport & Veltfort, 1943; Psychology & the War, 1943; Schmeidler & Allport, 1944). I would argue that the only explanation of this sudden outpouring is that the first burst of the work we saw the ONR seeding was out. In one quick jump it attained the output level long since enjoyed by attitude studies, then rose steadily right alongside. It was able to jump so suddenly because the organization for psychological warfare was its take-off platform. The study of attitude had gotten established in its niche through the opinion

*Lamberth's (1980) tabulation of articles on groups published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology also shows the sudden jump after World War II (inside back cover).

polling blitz born out of World War I propaganda operations. The study of the group likewise earned its place in the psychological war rooms of World War II--and it bore forever the mark of its birth.

Table 1 shows numbers and percentages of the articles on groups for which the ONR and other military sources supplied funding.

TABLE 1
 Military Funding for Small Group Studies
 Published in Four Social Psychology Journals

Year	No. ONR-Funded Studies (a)	Column 2 Plus No. Studies Funded By Other Military	Column 3 Plus No. Studies Suspected of ONR Funding ^(b)
1949	2 (18%)	2 (18%)	3 (27%)
1950	3 (33%)	3 (33%)	3 (33%)
1951	8 (33%)	8 (33%)	9 (38%)
1952	1 (10%)	1 (10%)	5 (50%)
1953	4 (35%)	6 (50%)	9 (75%)
1954	7 (26%)	11 (41%)	16 (59%)
1955	8 (31%)	13 (50%)	15 (58%)
1956	6 (29%)	10 (48%)	11 (52%)
1957	5 (17%)	8 (27%)	13 (43%)

(a) The percent they represent of the total number of articles in the Groups category is in parentheses.

(b) Articles which did not specify funding source but which were done by investigators or at institutional centers known to receive ONR funding.

Those investigators and institutional centers which I have on other grounds identified as ONR-funded and have included in the fourth column of Tables 1, 2 and 3 are: L. Berkowitz; E. Bovard, Jr.; D. Cartwright; L. Coch; J. Darley; L. Festinger; J. French, Jr.; K. Lewin; W. McKeachie; A. Zander; Laboratory for Social Relations, Harvard University; Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, University of Minnesota; Ohio State University; Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan; and the University of Rochester.

On the basis of Table 1, it would be hard to argue that the hand of the Office of Naval Research and the rest of the military was not heavy on the social psychology centered around group dynamics which was developed so rapidly after World War II. Until early in the 1950s, in fact, ONR was exclusive holder of small group studies' militarized pursestring.

Table 2 shows the same data for articles assigned to the attitude category.

TABLE 2
 Military Funding for Attitude Studies
 Published in Four Social Psychology Journals

Year	No. ONR-Funded Studies(a)	Column 2 Plus No. Studies Funded by Other Military	Column 3 Plus No. Studies Suspected of ONR Funding (b)
1949	0	0	2 (12%)
1950	0	0	2 (13%)
1951	0	0	1 (11%)
1952	1 (6%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)
1953	0	0	2 (11%)
1954	1 (5%)	2 (11%)	3 (16%)
1955	2 (8%)	6 (23%)	8 (31%)
1956	2 (9%)	8 (36%)	9 (41%)
1957	2 (7%)	5 (19%)	7 (26%)

(a) The percent they represent of the total number of articles in the Attitudes category is in parentheses.

(b) Articles which did not specify funding source but which were done by investigators or at institutional centers known to receive ONR funding.

Studies in the attitude area had traditional funding sources already, since it was an already-established area compared with group studies. Figure 1 showed that the attitude curve rose after World War II at approximately the same rate as the group curve, but Table 2 shows that attitude studies were not as ONR-dependent as were group studies.

Starting from the same relatively lower level as groups before the war, leadership studies never attained the quantity of output shown by group and attitude studies. Table 3 shows that they did receive substantial percentages of their funding from military sources, however, including the Office of Naval Research.

TABLE 3
 Military Funding for Leadership Studies
 Published in Four Social Psychology Journals

Year	No. ONR-Funded Studies (a)	Column 2 Plus No. Studies Funded by Other Military	Column 3 Plus No. Studies Suspected of ONR Funding(b)
1949	0	0	0
1950	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	2 (40%)
1951	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)
1952	0	0	0
1953	0	0	2 (33%)
1954	1 (13%)	5 (63%)	6 (75%)
1955	3 (27%)	7 (64%)	7 (64%)
1956	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2 (100%)
1957	0	0	2 (100%)

(a) The percent they represent of the total number of articles in the Leadership category is in parentheses.

(b) Articles which did not specify funding source but which were done by investigators or at institutional centers known to receive ONR funding.

These results establish the plausibility of the contention that the content of the social psychology developed after World War II was shaped in order to be ready at hand to the military. They who pay the piper call the tune. For social Psychology, these data show the fulfillment of the ONR's expressed intention to organize social science research to its liking.

Further evidence that it succeeded in doing so in social psychology is plentiful in self-commentaries about the field made by contemporary practitioners. Writing in the first volume of Human Relations, itself an ONR-supported venture through Lewin's Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan, Dorwin Cartwright (1947-1948) declaimed:

The complexion of American social psychology in 1947 is vastly different from what it was in 1939. Never in its relatively short history has the field experienced such rapid growth and development. As a result of the pressures created by the war for the solution of hundreds of social problems social psychologists found themselves drawn into wartime activities that called for the sharpening of research tools recently designed and for the invention of new tools previously unimagined. Out of this experience emerged new and useful techniques, a tremendous mass of information, and a group of social psychologists who now view their field and their place in society in new and radically different terms. Just as the first World War witnessed the establishment of psychological testing as a major field of psychology, it now appears that the second World War has brought to maturity social psychology. (p. 333)

Just what the Boring et al. (1942) organizing team said would happen. Social psychology was transformed by World War II, and a network of social psychologists was created which had some cohesiveness of view regarding the work which was properly social psychology. Starting out from the "tremendous mass of information" churned up largely through the pursuit of psychological warfare, their theorizing took off like a rocket in postwar social psychology, heavily fueled by money from the military.

By and large the increasing involvement of psychologists in practical problems of social technology was a necessary part of the war. Vital problems arose for whose solution social psychologists had either special skills or information. The vast majority of social psychologists were drawn into governmental service, mostly in full-time positions, but frequently as consultants on particular projectsBy the end of 1942 virtually all research activities of social psychologists were oriented toward technological problems. (Cartwright, 1947-1948, pp. 333-334)

There can be no doubt about the framework shaping the scientific view of postwar social psychologists. It was the "social problems" of the war which laid heavily on the social psychology built afterwards. These technological problems were largely in the field of mind manipulation, in the vast psywar enterprise. We have already witnessed how social psychologists were both organized and made in the workshops of the OSS's Psychology Division. Cartwright divulges an additional

piece of information probably verifiable in records of the Psychology Division still held incommunicado by the Central Intelligence Agency:

The last few months of the war saw a social psychologists become chiefly responsible for determining week-by-week propaganda policy for the United States Government. (Cartwright, 1947-1948, p. 340)

One wonders who. Kurt Lewin? Or some non-luminous bureaucratic type? Why? With what implications for postwar academic social psychology? The answers will probably await the declassification of additional OSS Psychology Division documents by a future researcher. In any case, Cartwright's interesting account, written immediately after the war, tends to verify the picture drawn by OSS and ONR documents. In a later summary of the first decade's work in social psychology after World War II, the same psychologist developed his account of postwar social psychology in the U.S.:

What has happened to social psychology in the ten or twelve years since the end of World War II? . . . It would be a mistake to assume that the field is the 'same thing' that it was a decade ago. . . . An important development is the tremendous increase in the total number of people calling themselves social psychologists A small sample of references cited in the publications of social psychologists in 1955 reveals that three-fourths of them were to articles or books appearing since the war and less than 10 percent to ones published before 1935. (Cartwright, 1961, pp. 9-10)

This would seem to indicate that the work taken up as social psychology after World War II was very much rooted in what the going problems as of the end of that war were. Nor is there any doubt from Cartwright's account that the centralization of research direction which was escalated in all disciplines during World War II persisted in social psychology after that war. Cartwright called it "the conversion from individual to organized research" (1961, p. 13). It was the postwar continuation of the contracting-out system adopted to wage war.

While the number of social psychologists has been growing, a striking change has taken place in the organization of social psychological research. One of the most conspicuous features of the postwar decade is the establishment of social psychological research units under such bureaucratic designations as 'center,' 'institute,' 'laboratory,' 'bureau,' 'office,' 'division,' 'branch,' and 'section.' These have sprung up primarily in the United States, but also in as widely scattered spots as Norway, Israel, India, and Japan. Many of these are located within universities, but they are also to be found as independent agencies and as parts of governmental or business organizations. (Cartwright, 1961, pp. 12-13)

Lewin himself acknowledged--even praised--the formative effects of World War II on social psychology, although once again the reader has to infer the psywar connection on the basis of information gathering elsewhere, information which was not made available to the

public until many years after Lewin's writing:

One of the byproducts of World War II of which society is hardly aware is the new stage of development which the social sciences have reached. . . .Applying cultural anthropology to modern rather than 'primitive' cultures, experimentation with groups inside and outside the laboratory, the measurement of socio-psychological aspects of large social bodies, the combination of economic, cultural, and psychological fact-finding, all of these developments started before the war. But, by providing unprecedented facilities and by demanding realistic and workable solutions to scientific problems, the war has accelerated greatly the change of social sciences to a new development level. (Lewin, 1947-1948, p. 5)

A well-groomed executive of military-guided social engineering, Lewin saw fit to frame partisan problems of mind control as "scientific problems," meaning value-free and therefore clean to work on. In his later review of the literature of small group research from 1921 to 1959, Paul Hare would state the case with a good deal more lucidity and parsimony with the flat assertion that "the basic problem in social psychology is social control" (Hare, 1962, p. 1).

The Role of the American Psychological Association

No academic discipline can be organized to produce work around certain themes without organizers to make it happen. In the case of social psychology, the American

Psychological Association was set up at the end of World War II as the central professional organization, putting five other professional organizations in the field out of business and streamlining the administration of the psychology enterprise. The research organization used during the war determined the research organization used after the war, for the wartime contracting-out system was simply continued. At one end of the deal was the individual researcher or research institute. At the other was the supporting agency--whether ONR or some other. Classically in between, the APA took on the combined function of brokerage house and employment agency. They organized personnel to produce the intellectual work of interest to the supporting agency, and they lovingly pandered the employers' ideology about the work.

A postwar American Psychologist series is an easily accessible example of the kinds of steps which must be taken to enforce an overall pattern on the research which gets done in a field. In the articles, issues were strictly framed for psychologists. Lyle Lanier's (1949) eloquent outline of the military nooks and crannies into which psychology fit peddled the essence of academic freedom. Lanier defined one and only one issue for practitioners of the profession who were doing or

considering doing military-funded research: whether "a collective pattern of research organization is incompatible with original scientific thinking. . ." (p.128). The centralized determination of priorities is never questioned--only whether methodologies can be flexed according to their internal logic. As long as the social scientist gets a good methodological workout, the purse strings that guide the methodologies into their real-world directions are thoroughly ignored. Not until John Marks' (1979) revelations on the Central Intelligence Agency's deeply secret MK-ULTRA project would psychologists such as Caroline Wood Sherif, Musafer Sherif, and Charles Osgood know that the "human ecology" so innocently tucked into Lanier's (1949) ONR organizational chart (p. 136) was an undercover channel for the surreptitious purchase of intellectual work by the CIA, for example. In a 1979 interview, Ms. Sherif expressed chagrin that the late 1950s social psychological investigations on youth gangs she and her husband conducted at the University of Oklahoma were in part supported by the CIA (Marks, 1979, p. 159). Nor would the bland box entitled "Operations Research Office" on Lanier's (1949) Army research organizational chart be exposed as a point of production of counterinsurgency social science until the academic

rebels of the anti-Viet Nam war movement turned their professional skills against the military research establishment in their own front yard (Klare, 1972, p. 80).

Charles Bray's (1952) sales pitch for contract research similarly dulled the social scientist's mind by falsely defining the issue as a matter of methodology:

There is no need then to place basic and applied research in opposition to one another in this context of contract research. . . . It is, therefore, basic research but the the primary reason for pursuing it under contract is application.
(Bray, 1952, p. 713)

The double-talking Bray was a top-level organizer of militarized social science. He had headed the Applied Psychology Panel of the World War II Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bray, 1948) and under cover of the Smithsonian Institution, would soon head the team of social scientists who integrated the banalities of everyday academic social science work into the nation's Viet Nam-era counterinsurgency strategy. The journal of psychology's professional organization served among other things as an ideological enforcer for the military and military-associated psychological work in academia.

Similarly, John Wilson (1952) assured psychologists that there was no cause for alarm, since "there has been no systematic assessment of the effect of the whole of contract research on psychology" (p. 715) beyond

its obvious "important and beneficial consequences of stimulating research output, and training more research psychologists" (p. 715). Although a man standing with his head in the sand, Wilson was put before academic psychologists as a person of logic.

Charles Hill's (1955) self-praise of military research in psychology reported that "the military dollar is supporting a lot of psychological research" (p.242) and would continue to do so. Yeah for military research!

Arthur Melton's (1957) paen to psychology's servitude to military aims truthfully acknowledged that "psychology is too useful--even too necessary--to be ignored by the military establishment" (p. 746).

Ignored it was not. A series of suggestive documents spread throughout several categories of classification in American Psychological Association archives held at the Library of Congress' Manuscript Division offers broad evidence of the APA's role. For example, in Box G4 there is a folder labelled "Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research, Human Relations Advisory Panel 1946-1950." The fact that APA office documents include a file with such a title is itself of interest, for it shows a certain level of communication between the two institutions. In this file there was a February

21, 1950 memo written by John G. Darley to members of the ONR Advisory Panel on Human Relations. It discussed an ONR briefing on psywar research which Advisory Panel members had just (1950) attended. At the briefing, a meeting was announced for a review of psywar problems to be jointly made by several government agencies. The social scientists of the ONR's Human Relations Advisory Panel jumped in feet first, creating "a subcommittee which would include present Panel members, contractors, and such other people as seemed desirable" to work on psywar problems jointly with the several government agencies. Clearly, the kinds of considerations we saw operating during World War II psychological warfare had not exactly waned in ONR-influenced precincts, including, apparently, the APA itself. Indeed, a May 1949 document in the same folder bears the title "Proposal for a Psychological Warfare Research Force," showing that thought, at least, was certainly given to problems of organizing social science workers for psychological warfare work well after the cessation of World War II hostilities.

Another document in the same folder entitled "Progress Report on Research in Contemporary Cultures, Director Dr. Margaret Mead, February 16, 1950" tells of "a comprehensive plan of research into attitudes and behavior

in the United States." With not too much stretch of the imagination one could wonder whether ONR-inspired research along these lines served a vision of the U.S. population as peacetime psywar target. A June 26, 1946 document, still in the same folder, listed 27 persons from several social science fields as "possible consultants for ORI [Office of Research and Inventions, which became the Office of Naval Research] conference on human relations," showing the APA in on the ground floor organizing. Similarly, in the same folder, a June 13, 1946 memo on APA letterhead from John G. Darley to Captain A.J. Vorwald (a Navy official assigned to development of the plan for basic research in the social sciences) discussed "broad research problems in human relationships" and outlined such research tasks as leadership, conference processes, morale, group effectiveness under stress, deviate individuals, and "studies of the origin, development, and management of attitudes, prejudices, and other non-intellective determinants of individual and group behavior." Was John Darley the social psychologist in the psywar drivers seat briefly at the end of the war? One might wonder. Box G3, folder "Department of the Army, General Staff, 1946-1950" contains several documents of interest. One is a March 13,

1947 memo to APA official Dael Wolfle. It emanated from the War Department's central research development division, and its subject was "Needed R&D [research & development] in psychology and Personnel Management."

It listed such items as

Psychological Warfare: Verbal propaganda directed against potential or actual enemy; Releases on and demonstrations of new weapons as a form of propaganda; Prisoner interrogation techniques.

Social Control Media and Techniques: Psychological preparation of population for total war; Control of mass hysteria in face of major disaster; . . .Preparation to conduct scientific studies of populations in face of natural disasters such as earth quakes, volcanic eruptions, etc, as a basis for future planning.

Opinion and Attitude Surveys: Development of techniques and media for keeping Intelligence informed concerning attitudes of. . .general population; secret surveys basic to strategic planning and basic policy decisions; Public relations program to be guided by attitudes data.

A list of names was attached, of persons attending a meeting the following week called the "Conference of Advisory Panel of Psychological Consultants, 21 & 22 March 1947":

Walter V. Bingham (Industrial), Adjutant General's Department
 Mitchell Dreese (Personnel), George Washington University
 Jack W. Dunlap (Psychobiology), Psychological Corporation
 Frank A. Geldard (Psychology), University of Virginia
 G. Frederic Kuder (Psychometrics), Educational and Psychological Measurement

Robert H. Seashore (Psychology), Northwestern University
 Laurance F. Schaffer (Clinical), Teachers College, Columbia University
 Carroll L. Schartle (Occupational Psychology), Ohio State
 Sam S. Stouffer (Sociology), Harvard University
 Dael Wolfe (Psychology), American Psychological Association Executive Secretary

Wolfe was something of a short order cook to the military. As consultant psychologist on the topic of "releases on and demonstrations of new weapons as a form of propaganda," for example, the military got social psychologist Neal E. Miller. Miller's project was called "Desert Rock! A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion" (Bordes, Finan, Hochstim, McFann, & Schwartz, 1953). Before and after psychological test batteries were administered to the U.S. soldiers who were again and again ordered directly in front of A-bomb test explosions, psychological and physiological subjects for military experimentation in the 1950s (Uhl & Ensign, 1980). One could imagine Nazi concentration camp doctors cutting up their living victims with similar equanimity. One assumes neither Miller nor Wolfe were cynical, but rather saw their actions as a simple matter of patriotic duty.

Ackroyd, Margolis, Rosenhead, & Shallice's (1977) book on the technology of political control in Ireland details but one case of the consequences of recruitment

of psychologists to work on "prisoner interrogation techniques." One wonders which psychologists today are working on "psychological preparation of population for total war," for it is sure that the 1980s began with a major drumming up of war fever. Who would have controlled the mass hysteria if the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania had melted down, as it almost did at the end of March 1979? Psychologists among too many others have more than once assured the U.S. public that Three Mile Island caused only minor and recoverable "psychological damage." Nuclear industry mouthpieces have echoed the psychologists with boasts that the only damage their Three Mile Island attempted murder did was merely psychological. Psychologists are versatile fronts. "Scientific studies of populations in face of natural disasters" are for gleaning the shape of things to come once the nuclear arsenals are emptied on us. Psychologists need only do routine work to contribute to "keeping intelligence informed." Finally, "secret surveys basic to strategic planning" lay there curled up, silently growing into a beast that would eat the academic social scientific enterprise whole once computerized simulation modelling of psywar factors began to be done on whole societies.

Other documents in the same folder show the APA as organizer of an advisory panel to do for the Army what the ONR panel did for the Navy. APA executive secretary Dael Wolfle wrote a March 24, 1949 letter to the Army's Operations Research Office, which used Johns Hopkins University as academic cover. He said:

I will be glad to secure for you a panel of nominees from whom you may select an advisory group to the Operations Research Office. . . . In order that they will have a more official status as representatives of psychology, I will secure nominations from some of the APA Divisions and officers.

Wolfle was himself asked to be one of the advisors. In his letter of the same date to APA division contacts, he suggested "that, when the panel of advisors is finally made up, it would be desirable to have four of the seven from the field of social psychology." Ever useful.

Around a month later, Wolfle wrote a May 3, 1949 letter to the APA Board of Directors, saying

We are asked to nominate members of a panel of consultants to supervise research programs in psychology. Emphasis will be on social psychology, but the board of consultants should not be made up entirely of social psychologists.

In organizing the Johns Hopkins-shielded Operations Research Office, the APA may very well have doubled as Central Intelligence Agency front. It would have been

neither the first nor the last of such collaboration. The APA's loyalties were firm and strong and compelling. It finally recommended the following list of names, according to another letter in the same folder, from Wolfle to ORO, dated May 17, 1949:

Jerome Bruner, Department of Social Relations,
Harvard University
Dorwin Cartwright, Center for Group Dynamics,
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
Stuart W. Cook, Committee on Community Inter-
relations, American Jewish Congress
Neal Miller, Psychology, Yale University
Allen Edwards, Psychology, University of
Washington, Seattle
Herbert S. Conrad, U.S. Office of Education
John R.P. French, Center for Group Dynamics,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The Harvard and Ann Arbor establishments floated on ONR money. It's not clear whether the American Jewish Congress acted as conduit for other interests. Jerome Bruner was by this time also on the ONR advisory panel, as were others from Harvard, Michigan, and Washington (Guetzkow, 1963). Neal Miller was a future operative in operation Desert Rock. The U.S. Office of Education was probably there to offer its subject pool for experimental ideological formation. John French was the Lewinian who perhaps more than any other sewed a scientific coat for Frederick Taylor's vendetta against people's self-defense maneuvers in the battle of the workplace (Coch & French, 1948).

Why social psychology still? For reasons no different in kind from the World War II period. The military interest in social psychology would hold firm for decades. Relations between the APA and the CIA looked to have a firmness as well. One document in Box H2, folder "Government Agencies/Central Intelligence Agency" has already been cited (Baird, 1951). It was a letter in which the CIA profusely thanked the APA for its help on "a variety of problems," and gave APA Executive Secretary Dael Wolfe special mention. In another letter in the same folder, APA Executive Secretary Fillmore Sanford wrote to a CIA colonel on December 14, 1950 to recommend these psychologists for "the mission you and I have recently talked about":

Donald Marquis, Psychology, University of Michigan
 Ernest Hilgard, Psychology, Stanford University
 Lyle Lanier, Psychology, University of Illinois,
 Urbana
 Quinten Holsopple, Veteran's Administration,
 Washington, D.C.
 Meredith Crawford, Vanderbilt University, Nashville
 Hadley Cantril, Psychology, Princeton University
 Donald Adams, Psychology, Duke University

One can only guess the mission, but it may have involved organizing the Human Research Organization (HumRRO), established in 1951 as an Army social science think-and-practice tank. Meredith Crawford was its director in the early 1950s, at the time of the HumRRO-sponsored operation Desert Rock (Bordes, Flynn, Hochstim, McFann, &

Schwartz, 1953). Finally, newspaper clippings in Box K8, folder "Government Agencies: Department of State 1946-1952" discussed an entity called the National Psychological Strategy Board. A March 22, 1951 New York Times article by James Reston reported that the idea of "a political general staff to coordinate and direct United States Policy in the Cold War is being seriously considered at the highest levels of government."

A November 23, 1951 Washington Post article filed right behind Reston's reported on a change in head of the Psychological Strategy Board to Raymond Allen, president of the University of Washington. "The board, Allen said, is charged with the responsibility of formulating policy and strategy in the psychological area." It seems pretty obvious that military interest in psywar as of the early 1950s remained at a high level, just as CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt had predicted in his 1949 War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Interest would not wane soon.

Finally, a very interesting 1949 document in Box G1 of the APA archive paints the full landscape of the status of psychological warfare in the then war which was called cold. It is in a folder entitled "Armed Forces Familiarization Course in Military Psychology,

Lectures Likert." The document is entitled "Psychological Warfare, R. Likert, Director Institute for Social Research." It reads, in part:

We are now engaged in an extremely serious conflict. It is essential that we win this conflict and that we win it without resorting to 'a shooting war.' One of our most effective weapons is psychological warfare and we must use this as efficiently and skillfully as we can. Psychological warfare can not be confined to our enemies. It must also be used to win increasing support from our friends and those who are neutral or are afraid to take sides.

What is psychological warfare? . . . Fundamentally, psychological warfare is the process by means of which we create in the minds of persons in other countries those ideas and attitudes which will result in the behavior which we desire. Psychological warfare necessarily employs every influence which will affect behavior. It employs not only mass media, and person to person contacts but also economic and political measures.

Actually psychological warfare involves the same basic principles as are involved in advertising and selling and in all other efforts to change attitudes and behavior. . . .

Any attempt to change peoples attitudes and behavior involves four major steps. . . . The first step is in essence an intelligence operation. However, it requires the use of methodology that is rarely employed by intelligence officers at present. It involves discovering people's present attitudes and behavior and their major values, concerns and motives.

The second step is deciding what attitude changes or behavior changes are wanted. Step three is taking action, waging the psywar. The fourth step is measuring

the resulting changes, if any. With the exception of the opening sentences, Likert's presentation came right out of OSS documents, which he probably had right in his filing cabinet. He lectured from the doorstep to the 1950s, time of "better dead than Red" history lessons in the nation's high schools and Joe McCarthy's TV spectacle in the living room. The U.S. may have made treaties saying that war had ended, but war had not ended. And it still hasn't. U.S. soldiers were first sent to Viet Nam in 1950, but Viet Nam hasn't ended it. The social scientific concerns so innocently, perhaps, professed by a leading member of the work crew who, along with others such as Kurt Lewin, had built the post World War II social psychology of intelligence-gathering are here under our feet today, like uranium tailings in the floor, slowly and inevitably poisoning to the death those who everyday walk above.

Conclusion

There are many ways to make a case for the domination of a given paradigm or a given thematic emphasis in an academic discipline. The existence of a bureaucratic structure which organizes the social scientific work activity is one part of the proof. The investment

situation is another: who is investing in what when social psychology receives development funding? Evidence that the thematic emphases the investor called for were, in fact, produced completes a sufficient portion of the evidence, in my judgment, to argue that U.S. social psychology, as developed during and after World War II, was heavily militarized. An internal analysis of the productions of social psychology would add further weight, as Bramel & Friend's (in press) work has already shown.

When in 1950 the Executive Secretary of the American Psychological Association announced that psychology was again to mobilize in the service of war, he was merely continuing tradition, not changing policy. It was the same year as the ONR's go-public conference to launch its tentacles far and wide (Guetzkow, 1963):

The most critical event of the past year for psychology was also the most critical event for the world: a period of uneasy international tension which we called a cold war flared up into a shooting war. The shooting is confined to Korea, but the struggle there and the international situation of which Korea is a symptom will mean changes in the profession and in the Association which represents the profession. (Wolfe, 1950, p. 634)

It was the APA's lecture on military psychology to its sector of the social scientific workforce. It was broadly ideological, where Likert's had been much

more explicitly focussed. Wolfle, let us remember, hobnobbed with the CIA crowd (Baird, 1951), where the over-arching international situation was always the framework within which daily lives were manipulated en masse. The international situation of which he so rightly said Korea was a symptom involved the geopolitics of postwar reshuffling of hegemonic zones. For social psychology, as for social science as a whole, the overall global situation would soon escalate yet again the integration of the discipline's everyday work with military objectives.

Noting that "during the last war we were one of the most heavily mobilized professional groups in the country " (Wolfle, 1950, p. 635), the APA organizer forecast that "there will be increased demands for psychological research in those areas which are likely to have military significance" (Wolfle, 1950, p. 635). Even as Wolfle reminded the profession of its loyalties, the first U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (USMAAGs) were being stationed in Viet Nam, after the U.S. had already financed about 70% of France's unsuccessful war of colonial reconquest (Gettleman, 1965). Outlining the APA's 1950 plans to organize in psychology a national roster of social scientists, for their rapid mobilization, like troops, Wolfle indicated that a formal organizing

network already functioned for academic workers:

APA is now called upon as a consultant in many planning activities. When policies affecting scientists are under consideration by the Department of Defense, by the Selective Service System or by some other agency psychologists are represented. (Wolfle, 1950, p. 637)

As the U.S. military escalated its attempt at Southeast Asian conquest, the various practices clumped together as psychology could receive orders rapidly. Once the military cast was set it was only a matter of quietly continuing the relation of social science's servitude in ever new ways, with the organizing claw of the military fading evermore into normalcy--until the Viet Nam war created a people's movement against the war and an intellectual workers' rebellion against their own class servitude.

Perhaps we should try to look at all this from the perspective of, say, the person who works as a social psychologist by teaching and conducting experiments on something so typical as effects on human beings of various spatial arrays of buildings. If the kinds of questions my investigation raises are ever considered by the social science worker who finds contentment in plying her or his trade in this way, it is usually, in my experience anyway, without much comprehension. To comprehend is to draw conclusions. To draw conclusions

is to enter a process of serious changes in one's everyday life. But in the first place, to comprehend requires a hefty amount of effort to build a picture of how human events work on this planet. Perhaps the biggest part of the difficulty in doing this is to realize that it's necessary to do it--to realize that it's dangerous to one's own life and limb to continue to tolerate conventional falsifications of everyday life.

But psychological warfare is, after all, pretty mundane. As possibilities for mind-bending go, propaganda campaigns based on the same principles as advertising aren't very cloak-and-dagger. And the bulk of the social science intelligence-gathering which must go on behind it is also mundane, or has certainly been made to appear so. It's the organization on the work process and the developmental potential of the ideologically-guided social science enterprise which together constitute something remarkable. As we have seen since its inception, social science has been quite versatile over time within the same basic positivist paradigm. The apparatus of objectivity has constituted a mystification of the enterprise's servitude, guaranteeing ideological loyalty on the part of the vast majority of its workforce and insuring its pliability to meet ever-new wrinkles in global developments.

CHAPTER 5

PROJECT CAMELOT AND THE PRESENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Introduction

Ostensibly, World War II ended in 1945. In actuality, warfare in various parts of the planet continued, hardly abated. Sometimes the U.S. role was less than up front, as in Southeast Asia where initially the French supplied the financing (Gettleman, 1965). The United States' role would become manifest only as the soldiers became U.S. nationals. More often, battles were fought "cold"--i.e., with words of persuasion or threat, with subversion leading to coup d'etat, or with assorted methods of economic domination without political takeover. Military interest in the weapons capability of social science remained alive apace.

Like any other piece of weapons technology, social science was pushed beyond the limits of its existing uses, toward sometimes futuristic applications. Planners took the long view on the grounds that research takes time to bear its practical fruits. They envisioned a long-lasting cold war between the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) punctuated perhaps

by "limited" wars in which bullets would be exchanged but the terrain of the fighting would be limited to some well-defined patch of the third world. Total war was of course always to be prepared for, but in the shorter run, overall cold war and limited hot wars were the assumptions.

We have seen that the perspective on humans subsumed under the rubric of social psychology was already well in favor with the military as the post World War II period began. As with the other social sciences, its continued development by the military was to lead not so much to cognitive breakthroughs about the nature of us humans as to a qualitative reorganization of the way the social science work process was integrated into the corporate-military-governmental policy stream. Social psychology, which had so hopefully entered the lair of the Office of Naval Research in 1946 would bare a fang at the people of Chile in 1973, for instance. It would do so not because social psychologists are bad people, although some undoubtedly are. It would do so because its workaday products had become centrally and cybernetically organized, via a managerial framework which used it and the other social sciences as pawns in a great game of global strategy.

The Smithsonian Group

We have come to know the story of why the military wanted to lead the development of the particular academic discipline of social psychology. Ring in nose, it delved away at its basic research. Mounds of questions arising from problems of consciousness-manipulation were riddled with the burrows of the searchers.

Meanwhile, the Sputnik crisis of 1957 threw science management into overdrive. In that year, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering combined a group of consultants in Human Factors and a group of consultants in Special Warfare Operations into an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Psychology and the Social Sciences (Notes on Planning Psychological and Social Science Research for DDRE, 1957-1962). Its purpose was

to identify the needs of the National Military Establishment for long-range scientific effort in psychology and the social sciences, in order that these needs may be weighed together with those in determining the requirements of the Nation and the National Military Establishment for immediate accelerations in basic scientific effort. (Fitz, Bennett, Carmichael, Cottrell, Erickson, Geldard, Harlow, Hunt, Melton, Miller, Nadel, Pfaffmann, Riley, Schramm, Stevens, Thomson, Wetter, & Wolfle, 1957)

Psychology was once again to be tied to the rack and stretched in orderly fashion. The most interesting

and dangerous outcome, for psychology as for the other social sciences, was to be the transformation in the mode of its integration into policy applications brought about by the labors of this Group. Soon called the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, it was chaired by Charles Bray, who had headed the Applied Psychology Panel of the World War II Office of Scientific Research and Development. Working from the assumption of "a need for the products and guidance of psychology and the social sciences in the long-term world conflict in which the nation is engaged" (Fitts et al., p. 1), the ad hoc group began a seven-year-long effort which culminated in the infamous project CAMELOT of the mid-1960s. Sheltered behind the benign visage of Washington D.C.'s Smithsonian Institution and financed by Office of Naval Research contract number Nonr 1354(08), the group's members worked out the systematic feed-in of social science work to the counterinsurgency strategy then being formulated by intellectuals of the corporate-military nexus.

Upon its hasty creation, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Psychology and Social Sciences included intellectual workers from such institutions as the University of Michigan, the Psychological Corporation, the Smithsonian

Institution, the Russell Sage Foundation, Vanderbilt University, Princeton University, the University of Wisconsin, Northwestern University, Yale University, General Electric Company, Brown University, Harvard University, the RAND Corporation, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. They published their first study report in 1957 (Fitz et al., 1957). The bulk of the document stated as its framework the strategy of simultaneous preparedness for total, limited, and cold war.

Cold war was singled out as the most decisive immediate arena,

in which weapons were important only in their role as persuaders of human behavior. . . . It seemed that full realization of the potentialities of psychology and the social sciences in designing a fully operational Psychological Weapon System could not be expected unless that system were explicitly admitted to the arsenal of primary weapons systems of the nation. Furthermore, such a system--which has as its purpose the persuasion of peoples with whom our Nation is in conflict--must be developed in parallel with an Anti-PW system, just as anti-ballistic-missile systems must be developed along with ballistic missile systems. The scientific problem is, therefore, not only that of discovering methods of effective persuasion, but it is also a matter of discovering countermeasures for techniques of effective persuasion should they become available to the enemy through their scientific discoveries. (Fitz et al., 1957, p. 3)

As they saw it, psychology's role could continue in

the World War II tradition, more than a decade after that war's ostensible conclusion. Chemical agents of persuasion and affect were to be sought as well, lest psychology's offerings fail to turn up strong enough techniques (Marks, 1979; Schefflin & Opton, 1978). Limited war was to include psychological weapons as well, but emphasis at that point in time was on cold war, in which "the principal weapon. . . is persuasion--the persuasion of men" and the hope was for "the occurrence of a 'break-through' in the control of the attitudes and beliefs of human beings" (Fitz et al., pp. 11-12) before it would accept the planned escalation in militarism. The social sciences received the by now accustomed nod:

Many facts and principles of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science are relevant to the formulation of a program of persuasion of the enemy and a program of countermeasures for 'hardening' of our people against their persuasion. (Fitz et al., p. 14)

I suppose the "better dead than Red" mentality drilled into the school children of the 1950s was perhaps meant to be an instance of the type of psychological inoculation envisioned. Additional support came from the intelligence quarter, probably based on the experience of using the social sciences during World War II:

The mathematics of Decision Theory and Game Theory, the technology and 'operational gaming', and psychological research on the characteristics

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of human decision processes provide a basis for the expectation that important contributions to the solution of the fundamental problem of intelligence operations will come from the behavioral sciences. (Fitz et al., 1957, p. 15)

This was to become one of the louder themesongs as cultural knowledge expressed in the quantified terms of social science research retained and then increased its importance. As a Smithsonian Group member was later to point out, "both social scientists and intelligence personnel are engaged in procuring and organizing knowledge about roughly the same range of events" (Knorr, 1961, p. 8). Finally, small group research, persuasion, and motivation were singled out as the critical fields of psychological research in which continued investment was desirable.

The Ad Hoc Group's first report was not a stunning groundbreaker. It simply recommended methodical development of the kinds of social science work which war had proven of interest and, presumably, use to the military. They were

- (a) Design and use of man-machine systems
 - (b) Human performance capabilities and limitations
 - (c) Decision processes
 - (d) Team functions
 - (e) Persuasion and motivation
 - (f) Adaptation of complex organizations to changing demands
- (Fitz et al., p. 22)

It merely recommended continued work on figuring out how to advance capabilities in the identified social science areas, in both basic and applied research directions. Military brass higher up in the research administration apparatus agreed, and the Ad Hoc Group was institutionalized under a spook-studded steering committee which took its orders from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering's office. Members of the steering committee also prepared papers under the Smithsonian Group's imprimatur. The steering committee was composed of Drs. Dael Wolfle (chairman), American Association for the Advancement of Science and formerly American Psychological Association-Central Intelligence Agency go-between; Morris Janowitz, military sociologist from the University of Michigan; John L. Kennedy, psychologist from Princeton University; Klaus Knorr, Center for International Studies, Princeton University; Arthur W. Melton, psychologist from the University of Michigan; Ithiel deSola Pool of the CIA-connected Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Charles A.H. Thomson, RAND Corporation. They constituted the highest layer of organizers within the social science professions who worked directly for the intelligence and military bureaucracies. They

organized the development of the counterinsurgency theory and practice of social science which was to be spread around the universities like the plague. Once given the go-ahead, the Smithsonian Group prepared a several-foot high stack of papers edging forward the frontiers of social science work on the model of manipulation. Using no more than the tried and true old method of a series of meetings to deliberate thoughtful papers solicited from people adept in the required purposes, the Smithsonian Group went on to bring forth one of the more insidious schemes ever to beset the people of the world in the sheep's clothing of social science.

Counterinsurgency and the Smithsonian Group

For anyone who followed the political analysis of the Viet Nam era, "counterinsurgency" became a household word. Simply, it's the military doctrine of "flexible response" to wars of national liberation in societies of the Third World colonized either directly or indirectly by nations of the industrialized metropolis. The 1950-1954 war in Korea was thought to have proved that the nuclear arsenal required by the "massive retaliation" doctrine was useless in a land war. And the simultaneous French-American war of 1950-1954 in Indochina had shown

that conventional military techniques could not secure territory against a people's war. Counterinsurgency was to be the final solution to unruly natives. They were insurgents--guerrilla fighters--against repressive regimes. To counter their struggles, the U.S. would try to build a capacity to wage guerrilla war back--either with its own nationals, or, preferably, through training local partisans. "Unconventional warfare" is another name for the strategy; it is one version of "limited war."

In his thoroughgoing report on U.S. planning for the next Viet Nams, Michael Klare (1972) noted that

the official Pentagon definition of counterinsurgency, as provided in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, is: 'Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.' Insurgency is defined as 'a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited. (p. 44)

Counterinsurgency was a blending of psychological warfare and military action, rather different, however, from the World War II combination. More like a mixture than an emulsion. The new concept in the counterinsurgency doctrine was the prevention of escalation of a conflict by virtue of getting in there early and nipping it before it had a chance to grow strong. Prediction,

and thereby prevention, of coming conflict within a society was the new element. Internal war was to be controlled from the outside. Which is where social science, including social psychology, came in.

In his long Smithsonian Group report entitled "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," Harry Eckstein of Princeton University said that

in a sense, the study of internal war is commensurate with the whole study of society, even peaceable society, for anything that increases our knowledge of social order can potentially increase our understanding of civil disorder. (Eckstein, 1962, p. 74)

All the ordinary preoccupations of many a social science worker, and especially those of a social psychologist, would obviously be potentially of interest within a counterinsurgency military strategy. The Smithsonian Group was in charge of funnel making. They did the figuring-out about how to institutionalize the feeding-in of whatever social science work was required by the military strategy. The channel ran from the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences of the Smithsonian Institution through the Defense Science Board, and, upon its endorsement, up to the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) of the Department of Defense (DoD). Instructions about what was wanted came back down the channel from Colonel P.H. Mitchell

of the Office of Science, DDRE, to the Smithsonian Institution's Steering Group of the Defense Advisory Panel in Psychology and the Social Sciences (Wolfe, Kennedy, Knorr, Melton, deSola Pool, and Thomson). They oversaw the studies in turn carried out by some 30 persons from the Smithsonian's Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences.

In 1961, counterinsurgency doctrine was adopted by the new Kennedy Administration, the first large escalation of U.S. troop level in Viet Nam took place, and the DDRE accepted the Smithsonian Group's assessment of what should take place in the social sciences. The latter, every bit part of the former, issued in several actions. (A) The Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was assigned to implement the Smithsonian Report Recommendations, which according to an official public report to the psychological community emphasized social change in the Third World, persuasion, and motivation (Bray, 1962). ARPA was "an elite organization of civilian scientists who worked directly under the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering" (Klare, 1972, p. 125). The Behavioral Sciences Council established within ARPA in 1961 "tended to follow the lines of the Smithsonian report" (Lyons, 1969, p. 150). (B) The Steering Group

arranged for an ingathering of the academics who were the prospective mid-level organizers of counterinsurgency social science work. They organized a symposium entitled "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research," held March 26-28, 1962 at the American University's Special Operations Research Office (SORO) installation. About 300 social scientists attended. (C) The Smithsonian Group put together a report entitled "Social Science Research and National Security" which was the definitive justification for the expenditure of Pentagon money on social science research. In 1964 this report would be accepted by the DDRE and in 1965 embodied by ARPA as Project CAMELOT.

The SORO Symposium

The Special Operations Research Office (SORO) was the Army's counterinsurgency social science research center operating since 1956 at the American University in Washington, D.C. Its name was changed in 1966 to Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS). SORO was one of several similar research institutes which lurked in the shadows cast by one university or another until exposed to public scrutiny in the mid-1960s by outraged academic antiwar activists. Johns Hopkins University had been

hosting the Army's Operations Research Office (ORO) since 1948. George Washington University had sheltered the Army's Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) since 1951. And from 1956 to 1968 a dozen universities formed the multi-service military research organization called the Institute for Defense Analysis: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Tulane, Case Institute, California Institute of Technology, University of Chicago, University of California, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, Columbia University, Princeton University, and Pennsylvania State University.* There was no lack of academic respectability to cover up the human suffering engendered by the beast into which social science was asked to pour its wares.

The 1962 SORO Meeting was the first "go public" recruitment effort for counterinsurgency social science, analogous to the 1950 recruitment meeting put on by the Office of Naval Research (Guetzkow, 1963). The United States was, by 1962, knee-deep in the big muddee, having

* Michael Klare describes the work of each of these in his War Without End (1962), still the best single source of information and analysis on the contribution made by academic workers to the counterinsurgency military strategy. Peter Watson's War Without End (1972) extends the coverage of ivory tower contributions to in-the-field uses.

escalated its troop commitment in Viet Nam to a level which began to incur public opposition at home. Academics being a generally hard-core bunch of loyalists to the money source, it was possible for the DoD to gather some 300 social science workers to its symposium entitled "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research."

The idea of counterinsurgency was meticulously spelled out to the conference participants. This is what the gathered social scientists were told:

In many developing nations where there is no direct negotiation or military confrontation with our major antagonist, the national interest requires our military participation when the military threat factor is but one of the several important factors to be faced in each situation. Military involvement is required long before events reach the stage when maximum physical force is appropriate or required. If employment of U.S. military forces in the classical sense is not appropriate, nor required, other components of the military counterinsurgency weapon must be used. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. 4)

What was the military counterinsurgency weapon? What were its parts?

They are military capabilities and skills which in prior wars were either ancillary or subsequent to use of direct physical combat capabilities--psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice. These capabilities have become the primary components of the military counterinsurgency weapon system, retaining the direct physical combat capabilities in a ready, indisparible, and highly critical reserve status.

(Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p.v)

Psychological operations were among its primary components, equal to guns in importance.

Success in the counterinsurgency mission is as much dependent on political, social, economic, and psychological factors as upon purely military factors, and sometimes more so. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. vi)

In a Counterinsurgency situation the primary sources of insurgent strength are not a strong military organization and its technological industrial support, but the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. vii)

The central counterinsurgency task was to organize the people themselves. Counterinsurgency planners thought in downright arrogant terms, it's true. They thought that by grasping enough quantified information about a people, they could understand that people and its history enough to engineer its future. They correctly saw that the primary source of insurgent strength is always the people themselves. But they incorrectly decided that they could apply a technological fix to a social process and divert or otherwise interfere with its development of adversary strength within a society. Just rake in the information and organize it.

Whether one is concerned with programs to alleviate political, social, or economic sources of discontent, with techniques of indirect influence, with the social environment in which actions occur, or with the social and political

factors which are targets of action, the kind of underlying knowledge required is the understanding and prediction of human behavior at the individual, political, and social group, and society levels. The systematic acquisition of such knowledge is the business of the behavioral and social sciences-- psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, history, and international relations. . . . The potential contributions of the behavioral and social sciences to the counterinsurgency weapon system may be summarized in three general areas. (1) The application of existing knowledge to military requirements. (2) The use of existing techniques for acquiring new knowledge required that is not presently available. (3) The development of new techniques for acquiring new knowledge required not presently available, and for which existing techniques are inadequate. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, pp. x-xii)

It doesn't take much insight to realize that social scientists could largely carry on with what they normally did and still contribute to the counterinsurgency strategy. All that was needed was for some number of social science academics to explicitly frame their research in terms of the military's requirements. The free market system of research procurement would take care of the rest. Researchers would perforce go where the money was, each picking off her or his small piece to be meticulous about. Much more often than not, any given social science worker would be unable--by virtue of the combined effect of ideological training and deliberate dismemberment of the research picture--to see what she or

he was participating in. They could therefore not see what effect their piece of the action had on people, merely by virtue of its integration with the war in Viet Nam or the war in Watts. This type of blindness is definitely an occupational hazard of professing social science in 20th-century North America.

The weapons spectrum ran from social science on the one end to nuclear warheads on the other. If winning the hearts and minds of the people themselves was the key to winning in a war limited to a given set of Third World countries, then nuclear warheads were not directly useful.

The problem, after all, is to achieve objectives on social groupings, by means of social groupings. There is a certain amount of hardware involved too, of course, but men and their motives are at the heart of the matter. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p.48)

The academics were to be objective, which meant don't ask why. The chief of the Army's Office of Research and Development told them bluntly:

We feel that a military social science research program will receive long-term support only if it emphasized the conduct of research and refrains from journalistic comments on world affairs. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. 359)

Or, a bit more flamboyantly:

Attack fearlessly and without emotional or ideological distortions the question whether the means on which we rely to cope with the

sources of turbulence in the new nations are adequate, whether we can steal our enemies' thunder. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. 171)

It's all sanitized. The sources of turbulence are bad for people, and our side is the good side. Our side is civilization. Paul Linebarger, the director of the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University got away with the metaphor of the day:

Man has differed from other animals in two major respects. First, his front feet have really become hands. Secondly, man throughout most of his experience has eaten man. An anthropologist points out that human flesh, particularly in remote areas is palatable, nutritious, and extremely inexpensive. (Special Operations Research Office, 1962, p. 68)

Social scientists were being asked to sew the cloak of civilizing mission for a corporate rapacity whose comic relief was the image of cannibalizing. In psychology, word was promulgated to the overall community of workers through a 1962 article by Charles Bray entitled "Toward a Technology of Human Behavior for Defense Use." Published in the prestigious American Psychologist, the article was prepared under contract Nonr 1354(08)--the Smithsonian Group's Office of Naval Research contract, as monitored by the Psychology and Social Science Division of the Office of Science, Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering.

The article's overall recommendation was for implementation of a systems approach through increased funding of "technologically oriented long-range studies within the general fields of human performance, military organization, and persuasion and motivation" (Bray, 1962, p. 527), coupled with contracts for many small-scale studies.

The need is to provide a relatively few capable scientists with superb facilities, adequate interdisciplinary and technical help, and continuity of support. The need is to instill in the key scientists involved a desire to improve national defense through systematic technological development of their subjects and to support them in a manner adequate to their task. (Bray, 1962, p. 541)

Two of its particular recommendations set out basic research areas for social psychologists: team functions and persuasion and motivation.

Other basic research topics [besides group psychology, interpersonal relations, and social perception] of particular concern to the military establishment. . . are the analysis and measurement of team performance, team composition and organization, and team training. . . . A current ongoing review of some 1,600 studies of small groups indicates that a primary research problem of measurement of team effectiveness depends upon advance in the systematic classification of the underlying dimensions of team tasks. Without such classification, meaningful and generalizable measurements of team effectiveness and of the relations of team variables to effectiveness are impossible. As with individual intellectual skills, so too with team functions: task taxonomy is fundamental. (Bray, 1962, p. 535)

The military establishment needs to know all that can be known about persuasion. . . . Basic research is required to unravel the complexity of attitudes and their relation to behavior. . . . Military support should seek to integrate basic and applied research in the pursuit of a technology of persuasion. (Bray, 1962, pp. 538-40)

We see here the military organization of social science work at a very high level of planning, with the military arm of government forming key areas of the social sciences.

The Office of Naval Research, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Army Technical Services ably provide support across the whole broad field of psychology and the social sciences. These agencies have fertilized many areas. It is such fertilization, by these and other government agencies such as the National Science Foundation, and by the private foundations, that has made it possible to say that the fields emphasized here are ready for intensive technological development. (Bray, 1962, p. 541)

Military and non-military social science work were interdependent, via institutionalized interlocks. But defense requirements were the cutting edge.

In the present structure of research support, and because of its deep technological needs, the Department of Defense is the logical source of this new type of support [superb support for a relatively few scientists, etc.] for the systematic, long-range study of human behavior. (Bray, 1962, p. 541)

Meanwhile, the Smithsonian Group had already in 1961 taken on the practical question of recruitment of personnel for social science in the service of the military.

The same year the first large group of U.S. soldiers was sent into combat in Viet Nam, it started a three-year job of preparing a report entitled Social Science Research and National Security.

How can a branch of social science be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national security matters, and how can talented individuals from within social sciences be drawn into this area? That this is feasible and deserves to be attempted is a thesis underlying the efforts of the committee that produced this volume. (Pool, 1963, p. 10)

Ithiel de Sola Pool, John L. Kennedy, Klaus Knorr, and Charles A. H. Thomson prepared the report. The organizing strategy worked out comprised three steps: (1) Describing the military's tasks and indicating the appropriate research, (2) focusing military and social scientist attention on the tasks and the research, and (3) funding and institutionalizing the research, and recruiting both intellectual workers and consumers for their products.

The human problems of modern weaponry. . . are the problems of gigantic organizations, of intercultural operations, and of organizations with goals additional to combat. . . . The social sciences have a good deal to say about how to reach men of particular cultures, ideologies, and personalities. . . . So strategic war planning puts heavy demands upon the social sciences. . . . A great part of contemporary military effort goes into situations where the primary requirements are good political relations with foreign nationals. . . . In many places the military job can only be accomplished by a process of nation

building. . . . In countries at the edge or over the edge of insurgency, an American officer working in close daily relations with people from the local culture can foresee an end to his job only when he has helped the local people establish all the prerequisites of stable nationhood. These include an adequate communication system, a growing economy, faith in progress, a set of political parties and pressure groups working toward national goals, a disciplined civil service, a sound currency, literacy, an education system, an honest government, and a modern ideology. . . . Hence we conclude that in an age of automatic weapons military men must deal with more social relations problems, not fewer. And more, the human dimensions have become so complex that intuition alone is no longer capable of dealing. Science is called for. (Pool, 1963, pp. 7-10)

Social science is called for to plug 15 years worth of military social psychology into the simulation techniques then beginning to appear on the market. Social science was to be an intelligence operation feeding policy formulation:

Social scientists study many of the subjects with which intelligence is most vitally concerned: various aspects (a) of the capabilities, practices, and objectives of states in international affairs and (b) of the domestic structures and functions (whether political, social, or cultural) with which these international capabilities, practices, and objectives are reciprocally related. . . . Much of the information produced by social scientists is of immediate use to intelligence, even to the extent that social scientists do not generate information about aspects of the environment that are of prime concern in intelligence. However, it is social science methods of gathering data, of deducing data from other data, and of establishing the validity of data that are of particular value--in principle at least--in producing appropriate kinds of information for

intelligence. (Pool, 1963, pp. 79-80)

There is virtually no good research in the social sciences which does not potentially have a direct or indirect bearing on intelligence production. . . . It would be impossible to predict exactly which particular researches are likely to have the greatest specific payoff. (Pool, 1963, p.94)

The three-year study spelled out how academic social scientists could work in counterinsurgency planning with the military. The 1962 SORO Symposium and subsequent meetings of its ilk set about to populate the workplace. In 1963, the Pentagon held its first World-wide Psyops Conference (Watson, 1978, p. 24). In 1965, Project CAMELOT went on line.

Project CAMELOT

In counterinsurgency theory, early detection of the potential for armed struggle in a society is considered critical for the subversion of that struggle.

The study of internal war is bound to be largely symptomatology, concerned with the discovery of symptoms indicating 'with a high degree of accuracy, that internal war will occur in a society's future.' (Pool, 1963, p.84)

The most important problems internal wars raise are precisely those we now study least: (a) how to anticipate internal wars (that is, how to discover the preconditions of internal wars), (b) how to prevent them, and (c) what to do after hostilities cease. Of these problems, the first two are obviously the more important. If they are solved, the third need never arise. (Pool, 1963, p. 109)

Early detection meant comprehensive and current information about a given society. Obtaining that information was a job for ideologically zealous organizers. Ordering that information and assuring its accessibility was a job for computers. The way to do it was invented within the Smithsonian Group, the germ of the idea appearing in a paper prepared by a house intellectual of the Hughes Corporation, well-known today for its long intimacy with the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Entitled "The Problems of High-Level Command and Control Systems," the paper sketches out a vision of high-tech centralized monitoring of available data sets and other forms of information about peoples and conditions virtually anywhere. The author was Robert L. Chapman. He submitted his report to the Smithsonian Institution's Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences under the provisions of the same old contract Nonr 1354(08).

Applying the systems approach--"a strenuous effort to gain perspective and to define a manageable problem" (Chapman, 1962, p. 1)--the paper applied the criteria of "technical feasibility and avoidance of value issues" (Chapman, 1962, p. 1) to searching out imaginative contributions for social science to make to the problems of using a military. Chapman opened with the words:

How can social science help determine whether a high-level command and control system is needed? And if one is needed, how can social science contribute to its design and operation? (Chapman, 1962, p. 1)

High level command and control system meant "advanced technology applied to the management process" (Chapman, 1962, p. 2) in such a way that foreign and domestic "group behavior and emergent conflict" (Chapman 1962, p. 2) as well as their implications could be centrally monitored at the highest level of government. Chapman assumed that social science was capable of producing a key piece of the technology. Under the heading "About Social Science," he argued that

existing evidence warrants the assumption that there are regularities and patterns in the behavior of individuals and groups and in economic, social, cultural, and political processes; and that these regularities can be characterized to permit prediction of human behavior at some level of abstraction. (Chapman, 1962, p. 3)

For surely it's the talent of social scientists to scry such regularities. With the high technology of computer storage and retrieval, the kind of literature search performed by hand in MacLeish's OSS operation could be accomplished by one person sitting down, at the push of a couple of buttons. More than that: with appropriate programming, computers could paint a picture of the future, complete with a probability rating for

the occurrence of a given scenario. All this fed the dream of remote control of human beings:

It is feasible to begin now to employ science and technology to predict and control social phenomena within a limited range. . . . Since it deals with the entities that conflict to provoke the tension that threatens peace, social science is integral to a high-level command and control system. Such a command and control system would provide the technology needed to integrate current social science knowledge and theory. (Chapman, 1962, pp. 5-6)

Down to the minute details of data display rooms, data analysis rooms, and visiting scientist access, Chapman sketched out the early version of the plan for routinization of social science espionage which within short time was to link the mundane everyday work discussed in academic hallways throughout the country's university system to the operating deck of a global control room.

The support of the social science community was recognized as essential in this project (Chapman, 1962, p. 12), since they were the ones who had to freely choose to do the work. Existing trends in social science research were seen as compatible with machine synthesizing of data (Chapman, 1962, p. 13). The social scientists themselves were seen as manageable, even cooperative:

Furthermore, there are social scientists who appreciate the insights of operational people

sufficiently to be willing and able to take into account the contributions of the decision makers in defining an appropriate framework. (Chapman, 1962, p. 13)

Social scientists were to have control over methodological questions such as validity of concepts and statistical procedures (Chapman, 1962, p. 14), not over ideology. Under the heading "Inventing and Legitimizing a Mechanism for Participating," Chapman suggests how to enroll social scientists at large:

The very nature of the proposed centralized social data analysis system poses special problems in insuring appropriate relationships between supporting groups and the system. This should not be a matter of contract with a university, company, or institution to provide the services of certain social scientists. Somehow, a mechanism must be invented for establishing an integral relationship between the system and some corporate body that can represent the profession as a whole--perhaps an association of professional societies. (Chapman, 1962, p. 14)

Chapman devotes several pages of his study to overall questions of acceptance of the plan--which he calls "the new system"--by all categories of people who would have to be involved in carrying it out, concluding that "an educational program would be necessary to assure the support for the new system from both the specialists and the general public" (Chapman, 1962, p. 19). It took just under three years for the new system to go on-line as Project CAMELOT.

The mechanics of the creation of CAMELOT were simple and done through standard channels: the Defense Science Board took the Smithsonian Group's reports and in the spring of 1964 created a subcommittee to decide what to do about its recommendations for creation and sorting of counterinsurgency social science research. Then,

On March 24, 1965, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering issued a memorandum of guidance to the military departments and Advanced Research Projects Agency to implement the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Report. The March 24 memorandum assigned to the Army the responsibility, on behalf of the DOD, to establish 'in the Washington, D.C., area, a centrally coordinated applied research effort' in the behavioral and social sciences applied to counterinsurgency. At the same time, ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) was instructed to initiate supporting research in universities, according to guidelines laid down in the DSB (Defense Science Board) report. The Navy, Air Force, and ARPA were also instructed in regard to smaller, related research efforts that would be complementary and contributory to the two main lines of effort outlined above. (U.S. House of Representatives, 1966, pp. 73-74)

The centrally coordinated applied research effort in the behavioral and social sciences was Project CAMELOT; the central coordinator was the U.S. Department of Defense.

Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. (Horowitz, 1967, p. 47)

So stated a recruitment letter prepared in August 1964 and later sent to selected academics along with an invitation to a month-long meeting of "leading behavioral scientists of the country (Horowitz, 1967, p. 49) to be held in August 1965 at Airlie House in Virginia for the purpose of reviewing the research design. August 1964, the reader will recall, was the staged incident of the Tonkin Gulf in which some U.S. gunboats were alleged to have been shelled by Peoples Republic of Viet Nam vessels, I.F. Stone's Weekly, 1964.) This propelled the U.S.'s formal war-authorization body into capitulation. Instead of accepting evident military defeat in Viet Nam, the administration secured the official sanction of Congress to throw almost the whole U.S. arsenal against the people of Viet Nam. Counterinsurgency was at the peak of its first full-scale field test.

Viet Nam was showing, however, that neither social scientists nor bombardiers could stop a liberation struggle which a people had already been waging for decades. For future securing of the empire, it would be desirable to destroy oppositional organization in its very early stages. The CAMELOT conception of early detection was to be the secret of control without B-52 bombing.

The literature of the field would be systematically

scoured for any drop of usefulness. A lot of work would be fed into computer programs simulating, in the form of mathematical models, the general characteristics of some given society. Out of the computer would come advice on how best to preserve or to break the existing hegemony of that society. The DoD's Project CAMELOT was to give the whole idea of simulation modelling on real societies its first field test.

Simulation, as a social science research technique, refers to the construction and manipulation of an operating model, that model being a physical or symbolic representation of all or some aspects of a social or psychological process. Simulation, for the social scientist, is the building of an operating model of an individual or group process and experimenting on this replication by manipulating its variables and their interrelationships. . . . The model is/ designed to incorporate or reproduce those features of the real object that the researcher deems significant for his research problem. . . . The important factor is that the components and variables being investigated through the model respond in a manner comparable to that of the behavior of the real system. (Dawson, 1962, p.3)

The first decision in the creation of a simulation model is the variables--what factors in the real world are significant for discovering the information wanted? Rules of relationship among variables, in the form of mathematical equations, are then imposed on the real-world variables. The mathematical constructs are so selected as to correspond to whatever the real-world structural interrelations among the variables may be.

Or so it is supposed and defined. Computers are then instructed, via mathematics, to put selected particular data into the framework set up by its program (the model). Depending on how that program was written, the computer might make a specific recommendation, such as that Salvador Allende be killed, or it might just reveal methodological flaws in the procedure. The operations people could make the computer do ranged from probabilistic predictions concerning a current world situation to searching raw data for specified patterns of regularity. It depended on what the computer operators wanted done, but it also depended on the data--all the data social science work could turn up, the basic research of political engineering.

Simulation modelling came from a coalescing of two streams of work--war gaming and small group research (Guetzkow, 1962, p. 83). Small group research--the soul of social psychology if it has one at all--had been literally made-to-order for marriage with war gaming. It certainly wasn't the working class which needed to develop a perspective-from-above on the functioning of humans in small groups.

CAMELOT was the trial run of an information system in which a computerized general model of a third world

social system would have specific information on some given culture plugged into it. It was described to prospective CAMELOT employees in this way:

Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are: First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; Second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and Finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things.

The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will be conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government. A large amount of primary data collection in the field is planned as well as the extensive utilization of already available data on social, economic and political functions. At this writing, it seems probable that the geographic orientation of the research will be toward Latin American countries. Present plans call for a field office in that region. (Horowitz, 1967, pp. 47-48)

Now, it happened that Project CAMELOT's cover got blown almost right away, and an international flap occurred over it. The United States Department of Defense was accused of a nefarious plot of entrapment on social scientists--hiring them to do unwitting

espionage. Since the objective of the social science investigations was to enable outside domination, in some measure, of people in a Third World society, and since the United States Department of Defense was organizing the enterprise, it was a fair enough charge. Like the factories in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam which went underground to escape the B-52s, the operations of Project CAMELOT were thereafter decentralized and camouflaged. This was enough to clean up appearances and enable continuation.

Chile 1973

In September 1973, the democratically elected president of Chile was killed and the government he headed was taken over by the fascist generals who are at this writing still in power. Tens of thousands of more people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded and terrorized. It was just another CIA-assisted coup, like many others in Latin America and other parts of the planet (Landis, 1975a and 1975b; North American Congress on Latin America, 1974). But this time--and it was not the only time--work done by social psychologists was poured directly into the hopper with bullets.

One piece of CAMELOT was relocated to Abt Associates of Cambridge, Massachusetts, the same Abt as in the

recruitment article in the September/October 1980 APA Monitor (Albin, 1980). Clark C. Abt, president of Abt Associates, had been a consultant to Project CAMELOT.* Under contract to the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency(ARPA), Abt employees constructed a simulation game fitting a paradigmatic Latin American country. Designed and first test-played during the last months of 1965, Abt's simulation game was called POLITICA. It was

a game which simulates the process of internal national conflict leading to democratic change, revolutionary change, or reaction. It has been designed to reproduce the role of the military and other factions in the politics and economic dynamics of a nation by structuring the roles of major national actors and groups, placing them in conflict or cooperation in a game environment and identifying from the resulting interaction the societal and human variables relevant to a study of incipient insurgency.

By sequential search of various patterns of variables under various initial conditions, the game is designed to highlight those variables decisive for the description, indication, prediction, and control of internal revolutionary conflict. (Gordon, Blaxall, Del Solar, Merrill, & Moore, 1965, p.1)

The substantive focus of POLITICA is political conflict of a type that may precede, accompany or follow insurgency or revolution. (Gordon

*See footnote, end of Chapter 5, page 338.

et al., 1965, p. 3)

What did social psychologists have to do with all this directly? Daniel Del Solar, one of the authors of the POLITICA game, promulgated some internal working papers of the sort he would have had in his filing cabinets. The following is a sample from a paper he himself helped prepare at Abt.

2.5 Social Variables and Personality Profiles
Social Variables for POLITICA

The actions of the players were studied by the developers in terms of the following social variables.

1. Social distance and mobility in group hierarchy, intra-group social class status (inferior, equal, superior).
2. Social cohesion of group (how much under what pressures).
3. Nature of binding force of a group; personalism (allegiance to a particular man), and/or ideological force.
4. Social control; nature of controlling force (through social hierarchy, or control of the 'name' of actions).
5. Social self-awareness as a definite group (group identity).
 Closed membership vs permeability or non-exclusiveness.
6. Social Organization; as measured by intra-group communication, role differentiation, division of labor, specialization.
7. Homogeneity/heterogeneity in terms of:
 - (a) Ideology
 - (b) Expectation from association
 - (c) Means of expression
8. Cohesiveness; tendency to remain in association.
9. Interest in Stability; degree of perceived 'disruption' necessary to motivate individuals and groups into action.

- Trade-off between desires and aspirations and actual structurally limited capabilities.
10. Principal social strengths (resources); importance to economic or political functioning.
 11. Concept of self-worth (aspiration-setting influenced).
 12. Group economic patterns of interests.
 13. Political-Economic goals; constrained by other values such as nationalism.
 14. Particularistic (degree of isolation of) political/economic position and goals (determines the degree of inter/intra group competition and dependency).
 15. Nationalism; primacy of national interests and needs, as perceived by the group; predisposition to react in specific ways to specific ideological and instrumental situations involving national interest/or need.
 16. Principal social weakness (inadequacies in the intra- and inter-group situation).
 17. Group attitude toward change (self-actualization needs, aspiration level); mobility, expectation.
 18. Group attitude toward equality; self-esteem needs of subjective equality and individual, non-group identity.
 19. Perception of need for standing alone or in coalition.
 20. Affiliation:
 - a. Primary (most frequently consulted) formal (stated, traditional) or informal interest partners.
 - b. Secondary formal and informal interest partners.
 21. Isolation: related to perception, communication, and particularistic political/economic position and goals; determines sensitivity to conflict-issues.
 22. Ability and tendency to interact in political process.
 23. Communications:
 - a. Principal sources of formal information
 - b. Principal sources of intelligence (informal or illegal)
 - c. Degree of integration in national communications net
 - d. Distortion in communications
 - e. Value ascribed to communications; low or high
 - f. Principal other group targets for expression of satisfaction-dissatisfaction

24. Group 'style', ways of doing things in terms of:
 - a. Violence/persuasion
 - b. Honor/opportunism
 - c. Unity/individualism
 - d. Caution/daring
 - e. Reliability/unreliability
 - f. Active/passive
25. Attitudes toward authority:
 - a. Tendency to act in authoritarian (unilateral, arbitrary, forceful) manner.
 - b. Tendency to react against authoritarian tactics
 - c. Tendency to react favorably to authoritarian tactics
 - d. Belief in utility of violence
 - e. Belief in utility of persuasion
26. Cultural values; only insofar as they are related to political process:
 - a. Tendency to and attitude toward betrayal of commitment or confidence
 - b. Trust in a particular institution such as the church or a particular political party
 - c. Propensity to define outsiders as hostile
 - d. Propensity to define outsiders as potentially cooperative
 - e. Propensity to consider human relations as exploitative, or mutually beneficial
 - f. Desire for dominance or expectation of subordination
 - g. Immediate gains essential or patience for the future
27. Language and dialects; may differ for some groups within a society
28. Religion and sects; political preferences and taboos
29. Concept of justice; related to style and values
30. No consensus on rules or conflict only within rules; (anti-systemic or system loyal)
31. Standard of living; Average, range, and trends of the group
32. Trend of ratio of real family income average to subsistence level expenditures
33. Average family size and solidarity
34. Literacy
35. Average highest educational level
36. Crime rate and three most common types of crime

37. Degree of acknowledgement of obligation to take an active role in the political system (low, medium, high)
38. Tendency to regard government and politics and unpredictable and threatening forces (degree of political alienation).
39. Degree of voluntary association membership (helps determine sensitivity and degree of involvement in the political system)
40. Oriented more as passive subjects (expecting a governmental output) or as participant citizens (making their own political input). Is political system viewed as exploitative or representative?

(Source: Gordon, et al., 1965, pp. 21-24)

Of all the human effort that goes into counterinsurgency strategy, social psychology's contribution is noticeable. Ordinary, everyday social psychology. Into the computer it goes, and where it lands somebody knows. It's not all that hard to grasp the systemic connections once the pattern has been shown. All it takes is practice.

Simulation games are worked up into higher and higher orders of sophistication through repeated playings, after each of which the usefulness of the variables used can be reassessed. New variables may be added, or existing ones redefined.

Personality Profiles

After game play, these variables were schematized on a matrix reflecting values for each of the variables and for every player in the game. Then the variables, essentially an output of the play of the first game, were translated into specific, jargon-free guidelines for action

which could be used as inputs in the second game. Each player in the second game could then be presented with an individualized personality profile which, in plain language, structured his role in accordance with the list of social variables. The personality profile also afforded the developers the opportunity to include additional input variables defining the initial state and possible dynamics of change--for example, sociological groupings, group cohesion, traditional attitudes, vocational patterns, dominant group attitudes, need affiliation, and social mobility. The profiles also included the player's voting and population strength; his initial loyalty; his objectives; his power units; and any additional information not presented in the scenario which could enrich his role. The profiles in effect constituted Micro-Scenarios. (Gordon et al., 1965, p. 24)

It can readily be seen that this type of policy-planning procedure rests on the entire enterprise of academic social science, not just on social psychology by a long shot. POLITICA was the simulation model used to decide Allende's death, according to former Abt employee Daniel Del Solar. Del Solar had worked on inventing the POLITICA model when he was at Abt:

POLITICA was used, perhaps in a more sophisticated version, to determine whether the situation in Chile would be 'stable' after a military take-over if Allende were still alive. It was determined by analysis based on POLITICA that Allende should not be allowed to live. This game plan was carried out by POLITICA planners and their counterparts in the Chilean army. Allende died. (Del Solar, 1973)

Impartial science at work. In El Salvador as of this writing, the gaming computers have spewed forth

material for the tactic of phoney land reform, which "has stolen the thunder from the left" (Helvarg, 1980, p.9), according to one of its academic managers. Clark Kerr, influential former president of Columbia University, is another, higher-level manager trying to quell insurgency early in El Salvador (Helvarg, 1980, p. 9). The social science component of contemporary weaponry is a multiple, independently targetable warhead. All at the same time, it points at Latin America, the Middle East, the inner city at home, and wherever else its masters want it to.

When CAMELOT got scuttled in the midst of its post-launching splash, many social scientists were misled into believing that the danger was over. Within the year, the military was assuring Congress that the project would live on:

Project CAMELOT represented only one facet of the overall behavioral and social science research program which is concerned with the problems of counterinsurgency and Communist-inspired violence in the developing nations of the world. The overall program will continue to be closely monitored and evaluated to insure that projects are responsive to the highest priority requirements and that maximum applicability of results is secured from the research. The resources formerly allocated for Camelot will be utilized to redesign research tasks which are concerned with the measurement of insurgency potential with a view toward determining in what ways the military assistance and allied programs can have increased effectiveness. The initial objective will be to develop a research plan that will specify those research tasks necessary to ultimately identify the parameters significant

in detecting social unrest which leads to Communist penetration of the society and potential Communist-inspired revolt in developing nations; to determine the significance and relationship between these parameters and possible military and other actions by indigenous government; and to highlight the possible implications for U.S. military assistance activities. (U.S. House of Representatives, 1966, pp. 32-33)

A dozen years later, the Pentagon was showing a New York Times reporter through the premises of SAGA, the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency, where computers use

war-gaming to study deeper questions of tactics and strategy. . . ./and/ players must hold four-star general or admiral rank, civilian Cabinet rank or an equivalent rank from outside the Government such as that of an influential university president. (Browne, 1978, p. A1)

At that time the Horn of Africa would perhaps have been the portion of the planet of interest. Tomorrow the Philippines, perhaps, or the South Bronx. The stockpile of social science data is well-tended and at the ready.

Conclusion

The evidence in this chapter has shown how an average piece of social psychology--indeed, of social science --can count on being systematically worked into U.S. foreign policy. No doubt further investigation would reveal links to population cool-out programs for the bombed-out portions of U.S. cities, to training of police for

urban insurrection duty, and to the global gaming of the Trilateral Commission. The integration took place over the years from about 1940 to the present. This chapter has shown the institutional steps through which it was accomplished during the second portion of that period, the golden age of counterinsurgency.

Perhaps the main practical question the evidence raises is whether there's any escape for a social psychologist or any other social science worker. Can a person profess a social science without increasing the already heavy burden of oppression on human beings? The answer is yes simply because there are those who do so. They are few indeed, however. The current work of Jim Dwyer, social psychologist at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, is an example of what's meant by social science in the service of our social class. Dwyer has linked up with a veterans organizing project in New York City called Citizen Soldier, the group which pioneered in documenting the effects of herbicides on U.S. soldiers in Viet Nam (Uhl & Ensign, 1980).* He is analyzing data

* During the war in Southeast Asia, the U.S. devastated huge sections of Viet Nam with chemicals that killed all vegetation. The plan was both to remove plant cover from enemy fighters and, in the South, to force farmers out of the countryside and into concentration camps where they could be watched. Large numbers of U.S. soldiers were sprayed or otherwise contaminated with the dioxin-containing chemicals Dioxin is both a carcinogen and a mutagen. It causes cancer in those exposed and it mutilates genes, causing a variety of congenital diseases in children of those exposed.

from questionnaires sent by Citizen Soldier to GIs who were in Viet Nam and has already testified before one Presidential Commission on his preliminary findings. If a causal connection can be shown between exposure to Agent Orange and diseases Viet Nam veterans disproportionately exhibit, then the U.S. government will perhaps be forced to concede culpability and therefore medical coverage for those of the victims who are U.S. nationals. Ronald Friend and Dana Bramel, social psychologists at the same institution are doing another kind of work which contributes to our side, although it addresses principally other social psychologists and students of social psychology productions, using minute internal analysis of the broad themes historically developed in social psychology to show whose side social psychology is on. Yet another social psychologist at that institution, Brett Silverstein, is researching attitudes toward ourselves as expressed in our personal use of food, on the basis of which he develops a discussion of everybody's victimization by capitalist agribusiness. He is writing a general-interest book on the subject. In all three examples, the social psychologists operate from their own understanding of overall societal structure and the role of their work in it. Every social psychologist (or

other social science worker) does that . What makes the difference is, first, the content of one's understanding of the world, and, second, one's imaginativeness about breaking out of the mold prescribed by business as usual in social science.

From the point of view of the analytic framework used throughout this study, the key point concerns the class ownership, and therefore the use, of our work. The essence of alienation is, after all, to have the product of one's work spirited away. It's a good deal more subtle for a social science worker than it is for a production line worker. A social science worker publishes in the literature of the field as if she or he is an individual vendor, an atom in the marketplace. The sense in which the work is owned and controlled elsewhere isn't obvious until viewed from the other side, from up down.

In my judgement, there is a way to hedge against the automatic cooptation of one's work. If that work proceeds out of needs that our side has rather than out of needs the coporations, the military, or the other agencies of governing have, then our work is not so likely to be appropriated by them, at least not right away. All manner of work is going on at the level of organizing, from prisons and weapons to day care and housing. The needs of such organizing efforts are among the needs that our side has.

Nor does this exhaust the possibilities. It is only meant to indicate a nourishing direction.

Footnote from page 326, Chapter 5:

* Camelot's 33 consultants were:

- Dr. Clark C. Abt, president, Abt Associates.
 Miss Kathleen Archibald, assistant research sociologist,
 University of California, Berkeley.
 Dr. Jessie Bernard, professor of sociology emeritus,
 Pennsylvania State University.
 Dr. Frank Bonilla, associate professor of political
 science, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
 Institute of Technology.
 Dr. Thomas E. Caywood, partner, Feat, Marwick, Caywood
 & Schiller.
 Dr. Ira Cisin, professor of sociology, George Washington
 University
 Dr. James S. Coleman, professor of sociology, Johns
 Hopkins University.
 Dr. Lewis Coser, professor of sociology, Brandeis University.
 Dr. Theodore Draper, research associate, Hoover Institute,
 Stanford University
 Dr. Harry Eckstein, professor of politics, Princeton
 University.
 Dr. S.N. Eisenstadt, professor of sociology, Hebrew Uni-
 versity.
 Dr. Frederick Frey, associate professor of political
 science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 Dr. William Ganson, associate professor of sociology,
 University of Michigan.
 Dr. Gino Germani, visiting professor of sociology,
 Columbia University.
 Dr. W.J. Goode, professor of sociology, Columbia University.
 Dr. Robert Hefner, associate professor of psychology, Uni-
 versity of Michigan,
 Dr. Arthur Hoehn, research scientist, HumRRo.
 Dr. Richard Jung, research associate, Department of
 Sociology, Cornell University.
 Dr. Samuel Klausner, senior research associate, Bureau
 of Social Science Research, Inc.
 Dr. William Kornhauser, associate professor of sociology,
 University of California, Berkeley.
 Dr. Sheldon Levy, assistant professor of psychology,
 University of Michigan.
 Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa, professor of sociology, University
 of Pittsburgh.
 Dr. Hugo Nutini, assistant professor of anthropology,
 University of Pittsburgh.

Footnote, continued:

-
- Dr. William Riker, professor of political science, University of Buffalo.
- Dr. R. J. Rummel, associate professor of political science, Yale University.
- Dr. Gilbert Shapiro, associate professor of sociology, Boston College.
- Dr. Thomas C. Schelling, professor of economics, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- Dr. David Schwartz, assistant professor of government, University of Pennsylvania.
- Dr. Neil Smelser, professor of sociology, University of California, Berkeley.
- Dr. Carl C. Taylor, USDA retired.
- Dr. William Taylor, analyst, Peat, Marwick, Caywood & Schiller.
- Dr. Gordon Tullock, professor of economics, University of Virginia.
- Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., the Rand Corp, senior scientist.
- (Source: U.S. House of Representatives, 1966, p. 62)

CONCLUSION

U.S. military strategy has shifted again. As of 1980, it is permissible to use nuclear warheads in "limited" warfare if deemed necessary. Furthermore, the United States has switched to targeting Soviet military installations rather than Soviet cities, going from retaliatory capability to first strike capability. The post-counter-insurgency era is the time of destabilization and the nuclear battlefield. Militarism is at the gallop in our society. While there's time, it might be worthwhile to ask the small question What has been happening in the organization of social psychology (or other social sciences) since the U.S. was defeated militarily in Viet Nam? For surely there's a story to tell in the answering. Perhaps the operation Desert Rock! psychologists have had some new life pumped into them.

This year, an article appeared in the New York Times headed "Pentagon Renews Ties with Colleges; Sharp Rise in Funds for Campus Research" (Reinhold, 1980, c 1). After some years of quiescence, the military-academic complex is cranking up again. War is coming again. According to an opposition U.S. newspaper, "Funding for Department

of Defense research projects on campuses has jumped more than 75% in the last five years" (Nadler, 1980).

As if this isn't bad enough, a few news stories have come out recently about Administration manipulations of the U.S. media which answer to the description of plain old domestic psywar. In one, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell said he learned from a book on the Office of Strategic Service's Normandy invasion psychological warfare plan "Overlord" how to mislead the press and the public about the planned hostage rescue attempt in Iran in the spring of 1980 (Weisman, 1980). In another, the White House was reported to have manipulated the news because the Administration wanted "to deflect public attention from the hostages" (Herbers, 1980) in Iran and take them off the public's mind. Direct placement of misleading "news" is routine "disinformation," routinely done. A more assiduous scanner of the news than I would turn up stories like these constantly, showing just the tippy tip of the iceberg. It seems that conditions today are enough similar to the recent past that even a small amount of digging should reveal more than one sequel to the CAMELOT story.

But are social psychologists (or other social scientists) interested in the connections between their work

and the military or any other form of oppressiveness or indeed, between their work and any parts of society? Not usually beyond the immediate, for by and large social scientists are like most of the rest of the population in their adherence to the underlying value system of the society they live and work in. They by and large don't even know the history of their own line of work, much less the history of the present crisis of the human species. And perhaps worst of all, they are by training usually of the opinion that their work doesn't affect people anywhere.

Distinguished scientist and historian of science John Desmond Bernal expressed the situation in one succinct paragraph:

The existence of classes and the exploitation of the poor by the rich have been for 4,000 years the most outstanding fact of social life. Yet in the 'science' of society far greater efforts have been made to pass it over or explain it away than to study it and work out the consequences of the fact itself. What social science needs is less use of elaborate techniques and more courage to tackle, rather than dodge, the central issues. But to demand that is to ignore the social reasons that have made social science what it is. To understand that we need first to look more deeply into its history. (Bernal, 1967, p. 1030)

That is the reason this study began with the beginning of social science. My hope was that by studying the social reasons that have made social science what it

is, it would be possible to establish a framework within which to engage in discourse about more recent social scientific activities. The recurring focus on social psychology was fortuitous. A similar argument could have been developed for any other constituent sub-field of social science, for "knowledge of society is never a passive dogma; it is always active either in preserving or in destroying a social system" (Bernal, 1967, p. 1025). Any part of social science is active either in preserving or in destroying this social system.

If this study encourages any of its readers to look to their own workplace (indeed, if this study has any readers beyond its review committee), it will have made a small contribution in the right direction. We as social science workers share with workers on the line in Detroit the fact of the alienation of our labor. Someone else takes it away and determines its use. Indeed, someone else determines in the first place to what end that labor should be expend. For supposed discoverers of reality to ignore that fact is to hopelessly distort what is "discovered," is to mindlessly keep step with the social scientific tradition "of not raising issues to which the system has no solutions" (Gorz, 1974, p.14)

So what if we don't look to our workplace and question our structural participation in the project of

strengthening the system of governing? Then we likely contribute our efforts to the side of injustice. But most of us don't see it that way.

Technical and scientific culture and competence. . . bear the mark of a social division of labor which denies to all workers, including the intellectual ones, the insight into the system's functioning and overall purposes, so as to keep decision-making divorced from productive work, conception divorced from execution, and responsibility for producing knowledge divorced from responsibility for the uses knowledge will be put to. (Gorz, 1972, p. 30)

We are as much or more mystified about what we do every day at work as the person on the line anywhere in a capitalist society. For many of us, the conceptual leap from ordinary, everyday social science work to the overall structures of governing is still too broad. Nevertheless, the connections are there; I didn't make them up. Perhaps it's what I make of them that's the bother. Luckily, I find I'm not the only one independently to arrive at the conclusions contained in this study, or I might think I was the crazy one. Among the best critiques that I've had the pleasure to look at recently include Martin Shaw's Marxism and Social Science: The Roots of Social Knowledge (1975), Robin Blackburn's reader Ideology in Social Science (1973), and Irvine, Miles, and Evans' collection of essays Demystifying Social Statistics (1979). If any reader's curiosity is

whetted enough to look at these books, she or he may wind up raising even more questions.

Does it matter if social science workers don't wake up and look at what they do? Things like that always matter; what each of us humans does matters. But if time is running out on us all as indeed it appears to be doing, then what social scientists do may not be material any longer after all. Be that as it may, we'll know in the future; for now, perhaps we could begin by letting the urgency sink in.

A P P E N D I X

- Appendix A: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES' OUTLINE
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ON JAPAN
- Appendix B: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES' OUTLINE
FOR NORMANDY INVASION PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE
- Appendix C: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES' GENERIC
COUNTRY OUTLINE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

APPENDIX A: Office of Strategic Services' Outline for
Psychological Warfare on Japan*

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* Source = Record Group 226 (OSS Research & Analysis Branch, Psychology Division). Report 55 (Index), Entry 10. National Archives & Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1942.

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APPENDIX B: Office of Strategic Services' Outline for Normandy Invasion Psychological Warfare*

P.W.E./O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN
FOR POLITICAL WARFARE(= U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)

I. TERMS OF REFERENCE

In accordance with the instructions received from COSSAC, P.W.E. and O.W.I., in appropriate consultation with S.O.E. and O.S.S., submit the following OUTLINE FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (= U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE) to prepare the way for OVERLORD and RANKIN and to assist whichever operation eventuates. For Political Warfare purposes the preparatory phase is common to OVERLORD and RANKIN, the only difference being timing.

II. APPRECIATION

1. Morale in Germany will be a "tougher nut to crack" than was the case in Italy where conditions were advantageous for Political Warfare operations. Nevertheless, morale in Germany has attained a brittle state which presents promising opportunities for Political Warfare. (e.g. The existence of six million foreign workers who have been pressed into forced labour in Germany and who form an indispensable but explosive part of the German war machine.)

* Source = Record Group 331 (Psychological Warfare, Division of Europe Military Command). Document C.C.S 545, "Combined Chiefs of Staff, Outline Plan for Political Warfare - 'Overlord', " 13 April, 1944. National Archives and Records Service, Wash., D.C.

2. While the Balkan Satellites lie outside the direct scope of the proposed operations, events in the Balkans can materially assist OVERLORD. There is an opportunity for Political Warfare to exploit several factors which might combine to bring about conditions in the Balkans which would seriously affect German morale as well as military dispositions. These factors include: the course of military events especially on the Russian front; the growing activities of patriotic forces in Yugoslavia and Greece; and the fact that the Satellites are now within range of Allied air power. These could be used to precipitate a crisis in the already vacillating Satellites.

3. The Occupied Peoples have been prepared and ripe for Allied military intervention for some time. Their expectations have been greatly heightened by recent events. This gives Political Warfare a three-fold responsibility in each Occupied Country: first that of furthering the still incomplete organization and coordination of the Resistance Movements; second that of checking premature outbursts; and third that of precipitating a crisis when desired, and if necessary on a European scale.

4. In all calculations, Political Warfare must take into consideration the extent to which conditions created by the fifth winter of the war favour morale operations in Germany and the Satellites, or militate against them in the Occupied Territories.

III. OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS

1. The impact of Fascism and four years of German domination have created a powerful ferment of political forces throughout Europe. These do not necessarily follow the pre-war political pattern, but the common trend is against the political and economic conditions which led to the progressive destruction of the rights of the individual.

Whereas the State uses Diplomacy directly to influence Governments, political personalities and dominant groups, it uses Political Warfare to exert direct and indirect influence upon the mass of the people; Political Warfare must therefore utilize the popular trends and emergent forces in Europe.

To render the maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN, Political Warfare must, at the proper time, exploit and canalise these political ferments existing behind the enemy lines. The timing of uprisings must be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. Whether he will be able to rely upon and direct the forces generated by these ferments depends upon the degree to which the Political Warfare agencies are able effectively to stimulate, organise and guide them.

Political Warfare agencies can only stimulate such forces effectively if the highest authorities give political support to these movements and sanction such stimulation.

2. The effectiveness of Political Warfare in connection with OVERLORD and RANKIN will also be qualified by the following factors:-

(i) Political. The extent to which Allied unity is maintained and to which the political aims of the United Nations are clearly defined and are accepted by the peoples of Europe.

(ii) Bombing. The extent to which morale considerations are taken into account in the implementation of bombing policy.

(iii) Deception. The extent to which morale factors are taken into consideration in the formulation of deception plans. (A deception plan based upon purely military considerations might prove to be a boomerang from a morale point of view, since it might create premature action before D-day or discredit authentic instructions at D-day.)

IV. AIMS In cooperation with the United Nations Armed Forces and all competent departments;

1. So to affect the will of the German People and of the German Armed Forces as to make them refuse to continue the war.

2. To cause the Satellites to abandon Germany in

circumstances which will assist OVERLORD.

3. To complete the process of enlisting, preparing and mobilising the Peoples of Occupied Countries for action within the framework of United Nations plans in such a way as to render maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN.

4. To create maximum goodwill towards, and identification with, the United Nations cause among the Peoples of Neutral Countries. (This, in British practice, is a Ministry of Information function.)

The objectives and themes supporting these aims are stated in Annex I. and cognate objectives coordinated with S.O.E./O.S.S. in Annex II.

The weekly directives of P.W.E. and O.W.I. are the machinery for current implementation.

The above aims are basically those pursued by the British and American authorities in the European theatre up to the present time. They will be brought to a climax by the contingencies contemplated. The extent to which they are achieved will be conditioned by the degree of political and military success attained by United Nations between now and D-day.

V. MEANS

A. Preliminary and Preparatory Phases. From a Political Warfare point of view these are identical except as regards tempo.

During these phases, P.W.E. and O.W.I. will:

1. Harness their regular media, e.g. radio broadcasts, leaflets, publications, rumours, etc. to the task of achieving the aims and objectives laid down in Annex I. by exploiting to the full the supporting themes listed therein.

2. Make the maximum use of covert radio and covert leaflets to the same effect.

3. Support the subversive and sabotage activities

which will be carried out by the duly authorised agencies in enemy and enemy occupied territories.

4. Assist, in consultation with the authorities concerned, and to the extent required, in implementation of bombing policy and deception plans.

5. Recruit and train personnel for front line and rear echelon Political Warfare.

6. Build up the necessary stocks of Political Warfare equipment and trained personnel for the countries to be liberated.

7. Assist the competent authorities in the preparation of proclamations, instructions, etc. for D-day.

. . .

O V E R L O R D
P.W.E./O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN
FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (=U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)

ANNEX I

PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES
FROM NOW UNTIL D-DAY

AIM ONE. SO TO AFFECT THE WILL OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES AS TO MAKE THEM REFUSE TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

OBJECTIVES:

(a) To make the German People and the Armed Forces recognise that their defeat is a present reality.

(b) To make the German people recognise that unconditional surrender is our irreducible demand and that

there is no possibility of splitting the United Nations on this or any other issue.

(c) To make the German People realise that all they can accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse for themselves, not only during but after the war, and that the consequences of unconditional surrender will be more bearable than the consequences of continuing the war.

(d) To dispel the fear of the German terror machine.

(e) To produce pressure for ending the war by arousing mass resentment among the Germans against their political and military leaders, and by appropriate stimulation of the foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Countries).

THEMES.

Supporting Objective

(a) To make the German People and the Armed Forces recognise that their defeat is a present reality/.

1. Germany has lost the initiative since November 1942.
2. Germany has lost the war in the air.
3. Germany has lost the war at sea.
4. Germany is losing the war on land.
5. Germany has lost the political war (e.g. Tripartite Collapse - United Nations solidarity).
6. Germany has lost the economic war (e.g. Production and Manpower).
7. German leaders realize that Germany has lost the war.

Supporting Objective

(b) To make the German People recognise that unconditional surrender is our irreducible demand and

that there is no possibility of splitting the United Nations on this or any other issue.

1. United Nations solidarity in the political field (e.g. recognition of the F.N.C.L., Mediterranean Commission, Three Power Conference).
2. United Nations co-operation in the economic field (e.g. Lease-Lend).
3. United Nations unity in the field of military strategy.
4. United Nations community of interests in post-war planning (e.g. Atlantic Charter, U.N.R.R.A., etc.)

Supporting Objective

(c) To make the German People realise that all they can accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse for themselves, not only during, but after the war, and that the consequences of unconditional surrender will be more bearable than the consequences of continuing the war.

1. United Nations strength makes a successful defensive war impossible for Germany.
2. The longer the war, the greater the human suffering and material destruction. The greater the destruction of German industry (e.g. by bombing), the greater the difficulty of reconstruction.
3. The longer the war, the more difficult it will be for Germany to be reconstituted as an accepted member of the family of nations.
4. The longer the Germans continue the war and their oppression of the Occupied Peoples, the longer will they postpone relief for themselves. Our first responsibility is to our Allies, particularly to those who have been plundered, starved and enslaved by the Nazi regime.
5. The example of Sicily and Italy and the activities of the Mediterranean Commission upon which Russia is represented.

6. United Nations' leaders assurances that they will not be party to mass reprisals but will insist upon stern punishment of the guilty.

7. Evidence of good treatment from prisoners of war.

8. The traditional just treatment of a beaten enemy by Anglo-Saxon peoples.

9. It is in the interests of the United Nations that Germany, stripped of Nazism and traditional militarism, be reconstituted as a member of the family of nations and share peacefully in the prosperity of the post-war world.

10. Unconditional surrender means that never in the lifetime of any living German will a German boy go off to war again.

Supporting Objective

(d) To dispel the fear of the German terror machine.

1. The terror machine is being weakened by casualties, dispersal, and doubts as to its own powers and effectiveness.

2. The terror machine can function only so long as it is accepted by the German people.

3. The increasing brutality of the terror machine is evidence of its anxiety and weakness.

4. Examples of successful resistance to the terror machine by the peoples of Occupied Countries.

Supporting Objective

(e) To produce pressure for ending the war by arousing mass resentment among the Germans against their political and military leaders, and by appropriate stimulation of the foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Countries).

1. The German leadership was guilty of leading the German people into a war of aggression.

2. The military, political and economic blunders of the German leadership.
3. The German leadership destroyed the best values of German civilization.
4. The German leadership has feathered its own nest at the expense of the people and of the national interest.
5. The German leadership is prolonging the war solely to save its own skin.

AIM TWO. TO CAUSE THE SATELLITES TO ABANDON GERMANY.

OBJECTIVES:-

- (a) To convince the Satellites that Germany's defeat is a present reality.
- (b) To convince the Satellites that the consequences of sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse than the consequences of a prompt surrender to the United Nations, and that there is no third course open to them.
- (c) To make the Satellites conscious that they are already within the reach of United Nations military power.
- (d) To convince the Satellites that Germany will not and cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegrounds for the defence of Germany. (N.B. This does not apply to Finland).
- (e) To show Germany's decreasing power to enforce her will upon the Satellites.
- (f) To cause the peoples of the Satellite Countries to sabotage the German war effort, bring pressure upon their Governments to get out of the war, or overthrow their Governments if they resist such pressure. (N.B. The timing of this will vary for each country).
- (g) To dispel both the Bolshevik Bogy and the fear of Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. imperialism by demonstrating Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. community of interests and adherence to the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter.

(h) To dispel hopes of splitting the United Nations on the settlement of Eastern Europe.

THEMES:-

Supporting Objectives

(a) To convince the Satellites that Germany's defeat is a present reality.

Same as themes supporting Objective (a) of Aim One.

Supporting Objective

(b) To convince the Satellites that the consequences of sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse than the consequences of a prompt surrender to the United Nations, and that there is no third course open to them.

1. The longer they stick with Germany, the greater their human suffering and material destruction.

2. The longer they stick with Germany, the longer will they be exploited and impoverished for Germany's benefit.

3. The longer they stick with Germany, the longer will they postpone their own relief and rehabilitation.

4. The sooner they surrender, the sooner will their countries be reconstituted as accepted members of the family of nations.

Supporting Objective

(c) To make the Satellites conscious that they are already within the reach of United Nations military power.

1. Ploesti and similar examples as available.

2. The growing strength of patriot forces of the United Nations close to the frontiers.

Supporting Objective

(d) To convince the Satellites that Germany will not and cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegrounds for the defence of Germany. (N.B. This does not apply to Finland).

1. The example of Italy, because it allowed the Germans to disperse Italian forces outside Italy and failed to organise national resistance to the Germans in time.

2. The probability that, if they stick with Germany, their peoples will be sacrificed as were their troops on the Russian battlefield.

Supporting Objective

(e) To show Germany's decreasing power to enforce her will upon the Satellites.

1. Same as themes supporting Objective (a)

2. The decrease of Germany's armed strength makes her both less able to back her demands by force and more dependent upon the Satellites.

3. Examples of Germany's failure to enforce her full demands upon Satellite or even upon Occupied Countries.

Supporting Objective

(f) To cause the peoples of the Satellite Countries to sabotage the German war effort, bring pressure upon their Governments to get out of the war or overthrow their Governments if they resist such pressure. (N.B. The timing of this will vary for each country).

1. Campaigns to encourage sabotage of transport, withholding of manpower, hoarding of crops, etc.

2. Promotion of dissension and explicit or implicit stimulation of all democratic groups.

3. The Satellite Governments are continuing in Germany's war at the expense of their peoples either to serve their own interests or because they lack skill and courage to reverse their course.

4. The Satellites must "work their passage home." They will be judged by their actions and by the degree to which they help to shorten the war.

5. Mutatis Mutandis, same as themes supporting Objective (d) of Aim One.

Supporting Objectives

(g) To dispel both the Bolshevik Bogy and the fear of Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. imperialism by demonstrating Anglo/U.S.A./Soviet community of interests and adherence to the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter, and

(h) To dispel hopes of splitting the United Nations on the settlement of Eastern Europe,

Same as themes 1, 2, 3 and 4 supporting Objective (b) of Aim One.

AIM THREE. TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF ENLISTING, PREPARING AND MOBILISING THE PEOPLES OF THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN WORKERS IN ENEMY TERRITORY, FOR ACTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UNITED NATIONS PLANS.

OBJECTIVES.

(a) To sustain morale.

(b) To maintain discipline and, while combating "attentisme" to avoid premature overt action.

(c) To ensure disciplined co-operation of the whole people in all degrees from passive to para-military in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations.

(d) To stimulate the peoples of the Occupied Countries to prepare themselves for future voluntary co-operation as independent members of the family of nations.

THEMES:

Supporting Objective

(a) [To sustan morale.]

1. The United Nations are winning the war. (Militarily, politically and economically).

2. The peoples of the Occupied Countries are in the forefront of the armies of liberation of which the foreign workers are the advance guard.

3. The Occupied Nations through their armed forces and resources outside Occupied Territory are already making a major contribution towards winning the war.

4. Each Occupied Nation will deal with its own quislings and collaborationists.

5. This is the last winter before liberation.

6. We are aware that future leadership is already being created within the Occupied Countries.

N.B. Policy towards Governments in exile and recognised authorities cannot be defined in an overall plan but will be dealt with in regional plans.

Supporting Objective:

(b) [To maintain discipline and, while combating "attentisme," to avoid premature overt action.]

1. The effective work done by organised resistance movements (Cross-reporting to the Occupied Countries).

2. The German plan is to break up the

resistance movements by provoking them to expose themselves by premature overt action.

3. The Occupied Peoples, as part of the army of liberation, will receive unmistakable instructions at the proper time (Avis, etc.)

Supporting Objective

(c) To ensure disciplined co-operation of the whole people in all degrees from passive to para-military in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations.

1. Stimulation of undetectable sabotage against transport and communications.
2. Stimulation of the withholding of food from the Germans.
3. Stimulation of administrative sabotage.
4. Stimulation of evasion of labour conscription and slow-down of forced labour.
5. Support of para-military activity by patriot groups where consistent with United Nations plans.
6. Demoralisation of German troops.

Supporting Objective:

(d) To stimulate the peoples of the Occupied Countries to prepare themselves for future voluntary co-operation as independent members of the family of nations.

1. Reaffirmation of United Nations determination that each people shall freely choose its own ultimate form of government, provided it is not a fascist form or a tyranny which might endanger peace.
2. We are aware that future leadership is already being created within the Occupied Countries.

3. We share and support the common hopes and aspirations of the people of the Occupied Countries.

4. Recognition that the sufferings and experiences of the Occupied Peoples have given them not only the right but the competence to make an important contribution to the reorientation of the post-war world.

5. Full explanation, with particular applicability to each country, of United Nations plans for relief and rehabilitation.

6. The United Nations will insist upon the restoration of all property looted or stolen from the Occupied Countries by whatever means.

AIM FOUR: TO CREATE THE MAXIMUM GOODWILL TOWARDS AND IDENTIFICATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CAUSE AMONG THE PEOPLES OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. (N.B. This in British practice is a Ministry of Information Function.)

OBJECTIVES:

(a) To ensure resistance to eventual enemy aggression.

(b) To ensure continued neutrality where it is in the interests of the United Nations military policy.

(c) To create an atmosphere favourable to such neutral countries entering the war on our side as the United Nations High Command wish to have do so.

THEMES:

Supporting all three Objectives:

1. The continued existence of the neutrals as free and independent nations depends upon a United Nations victory. So does their continued

enjoyment of the four freedoms.

2. The sooner the war ends in a United Nations victory, the better for the peoples of the neutral countries.

3. Eventual United Nations victory is certain but it can be accelerated by the attitude and conduct of the neutrals.

4. The post-war attitude of the United Nations towards the present neutrals will largely depend upon the conduct and attitude of the neutrals between now and the end of the war.

5. Theme 1, supporting Objective (d) under Aim Three.

Supporting Objective

(b) To ensure continued neutrality where it is in the interests of the United Nations military policy.

1. German defeat is a present reality. (All seven themes supporting Objective (a) under Aim One.)

5th October 1943.

APPENDIX C: Office of Strategic Services' Generic
Country Outline for Psychological
Warfare*

Working Outline - Main Headings

- I. Adaptation to the natural environment.
- A. The forms of economic enterprise
 - 1. Primary (dealing directly with natural things in their environment)
 - 2. Secondary (carrying, processing, and otherwise dealing with things out of their natural environment)
 - 3. The minds of people in each form of economic enterprise
- II. The social organization.
- A. Territorial dimension
 - 1. The local community
 - 2. The intermediate community
 - 3. The national community
 - B. Social differentiation of the non-rank type
 - 1. Sex, age, sex and age groups
 - 2. Family and extended kinship groups
 - 3. Associations - formal and informal
 - C. Rank, forms of (social stratification)
 - D. Ethnic differentiation
 - E. Church or churches
 - F. The government
 - 1. Formal arrangements

* Source = Record Group 59 (OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Psychology Division). Document R&A 824 "Social and Psychological Analysis of a Nation: A Working Outline," January 2, 1942, pp. 7-30.

2. The government as a functioning system

III. Ideologies.

- A. "Religious ideologies"
- B. "Nationalistic ideologies"
- C. "Moral ideologies"
 1. "The ideal person" type
 2. "Community well-being" type

IV. Recent Social Change.

- A. General trends
- B. Disfunctional aspects of recent changes

V. Leaders and leadership.

- A. Leadership in the organizational sense
- B. Particular individual leaders and aspirants

VI. The individual in his society.Working Outline - Development and DiscussionI. Adaptation to the natural environment

- A. The forms of economic enterprise
What kinds of economic enterprise are there in the nation in question?

Where are these kinds? Does their distribution make for any clear-cut local areas? If so, what are these local areas? For instance, what types of local communities are organized around a specific enterprise such as a mine, or around a typical combination of enterprises such as market town and grain-dairy-subsistence types of farms?

How are these local areas inter-related? How are these forms of economic enterprise inter-related?

What is the relative importance of Primary

and Secondary forms of enterprise?

1. Primary forms of enterprise (those in which people act directly on or with the raw materials or living things, or both, in the natural environment):
 - (a) Agriculture (by product and organization of production)
 - (b) Extractive industries (by product, etc.)
 - (c) Pastoral enterprises (by product, etc., e.g., cattle-raising, sheep-herding)
 - (d) Forest enterprises (by product, etc., e.g., cutting and preliminary preparation of forest products for secondary processing)
 - (e) Fishing (by product, etc., e.g., river salmon; deep-sea fish; oyster cultivation)
 - (f) Hunting and trapping

2. Secondary forms of enterprise (those in which people act on or with things previously taken out of the natural environment):
 - (a) Trade
 - (b) Transport
 - (c) Manufacturing and processing
 - (d) Communications (as enterprises)
 - (e) Finance and banking (all credit enterprises)
 - (f) Service enterprises (e.g., laundries, barber shops, filling stations)

Note: In describing these enterprises, use and define the local names of each and supply an organization chart for each, supplemented with explanation of kinds of work, groupings in work situations, forms of compensation -- cash versus commissary credit, share-cropping versus day labor, piece work versus hourly rate, etc. How are labor forces recruited and controlled? How does the smallest producing unit work, how is it connected with similar and larger units, how is the product channeled into consumption, what are the types of markets?

B. The kinds of people in each form of economic enterprise

In terms of getting a living out of these economic enterprises, what kinds of people are there in the nation, where are they to be found, and how are they to be recognized?

Characterize the kinds of people in native or local terms wherever possible; indicate their participation in each enterprise and what it means in local terms with respect to income, living conditions, reputation or social evaluation; where, if at all, they are concentrated; how they are "tagged" locally -- so that under category II, below, we shall be able to recognize them again as "small farmer," "big cattle-worker," "machinist," "farm laborer," "rug weaver," "rich peasant," "shop keeper," etc. We are especially interested, of course, in the major kinds of people locally distinguished in such terms, i.e., large groups in terms of which the natives themselves think. We are also interested in kinds of people of whom there may be very few, e.g., the itinerant barbers in a given country may be very important as bearers of news and gossip throughout the back country; journalists may be rare but of considerable importance.

II. The social organization.

Summary

- A. Territorial dimension
- B. Social differentiation of the non-rank type
- C. Forms of rank (social stratification)
- D. Ethnic differentiation
- E. Church or churches
- F. Government

A. The social organization in the territorial Dimension

Note: The following presupposes the availability of demographic and geographic descriptions of the nation, including maps and census data showing locations of larger and smaller communities, density of population by regions, routes of travel, units of political administration and other kinds of districts by which the people are differentiated and organized.

1. The local community

- (a) What kinds of local communities are there -- with respect to size, concentration and character of settlement -- how many are there of each, and where are they located? (e.g., metropolitan cities, market towns, agricultural villages, seaports, river towns, mill towns, mining camps)
- (b) What ecological parts of the local community, if any, are important units in the people's lives? (e.g., the buraku or "hamlet" in Japan)

Note: Maps or sketch-maps of typical arrangements of streets, houses, mansions and slums, stores, factories, etc., in the local community should be supplied. The "lay-out" of the local community is likely to express arrangements of the people into castes or classes, for example, and it may in some cases be a concrete representation of some widely-held view of the world.

2. The intermediate community

- (a) What unit district comprising several local communities is

locally recognized and is also the most strategic unit for a typological analysis of constellations of local communities important to communication and control?

- (b) What are the types of intermediate communities; how many of each type are there; how many people live in them; and how important are they to the life of the nation in other respects?

Note: The criteria for selecting such a unit include (a) that the inhabitants usually feel they "belong" there, (b) that it includes several local communities having various functions but usually sharing in the local social and economic way of life, (c) that its size in relation to local means of travel and communication is such that at least some of the people in each part rather frequently see and know about some of the people in every other part, and (d) that it is a good unit for the analysis of demographic and economic data because it is actually used as an administrative unit and as a unit for the national census, if any.

For example, the counties of the United States can be stratified into types according to their major economic enterprises and the relative complexity of their local social organization. They can then be arranged according to their spatial and functional relations with larger and smaller centers for trade, transport, credit facilities and cultural influence. These relations of local communities (in counties) can then be organized into constellations around "key cities" or "gateway cities," and one can then trace the

interconnections most important for any or all phases of communication and control. Similarly, in Turkey, one might select the Turkish "county," provided it meets the criteria mentioned above.

3. The national community

Given the local and intermediate communities of the several types, what are the "key cities" and what are the channels and forms of communication, influence and control by which the sub-national communities are inter-related not only spatially but functionally? What types of communities in the nation are less well-integrated into the national system? (e.g., wild tribes, illiterate and isolated communities of hill dwellers or peasants)

Note: In the foregoing the order of generalization is 1, 2, 3 -- the latter being a systematic summation of 1 and 2. In actual research operations the analysis for 1 and 2 would depend a great deal upon other information called for under other categories of the outline. That is, one could use the whole outline on a particular community, and then extend it to other communities representative of all the important types, and such analyses would be the bases for the larger generalizations regarding the functional inter-relations of all the parts of the nation. Consequently, the first questions to be answered regarding "The social organization in the territorial dimension" -- IIA in the outline -- are concerned primarily with identifying, by name, location, size of population, and general characteristics, the significant spatial units in which the people live.

B. Social differentiation of the non-rank type

Note: Answers to the following questions, as well as to questions throughout the outline, should refer explicitly to particular communities, to types of communities, or to groupings throughout the whole nation, whichever may be the case.

1. Sex, age, sex and age groupings

- (a) What is the general position of women -- what are the reciprocal rights, duties, privileges, and obligations of a woman in her relationship with others? (Especially with men, with women, with children)
- (b) What is the general position of men -- what are the reciprocal rights, duties, etc. (same type of question as for women)
- (c) What is the general position of each of such age groups as are locally distinguished?

Note: For example, in our society we sometimes recognize seven age-grades: infants, children, adolescents, young adults or youth, adults, middle-aged people, old people. Other societies may recognize fewer age-grades, or even finer divisions, and some societies have fewer subdivisions among the sub-adults but more among adults. Our system, for example, may be a system of our cultural "accent on youth."

- (d) What are the significant inter-relations of sex and age? What is the behavior of and toward people in each of the specific combinations of sex and age that are

locally recognized, e.g., young man, old woman, infant girl, adult married man, etc.?

Note: Part of the whole problem of age-grades are the social processes by which new generations are trained. Here we are concerned, therefore, with the social structures involved in formal and informal education, that is, the whole social context in which psychological and social personality formations are effected, the groups involved and their significant inter-relations. But the study of educational processes is more effectively treated under category VI, where we are interested in how, psychologically speaking, the social system is internalized in the individuals of successive generations.

2. The family and extended kinship system

(a) The elementary family:

- (1) What are the household units and who are in them?
- (2) What is the general relation between parents and children?
- (3) What are the primary relations within the family as revealed by behavior in each of the reciprocal relations present?
(e.g., Father - Son)-especially
Mother - Son) in war-time
Father - Daughter
Mother - Daughter
Brother- Brother
Brother- Sister
Sister - Sister
Brother- Adopted Sib)where
Sister - Adopted sib)ad-
option is
common and
important

Note: Local kinship terms and even colloquial phrases sometimes express the nature of certain kinship relations the patterns of which are sometimes extended--by association--to other relations outside the family. In our society, for instance, a well-liked "boss" may be referred to as "The Old Man." In Turkey Mustapha Kemal was popularly called Ataturk or "Father of the Turks," a phrase having considerable emotive power among the people, evidently.

- (4) What is the general behavior of the family as a family in the local community?

(b) The extended kinship system

- (1) What are the significant reciprocal relations in extended kinship groupings? e.g., Nephew - Uncle (Mother's Brother - Sister's Son; or Father's Brother - Brother's Son). This is important in our society and is extended to the larger society as well as a symbol of national solidarity -- "Uncle Sam." Also - it is usual to find strong solidarity between alternate generations (Grandson - Grandfather) and antagonism between sequential generations (Son - Father).
- (2) Does the extended kinship group act as a corporate unit? Under what circumstances? What are the rights, duties, obligations, and privileges involved?

3. Associations

Note: Here we are especially interested in the structures, functions, and inter-relations of groups in which opinions about public affairs are formed, often according to standards of judgment shared in common by the participants and arising out of their interaction in such groups. This involves not simply each association by itself but also the interconnections among the several associations, if any, such as are effected by communication, inter-locking memberships, and other inter-group bonds and antagonisms.

(a) Formal types

What are the organized groups that have names, and formal rules governing entrance, membership, and exit? What kinds of people are in each? What are their activities? What are their manifest purposes or aims? What are their actual functions? What is the reputation of each? With what other groups is it affiliated or connected and to what other groups is it opposed?

(b) Informal Types

What are the significant kinds of informal activity groups--cliques, recreation groups, neighborhood aggregates, coffee-houses or tavern groups? That is, what are the groups significant to the formation of individual opinions about public affairs that do not have names, formal regulations regarding membership, officers, dues, or other trappings of a club or association? What is

the place, occasion, and behavior which characterizes each of these kinds of groups? e.g. in our society, "The Monday After Quarterbacks"; the "drug-store cowboys"; the group around the stove in the general store; a group of business men who have lunch together; "Cafe Society"; hunting, fishing, golfing or other cliques of men; bridge cliques among women, etc.

C. Forms of rank (social stratification)

Note: This category refers especially to those forms of rank by which all the people of a given society are arranged in social strata which share unequally in the locally available rewards, privileges, rights, duties and obligations. (The phrase, "all the people of a given society," is included to specify total community arrangements and to rule out of consideration here the internal structure of a factory, let us say, or the hierarchy in a formal association, a church, or in the Army. These distinct structures are treated elsewhere in this outline; as a matter of fact, it appears that in a modern society the hierarchical divisions within all these separate structures tend to be integrated into more general systems of stratification).

Class and caste are the two most common types of social stratification. In a caste arrangement, the members of one caste cannot move out of their caste into any other, nor is marriage between members of different castes approved. In a class system, however, vertical mobility and marriages "up" and "down" are permitted, and in an open class system

such as ours in America there is a great deal of such movement. It is possible for a class system to lose this condition of being "open" and to approach a caste or caste-like arrangement. Consequently this distinction between "open" class system and "closed" caste system is a distinction between polar antitheses, and in the case of any specific nation or society one must make some comparisons with other societies in order to place the local arrangements somewhere in the range between these antithetical types of social stratification.

While class and caste systems are widespread, there may be other forms of rank order in some of the nations of the world, and this category should be kept open to receive them in the framework of this analysis. It is possible, for example, that we may find a social stratum marked out by a single religious, ethnic, occupational or socio-economic trait or by a certain combination of such traits. Further, it may be that all the individuals in that stratum are restrained and feel constrained to restrict their marriages and most of their social intercourse to themselves. Such a stratum may not be a caste, however, because there may be socially prescribed ways for an individual member to change his identification with the group and its symbols and to move out of it into some other part of the larger society. (Some minority groups are like this in that they are not castes nor are they at present integrated into the class system of the larger society).

Regarding the specific strata found in a given country we need to answer such questions as the following:

1. Who belong to each stratum; how many individuals; where do they live and work; how are they to be recognized (especially by such symbols of rank as dress, speech, manners, eating habits, income)?
2. What is each stratum like in terms of its "station in life" (the privileges, rights, duties, and obligations of this position) and what is it like in terms of its "way of life," its behavior with respect to food, shelter, clothing, education? What physical and other satisfactions and spiritual values are important to its members?
3. If the stratum is formally recognized, how is it organized?
4. What are the various kinds of social mobility up and down? What restrictions on vertical mobility are there?
5. How do the individual members of each stratum think and act under various specific circumstances, especially community crises? Under what circumstances do they not get together; what, especially, do they do in crises -- as in war-time?
6. How and when do the several different strata combine; how and when do all or almost all the people of different positions in the community act in close collaboration? What prevents open conflict between the people of different strata; what, if anything, precipitates such conflict?

D. Ethnic differentiation

Note: Here we are concerned with locally recognized distinctions between the various ethnic groups in a population, and with the distribution of the members of each ethnic aggregate in whatever rank order may be present.

An ethnic group may compose a caste or caste-like stratum, in which case it should be treated under the preceding section (II, C). The members of an ethnic aggregate may, however, be scattered through several strata and in each stratum they may share in many respects the status of the other people in that stratum. In these terms the Jews in Germany, for example, were formerly to be found in several different social classes, and the aim of the Nazis has been to force them into a completely subordinate caste.

This section therefore has to do with ethnic aggregates that are not organized into distinct strata in a total community rank order, and with social distinctions related to ethnic differentiation which are made by people within the framework of their social stratification.

1. What is the composition of each ethnic group with respect to numbers and kind of people identifiable by language, religion, nationality, "race" or however their traits are thought of locally?
2. What is the degree of and kind of organization of each ethnic group; what is its internal structure; is it formally or informally organized?
3. What are the relations of each ethnic group with the rest of society; what are the attitudes and what is the behavior in these relations; are they

friendly or hostile; what are the bases for these attitudes?

4. What ties the two (or more) ethnic groups together; on what do they see eye to eye; on what bases do they collaborate; what resolves their antagonisms and maintains their relationships?
5. Does a given ethnic group have any relations or affiliations with an analogous group in any other nation? If so, what is the nature of the relation or affiliation; is it formally recognized and organized; if not, how is it maintained?

E. Church (or churches)

1. Is there one church or many churches? Is there an "official" church (state-affiliated)? Is membership obligatory or not obligatory?
2. What is the size and social composition of the membership of each church? What is the primary unit (e.g., congregation) in each church; how many are there and where are they located?
3. What is the internal organization of each church?
 - (a) officers, hierarchy
 - (b) how does the structure of the church operate as a functioning system?
4. What are the relations of the church to the rest of the community?
5. What are considered to be the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, etc. of the members? (considered by themselves? by others?)
6. How important is the church in the lives of the various kinds of people, by sex-age

combinations especially? (e.g., in some parts of our society the church is considered to be "for the women and children").

7. Where is power located in the church -- inside? outside? (power especially in relation to national policy).

F. The government

1. What are the formal, legal and customary arrangements in the governmental structure?
2. How does the government work as a functioning system? What is the real locus, range, and functions of power? That is, as distinct from the ideal and legal arrangements, what are the actual workings of the political system?

The answers to this would include discussion of the following:

- (a) political parties
 - (1) the formal organization of each (open or secret, etc.)
 - (2) the social nature of their membership (age-sex groups; religious, ethnic, income, occupational, and other traits of the members; regional strengths and weaknesses; etc.)
- (b) pressure groups and their activities, organization and membership; e.g., an "official caste"
- (c) corruption and who corrupts whom (especially the habitual or traditional patterns)

Note: Organization charts are especially needed here. Governmental systems-- legal and actual--vary to a great degree, of course, so it is not possible in this brief outline to provide detailed questions to cover all kinds.

The general procedure suggested here is to examine the formal arrangements as distinct from the actual functioning of government and political power. The analysis should be carried far enough to provide a significant framework for the analysis of related phenomena under categories III and IV (e.g., ideological movements and their recent effects) and under category V where leadership and leaders, the actual personalities, are treated in detail.

III. Ideologies.

Note: The term "ideologies" as used here is intended to cover symbolic systems, -isms, systems of social values or basic beliefs, ideals, ethical and moral codes, the important, inter-related ideas in a folk lore (where a folk culture is properly distinguished), or social logics insofar as any one of these is important to specific social aggregates and their inter-relations, particularly those shown in preceding sections to be vital parts of the social structure. The latter might include the elementary family, a certain social stratum, a governmental organ such as the army, and a certain church.

To some extent the ideology of a given social aggregate will already have been described under category II or I. Here, however, we want to pull together these various ideologies for the purpose of comparing and contrasting them (for their comprehensiveness, universal appeal, or limitations, their strengths and weaknesses, etc.) and especially to see their inter-connections and conflicts, not only at this symbolic level but in the usual interaction of the various social groups and structures involved. It should be kept in mind that in categories I, II, and III we are dealing with the social system

"as of now" so that in some instances we shall deal with recent ideological movements, interactions and other changes under category IV (Recent Social Change).

In a stable, homogeneous, usually simple society one may find a completely integrated and solely dominant symbolic system, a set of "absolute logics." In a modern differentiated, complex society, the situation at the symbolic level is likely to present "competing logics." For example, in our society in 1940, the Roosevelt logic of the New Deal, competed successfully with the Willkie logic of the American Way.

In the outline below, "religious ideologies," "nationalistic ideologies," and "moral ideologies" are distinguished, but only in order to suggest some major varieties. It is understood that such distinctions would not hold everywhere. In Japan, for instance, there has apparently been a synthesis of religious, political, moral, "economic" and all other beliefs into Nippon Kokutai. Nor would it be expected that a single unified system of "absolute logics" would be solely dominant in a modern complex society, though such a state of affairs may occur in war time. Indeed, there may be a traditional pattern for the achievement of what might be called "total collaboration" in war time, and if so, the war logics may be a permanent, though periodically latent, part of the social system, and they may even be interwoven with the religious ideology.

A. "Religious ideologies"

Is there a single Church ideology that includes the whole community, or are there two or more in conflict? Is a given Church ideology opposed to any other ideology, e.g., a political one? What happens to those who violate the given ideology; what happens to the sacrilegious, the dissenters?

B. "Nationalistic ideologies"

What is the ideology expressing and sanctioning phases of national solidarity? There may be two sets of phases: (1) those connected with internal loyalty, (2) those connected with opposition to other national solidarities. For each, distinguish between the formal, diplomatic, or platform ideology, and the frequently important popular, traditional, oral, or informal ideology.

C. "Moral ideologies"

1. The "ideal person" type.
In each social aggregate, what is the good man? What is the good woman? Contrast ideal behavior with actually acceptable behavior, and both in turn with what behavior is punished, and how. Do this for each social grouping distinguished in categories I and II, especially community, neighborhood, family and kinship groups, associations, etc., in fact, all but the "religious" and "nationalistic" aggregates.
2. The "community well-being" type.
What are the beliefs among specific social aggregates about acts or events that (a) lead them, under the specified circumstances, to punitive collective action, or (b) lead to disphoria, feelings of ill-being, low morale, distress, feelings that things are going wrong, feelings of distrust among the people in their relations with each other, with their gods, with their government and leaders? (e.g., in Japan: in the event of an earthquake, the people hold a belief that this is due to the sacrilegious act of somebody who has deceived or misled the Emperor).

Note: Each ideology should be described in terms of the social group involved, the events or acts and behavioral responses connected with it; the forms of representation, such as

phrases, slogans, gestures, key words, appropriate idioms, and all other kinds of graphic and audible signs (including music, for example); and how and when they are properly used.

IV. Recent social change

A. General trends

In the foregoing categories (I, II, and III) we have dealt with the society "as of now," as a going concern, a natural persistent system of things that do not change, or at least, things that change only slowly. In this category we are especially concerned with real changes in the most relevant recent times. Many of these are probably subsumed under two kinds of changes:

- (1) sumbergency of autonomous local communities in larger territorial units of adaptation and control;
- (2) "acculturation" -- usually "Westernization" or the process of more complete integration into modern civilization, in the "Steel and Electrical Age."

B. Disfunctional effects of recent changes

For the purposes for which we are studying these societies, we are less interested in the finer details of the social processes indicated under "General trends" above, than we are in the questions below.

1. What kinds of dislocations have occurred and are occurring?

Note: The analysis of a social system in terms of categories I, II, and III quite properly stresses the functional, integrative aspects of the life of the people. Here we want to single out the disfunctional aspects, the breakdowns

or dislocations in customary forms of behavior with respect to:

- (a) the country's adaptation to the natural environment, such as the destruction of silk industries in Syria due to the rise of Rayon manufacturing elsewhere;
 - (b) the social organization, such as a recent shift from the bases which support the producing unit type of family, which shift may not only disintegrate traditional family structure but may extend to moral codes and weaken the power of an older ideology regarding national solidarity; and
 - (c) the ideologies, such as increasing awareness of the existence of alternative ideologies due to a decrease of illiteracy, which in turn was due to compulsory education promoted for other purposes but which may at the symbolic level produce conflicts with the traditional ideology.
2. With respect to a given change or dislocation, what kinds of people approve? What kinds disapprove?

Note: This question may also be stated as follows: What is the range of positions adopted by the various kinds of people with respect to this change?

"Position" in this sense refers to a more or less coherent or consistent logical arrangement of the specific attitudes considered

appropriate by the natives who adopt it. We should expect to find not only "positions" adopted formally by particular action groups or organizations such as political parties, but also the frequently important "positions" adopted by unorganized elements of the population, including positions of indifference, boredom, apathy, retreat due to fear of action, etc. The latter, in the case of enemy countries, are the very positions we might help exploit to our own advantage. In the case of friendly or allied countries, we should likewise need to know about them in order to change them.

Here, as throughout the outline, we are asking: How do these people act? How are these actions continued? If we want to maintain them (or change them), how do we do it? It would seem that the points or areas of dislocation and change, and what the various kinds of natives think about such changes, would be crucial to our objectives, because these would be the areas about which the natives are uncertain or insecure about their social system and therefore are likely to be susceptible to skillful leadership or suggestion.

V. Leaders and leadership.

A. Leadership in the organizational sense

Note: In previous sections dealing with specific social groups and structures, the questions have included requests for organization charts and explanations of the structure and functions

of groups and the positions in them, so that for the most important aggregates such questions as the following should already have been answered:

How is the leader selected? Who is included as a potential leader? Who is excluded as such? What kind of a person usually gets selected as the leader? What does it take to be "born a leader" (in certain structures where positions are inherited)? What does it take to become a leader; what are the qualifications and usual avenues of mobility? What does it take to hold onto leadership?

In this category the central question is:

What is the customary relative prestige of the leadership positions of the different structures? For example, how does the military leader usually "rate" in the larger society in comparison with the leaders in religious and political structures?

We also need to answer, in the organizational sense, the following:

Who is "in the Saddle" now? Who are "out"? What are the chances that a useful shakeup among the personnel of the elite might be brought about, or that a redistribution of power among the several structures might be effected? (These questions lead to those under B, below).

B. Particular individual leaders and aspirants

Who are the particular individuals "in the Saddle" now? What is the reputation of each among the various groups in the population?

What were their life careers -- how did they fit into or use the social system to get their present power? What are their strengths and weaknesses, that is, what have they done and what are they doing which pleases or offends the various groups in the population? Who are "the Outs"? Why are they "out"? What are their chances of getting back "In"?

VI. The individual in his society.

In this section the general questions to be answered are: "How is the individual's personality development influenced by his being a member of this society?" and "How do (or have) changes in the society influenced individual personality?" The first of these questions primarily concerns child development, while the latter more strictly relates to changes in the developed or adult personality. Evidence here will include biographical and life history materials. (N.B. of V, B in which similar problems concerning leaders are considered.)

A. The child in the culture

1. What are the taboos and restrictions imposed on free behavior development? For example, place in family group, "Children seen and not heard"; or the taboos or permission on sex behavior). The problem of how group traditions are transmitted to the children is included in II, B and C; III. Here the interest is in the individual's responses to, or within, the group structure previously described.
2. What are the common personality characteristics found in different groups at each sex-age level? What sort of behavior is considered problem behavior?

B. Culture changes and adult personality

The adults of the region have been subjected to certain social influences which have been factors in their personality development. What are the effects of changes in the society (especially recent social changes, cf. IV) on the personality and behavior. Such effects in personality may be evidenced by, e.g.,

1. Increased aggressive behavior -- generalized or toward special groups.
2. Increased docility (possibly surface acceptance concealing antagonistic attitudes).
3. Anti-social behavior patterns, crime, delinquency, suicide, etc.
4. Personal aberrations as shown in psychoneuroses and psychoses.

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